The Irish convention and Sinn Fein : in continuation of "A history of the Irish rebellion of 1916"

•

LlBRIS
BERTRAM C.A WINDLE" K'. K S.G FRS F.S.A

THE

IRISH CONVENTION

AND

SINN FEIN

s

THE

IRISH CONVENTION

AND

SINN FEIN

IN CONTINUATION OF " A HISTORY OF THE
IRISH REBELLION OF 1916 "

BY

WARRE B. WELLS & N. MARLOWE

MAUNSEL & COMPANY, LIMITED
DUBLIN AND LONDON

1918

Printed by John Falconer, Dublin.

PREFATORY NOTE

THIS book is written in continuation of "A"
History of the Irish Rebellion of 1916," by the
same authors. In it, as in its predecessor, their
attitude is, to the best of their capacity for politi-
cal detachment, purely historical. They endeavour
" to exhibit, not to criticise, conflicting tendencies
in present-day Ireland. Their especial purpose is
to place the work of the Irish Convention in its due
relation to contemporary events in Irish history.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION.

PAGE

Ireland after the Rebellion — The Growth of Sinn Fein— The
'Military Aspect — Nationalist Party's Position— f-The Con-
scription Question — Mr. Redmond's New Policy — The
Dublin Police Incident — Ireland and the New Govern-
ment—Release of Interned Prisoners — Convention Policy
versus Sinn Fein Policy — The Irish Conference Committee
— North Roscommon Election — Arrests in Ireland —
Nationalist Manifesto to America — The First Sinn Fein
Convention — South Longford Election — The Convention
Scheme — Its Reception in Ireland — Constitution of the
Convention — Major Redmond's Death — The General
Amnesty — First Meeting of the Convention. 1

CHAPTER II.
SINN FEIN POLICY.

The East Clare Election — Mr. de Valera's Ascendency — The
Intervention of Mr. Austin Harrison — Hunger Strikes —
The Death op- Thomas Ashe — Attitude of the Government
—Clericalism and Sinn Fein — The " Hidden Hand " —
The Sinn Fein Convention — Constitution of the Movement
— Its Aims and Programme — Sinn Fein and Labour — The
Peace Conference Policy — Its Theoretical Basis — Its
Practical Possibilities — Sinn Fein and the Food Supply —
Raids for Arms — The South Armagh Election — Sinn Fein
and America — A Success for the Parliamentary Party. 60
i

CHAPTER III.
THE CONVENTION.

Its Representative Claims — Personal Notes on the Delegates —
Mr. Redmond, Sir Horace Plunkett, and " M " — The
Ulster Unionist Delegates — Labour Members — Local

CONTENTS

PAGE

Representatives — The Southern Unionists — Churchmen
and Statesmen — The Nominated Members — Mr. Murphy's
Position — Full Last of Delegates — The Secretariat — Pro-
ceedings of the Convention — Its Secrecy — Preliminary
Procedure — Grand Committee Appointed — Visits to Belfast
and Cork — Reference to Grand Committee — The Midleton
Compromise — Resumed Sittings of Full Convention — The
Deadlock — Mr. Lysaght's Resignation — Sir Edward
Carson's Position — Intervention of the Government —
America and the Convention — Delegation to the Cabinet —
Mr. Dillon and Sinn Fein — "Bolshevism" in Ireland —
Proclamation of Clare — Reassembly of Convention. 83

CHAPTER IV.
THE REPORT AND AFTER.

Death of Mr. Redmond — The Southern Unionist " Cave "~
Waterford Election — Drafting of Convention's Report —
A Remarkable Coincidence — Conscription for Ireland —
Convention's Report Presented to the Government — The
Prime Minister and Ireland— The Report of the Conven-
iion— Ulster and Finance — The Chairman's Letter of
Transmission — Ireland and Conscription — Organisation of
Resistance — The Dublin Mansion House Conference —
Action of the Hierarchy — The Pledge against Conscription
— Nationalist Party's Abstension Policy — The General
Strike — Reaction on Home Rule Proposal — " No Popery "
— Sir Edward Carson's Veto — The Wreck of the Conven-
tion— Changes in Irish Executive — Sir Horace Plunkett's
Appeal — The End of a Chapter. 121

•-?

«

THE

IRISH CONVENTION

AND

; | SINN FEIN ' >

CHAPTER I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE IRISH CONVENTION

WE ended our "History of the Irish Rebellion of
1916 " with the question — " Would the influence
of the Rebellion produce, in spite of the failure
of the first impulse in that direction, a secure
and lasting Irish settlement? Or else— ? ''
That History was brought to a temporary close
with the date of July 28th, 1916, the date on which
Mr. Asquith, in the House of Commons, announced
the final failure of Mr. Lloyd George's attempt to
negotiate a settlement on the basis of the policy
known in Ireland as " Partition " —the exclusion
of the six counties of Ulster from the Home Rule
Acjb of 1914. The present book continues the
political history of Ireland from that point down
to the issue of its report by the Irish Convention
entrusted in the summer of 1917 with the task of
endeavouring to find an answer to the question
with which our earlier volume closed.

Sir Horace Plunkett played so important a part
in the main event described in this book that we
may suitably begin it by quoting his compact
account of the political situation as it existed in
the summer of 1916. The future chairman of the

ii.

2 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Convention had strongly opposed the partition
scheme and had proposed as an alternative that the
Irish Government should be put " into commis-
sion " —its administration to be placed in the hands
of an Executive Council, consisting of Irishmen
of recognised standing, drawn from different parts
of Ireland, and fairly representative of the main
interests and currents of opinion in the country,
while any Irish legislation which was necessary
would remain in the Imperial Parliament, where
it would be looked after by the Irish represent-
atives. In urging this proposal, which was not
adopted, against the partition scheme, Sir Horace
Plunkett wrote in a public letter in June,
1916 : — " The present state of the Irish question
must make the angels weep, though they
may indulge in an occasional laugh at the anom-
alies with which the tragedy is relieved. The Irish
Government has been swept away by a Rebellion
made in Germany, with which country Ireland is
at war. Downing Street and Dublin Castle were
equally surprised by events elaborately planned in
New York and Berlin. Home Rule has been placed
on the Statute Book to please the " South and
West " ; its operation was suspended for fear of
stirring up trouble in Ulster. The North, where
armed opposition to Parliament, one of the chief
causes of the Rebellion, originated, remained quiet ;
in no Southern constituency affected had its repre-
sentatives in Parliament any knowledge of, or
responsibility for, the rising. So, while Home
Rule is the law of the land for North and South
alike, both are under Martial Law."

Attempting to set out briefly and clearly the
main facts of the situation with which Mr. Lloyd
George had to deal, Sir Horace Plunkett pro-
ceeded : — " Ireland is quiet at the moment, but the
military executions and deportations have widened
and deepened the influence of Sinn Fein. A

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 3

Rebellion, which was condemned at the time of its
action, has set in in favour of the promoters of the
occurrence by ninety per cent, of the Nationalists.
The opposition to the Parliamentary Party is
increasing steadily in Ireland, and might take tne
form of a dangerous revolt against Constitutional
methods. In the United States, we are told in the
Press, the German-Irish alliance is trying to use
Irish unrest for the purpose of stopping the export
of munitions to the Allies. The enemies both of
tne British Government and of the Irish Parlia-
mentary Party are proclaiming that Ireland is
again going to be tricked out of Home Rule, that
tne ±±ct on the Statute Book is a mere invoice, and
that there is no intention of delivering the goods.
And then there is Ulster, where Sir Edward
Carson's followers, who two years ago threatened
Civil War rather than submit to the will of Parlia-
ment, feel that their attitude has been justified by
the Rebellion, and are determined that, at any rate,
so far as the six wealthiest and most progressive
counties of their province are concerned, the goods
shall not be delivered." In these circumstances
Sir Horace Plunkett described the task with which
Mr. Lloyd George found himself confronted as a
three-fold task. " He had to dispel once and for
all any doubt there may be as to the good faith of
the Government in the matter of Home Rule, to
put an end to the possibility of Civil War, and to
improve the chances of a satisfactory final settle-
ment of the Irish Question after the war." In
that task Mr. Lloyd George failed, and no serious
attempt to fulfil it was made for a full year after-
wards. Sir Horace Plunkett's description, however,
may be permitted to stand as a tolerably faithful
estimate in the political situation in Ireland in the
summer of 1916, after the failure of the first
attempt at settlement which immediately followed
the Rebellion.

4 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Superficially nothing was changed. The form
of Castle Government, which Mr. Asquith had
described as finally discredited, was completely
restored. To general surprise Lord Wimborne had
been reappointed Lord Lieutenant. Mr. Birrell
was succeeded as Chief Secretary by Mr. Duke, the
Unionist member for Exeter, about whom little
was known except that his desire for settlement
was sincere ; and Irish politicians were sympathetic
towards him at the outset of his difficult career.
Ilie country remained under Martial Law, and the
military authority was invested with greater re-
sponsibility than the civil. Sir John Maxwell, who
had suppressed the Rebellion with an iron hand,
was retained as Commander-in- Chief of the Forces
in Ireland. A popular demand for his removal
had sprung up immediately after the suppression
of the Rebellion, and continued in gathering
volume. This demand was not met until the follow-
ing November, when he was succeeded by Sir
Bryan Mahon, an Irish General who had com-
manded the Irish Division in Gallipoli; but as a
concession to the Nationalist Party Lord Lans-
downe announced in the House of Lords on July
12th that Sir Neville Chamberlain, who had asked
to be relieved of his duties, was about to be suc-
ceeded as Inspector- General of the Royal Irish
Constabulary by " a gallant officer whose record
inspires us with confidence, and who will, we be-
lieve, be regarded favourably by all political
parties in Ireland." This officer proved to be
Brigadier- General John Aloysius Byrne. The
duties of administering the restraints imposed
under Martial Law devolved, of course, more in-
timately upon the Constabulary than upon the
Military, and the Government apparently im-
agined that its administration would be less
unacceptable in the hands of an Inspector-General
who was an Irishman and a Roman Catholic.

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 5

By this time, however, public feeling in Nation-
alist Ireland had passed into a condition in which
the question of the personnel of administration
was of little practical consequence. In all her
history Ireland has seen no more remarkable re-
vulsion of political opinion than that which
followed the Rebellion of 1916. The Rebellion
occurred at a moment when the first fine careless
rapture of Nationalist Ireland's emotional war
interest was wholly spent, and the country was in
a state of reaction to war — weariness and disillu-
sion. It was in this atmosphere that the disaffection
which issued in the Rebellion came to a head.
But, though strategically the Rebellion was
serious, politically it was, in itself, trivial. It was
not, except indirectly and remotely, a product of
the political philosophy known before its occur-
rence as Sinn Fein. That political philosophy
made its limited appeal first to a small company of
writers and scholars, and next to some extent to
the smaller bourgeoisie of the cities. Sinn Fein
nationalism was doctrinaire; it could not acquire
the character of agitation. The Rebellion of 1916,
on the other hand, had behind it the driving force
of economic misery, together with that strong
emotional nationalism which has always been a
characteristic of the very poor in Irish cities.
It was primarily and essentially a revolt of the
Dublin slums, using as its military instrument
the Citizen Army, founded by James Larkin
during the great strike of 1912 — a revolt of
the Dublin slums in alliance with the neo-
Fenianism surviving in the secret society known
as the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and
using as its military instrument the Irish Volun-
teers. The Rebellion, then, was not in any exact
definition of the term Sinn Fein, and the political
philosophy which bore that name was before it of
only moderate consequence in Irish life. The

6 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Rebellion failed so completely and so early for the
precise reason, very largely, that the great mass of
the Irish people did not approve of it, and had not
been consulted about it; a majority condemned
Pearse and Connolly as impractical visionaries.
Nevertheless, a very short time after the outbreak
Sinn Fein was a potent force in Ireland, and a
very large part, perhaps a majority, of the Irish
people gloried in avowing themselves Sinn Fein.

A political phenomenon so remarkable, and
destined to exert such a large influence in the
development of political events in Ireland, is
worthy of something more than superficial
study. " The truth is," wrote Mr. James Stephens
on the morrow of the rising, " that Ireland is not
cowed. She is excited a little. She is gay a little.
She was not with the Rebellion, but in a few weeks
she will be, and her heart, which was withering,
will be warmed by the knowledge that men have

thought her worth dying for If freedom

is to come to Ireland, as I believe it is, then the
Easter Insurrection was the only thing which could
have happened. I write as an Irishman, and am
momentarily leaving out of account every other
consideration. If, after all her striving, freedom
had come to her as a gift, as a peaceful present
such as is sometimes given away with a pound of
tea, Ireland would have accepted the gift with
shamefacedness, and have felt that her centuries
of revolt had ended in something very like ridicule.
The blood of brave men had to sanctify such a
consummation if the national imagination was to
be stirred to the dreadful business which is the
organising of freedom. . . . Following on such
tameness, failure might have been predicted, or at
least feared, and war (let us call it war for the
sake of our pride) was due to Ireland before she
could enter gallantly into her inheritance. We
might have crept into liberty like some domestic-

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 7

ated man, whereas now we may be allowed to march
into freedom with the honours of war . . . ."
It follows necessarily from her history that the
popular historical heroes of Nationalist Ireland
after the semi-legendary figures of bardic times,
and those first opponents of foreign invasion such
as Brian Boroimhe, are the men who have resisted
in arms the domination of England — who are, in
other words, " rebels." Art McMurrough Kavanagb,
who waged successful war against Richard II. ; the
long line of Geraldines from Garrett in the time of
the Tudors to Lord Edward; the O'Neills and
O'Donnells of Ulster, whose century of intermittent
rebellion culminated in the flight of the " wild
geese " at the beginning of the seventeenth century,
to be renewed half a century later ; Sarsfield in the
war of William and James (who ranks as a
" rebel " in English history) ; Wolfe Tone and the
Emmets a hundred years later; Mitchel, Smith
O'Brien, Meagher and the other " Young Ire-
landers " of 1848 ; James Stephens and the Fenian
leaders of 1867 — these are the national heroes of
Ireland. The more recent change in the political
struggle between Ireland and Great Britain from
the sphere of physical force to constitutional action
had not effected their memory. Nationalist Ireland
has never admitted the validity of the claim that,
as an essential article of any treaty of political
peace with England, as an earnest of her loyalty
to the British connexion, she should make, as it
were, a formal act of self-humiliation, a formal
repudiation of her history of rebellions and of her
famous rebels. " She may enter the Council of
Empire," wrote Kettle, " provided that she enters
on her knees and leaves her history outside as a
shameful burden. This is not a demand that can
be conceded, or that men make on men . . .
In days rougher than ours, when a blind and
tyrannous England sought to drown the national

8 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

faith of Ireland in a sea of blood, there arose
among our fathers men who annulled that design.
We cannot undertake to cancel the names of these
men from our calendar. We are no more ashamed
of them than the constitutional England of modern
times is ashamed of her Langtons and De Monte-
forts, her Sydneys and her Hampdens." With
that tradition behind them the men of 1916 must
in any case have commanded, whether their action
was justified or not justified, approved by the great
mass of the Irish people or not approved, a
natural place in the popular imagination in the
illustrious succession of Ireland's historic " rebels."
That appeal to tradition, to sentiment, must in any
circumstances have been potent.

" Ireland was not with the Rebellion, but in a
few weeks she will be." Mr. James Stephens 's
words were written before the immediate sequel to
the Rebellion. It was, in fact, a matter not of a
few months, but of a few, and a very few, days.
The events of those few days made a great part of
Nationalist Ireland " with the Rebellion," with a
swiftness, and to a degree, which, before they took
place, no man in Ireland could have contemplated.
The men of 1916, it has been said, must in any case
have taken a natural place in the popular imagina-
tion in the illustrious succession of Ireland's
historic " rebels." The exaction from them of the
extreme penalty for their offence at once invoked,
and invested their persons with, all the ancient
memories for which that succession stood. It re-
placed in a moment an appeal to reason with an
irresistible appeal to sentiment. The justice, or
even the expediency, of the execution of the rebel
leaders, the sentences of penal servitude, the whole-
sale arrests and deportations, announced day after
day without publication of the evidence which
justified the infliction of the capital penalty, from
behind the closed doors of Field Courts-Martial,

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 9

are matters of controversy with which this
historical record is not concerned. Their effect
on a great mass of Irish opinion, which read of
them, as a commentator entirely unsympathetic
with the Rebellion wrote at the time, " with some-
thing of the feeling of helpless rage with which
one would watch a stream of blood dripping from
under a closed door," is a matter of historical fact.
To this mass of Irish opinion, as an immediate re-
sult of them, the memory of the thousands of Irish
soldiers who had died in the face of the enemy in
France and Flanders, in Gallipoli and Macedonia,
suddenly became less real and vital than the
memory of the dozen rebels who died at the hands
of British firing parties in the barrack yards of
Dublin. From that moment the old and deep but
iiitherto submerged emotions resumed full sway
of the national imagination and jostled out the
novel and superficial emotions induced by the
war and Ireland's earlier participation in it.
All the past history of Nationalist Ireland recoiled
upon her ; a large part of her people were suddenly
back in the ancient fierce mood of quarrel with
England.

Two circumstances tended to confirm this mood
induced by the aftermath of the Rebellion. One
was the renewed agitation which sprang up
immediately after its suppression for the applica-
tion of conscription to Ireland. The opposition
to conscription, deriving in part from the re-
pugnance of Irishmen to compulsion in any form,
in part from the fact that the conception of the
war as " Ireland's war," as the phrase went, had
never struck any deep roots in the country, in part
from the view that Ireland with a declining
population could not economically afford the drain
of manhood involved, but deriving chiefly from the
belief that the principle of nationality was vitally
involved in the question, and that acceptance of it

I

10 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

would fatally compromise the Irish national claim
—this opposition was now confirmed by the fact
that the Rebellion was partly inspired by the
belief that the application of conscription wras
imminent, so that the memory of the dead remained
a continuing inspiration to resist it. The other
circumstance was the Nationalist Parliamentary
Party's acceptance of the principle of " partition "
in the abortive negotiations for a settlement in the
summer of 1916. Sir Horace Plunkett, at this
time, expressed himself as fearing, " that the
Government, relying on their knowledge of British
public opinion and of the Parliamentary situation,
would find that they had wholly misjudged the
feelings of the Irish people, and that their pro-
posal for setting up a government without consult-
ing the Irish electorate would arouse an opposition
which would drive tens of thousands of moderate
men into the Sinn Fein camp."

These considerations serve to explain the extra-
ordinary revulsion of popular feeling which swept
over the country after the Rebellion in the early
summer of 1916. The fact that, though the
Rebellion in its origin was only indirectly and
remotely Sinn Fein, this revulsion of feeling
associated itself with that political theory is easily
intelligible. The actual authors of the Rebellion
were dead or imprisoned; the Citizen Army and
the Irish Volunteers were disbanded and their
organisations suppressed; the moving spirits of
the Irish Republican Brotherhood had retired into
their mysterious obscurity. These rallying points
for the new and vastly swollen disaffection were
gone; but the outbreak had become loosely associ-
ated in the public mind with Sinn Fein; the Sinn
Fein idea was " in the air " ; and the revulsion of
popular feeling naturally grouped itself about it.
From this point then, rather than from anything
antecedent to the Rebellion, or even from the

Rebellion itself, we may trace the emergence of a
new and incalculable factor in the political life of
Ireland. In the period immediately after the
Rebellion, and during the remainder of the year
1916, Sinn Fein was scarcely more than an
emotion, a sentiment, an " atmosphere," a stream
of tendency not yet canalised in a policy. It was a
latent potentiality rather than a concrete actuality.
One was conscious of a novel presence in Irish
thought, oppressive, pervasive, but impalpable.

There was in this period no exact measure of
estimation of its influence, or even of its scope,
though it was apparent that it was widely diffused.
Incidents there were as straws in the wind — most
significant, perhaps, the election in August by the
Gaelic League, which was in no sense directly
implicated in the Rebellion, of its new President
in the person of Professor Eoin (John) MaciNeiil,
who was at the time serving a life sentence for
alleged complicity in the rising. Of overt " mani-
festations " of the new spirit of revolt there was
none of any consequence. The widespread wear-
ing of Republican badges; a certain, at first dis-
creet, popularity of Sinn Fein songs, an occasional
appearance of the tricolour in the streets of Dublin
and other towns; a few trivial street disturbances
— these were all the indices apparent. More
there could not have been. The hand of Sir John
Maxwell lay heavy upon the country. The rigours
of Martial Law, gradually dwindling later into
almost complete disuse, were at first stern and com-
prehensive. Assembly and procession were for-
bidden.

Certainly to the close of 1916 Sinn Fein, what-
ever else it might mean, meant no challenge. to the
security of the military position from the Govern-
ment's point of view. " We shall certainly admit
to the full," said Lord Lansdowne on behalf of the
Government in the House of Lords on July 12th,

12 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

" the obligation which lies upon us to prevent a
recurrence of these deplorable incidents, and we
shall address ourselves to the task without shrink-
ing from it ... Under the system which exists
at the moment there ought not to be much fear of
the situation in Ireland getting out of hand. We
have Sir John Maxwell responsible, with some
40,000 troops to support him, and with the control
of the Constabulary in his hands. We have un-
abated confidence in Sir John Maxwell, and shall
give him all the support to which he is entitled.
The powers which he is exercising, and which were
conferred upon him by the Defence of the Realm
Regulations, are powers which we are prepared
to extend, if necessary, to meet any emergency
which may arise . . . The Prime Minister has
already stated that he quite admitted that the
present condition of the country requires the
utmost vigilance on the part of the Imperial
Government. For a time there was a rapid
increase in the numbers of the Sinn Fein
organisation, but that increase has dwindled of
late. Although there have been disquieting symp-
toms they are less disquieting now, and the reports
show that there has been some improvement in that
respect. What is noteworthy is that there appears
to be hardly any ordinary crime in the country.
Lord Peel has suggested that our first duty
is to govern Ireland, and to end if we could
the mischief that has arisen during the past few
years. We have taken some steps already with
that object, and we certainly will not hesitate to
take further steps if they are necessary for the
purpose."

The Nationalist Parliamentary Party's position
after the abortive negotiations for a settlement
was one of great delicacy, difficulty and com-
plexity. On the one hand it was anxious to avoid
any extreme policy which would alienate British

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 13

sympathy. On the other hand, with its position in
the country seriously undermined by the after-
math of the Rebellion, it was impelled to adopt a
strong policy more or less sympathetic with the
Sinn Fein point of view, but with the uneasy
knowledge that such a policy, in so far as it con-
tributed towards giving greater freedom to the
new movement, was more likely to strengthen the
hands of Sinn Fein than to improve its own position
in the country. In the House of Commons on July
31st, three days after Mr. Asquith had announced
that the Government did not intend to proceed
with the abortive " partition " scheme of settle-
ment, Mr. John Dillon moved a resolution to the
effect "that, in view of the announcement by the
Government that they do not intend to introduce
their long-promised Bill to settle the government
of Ireland, it is vitally necessary and urgent that
the Government should disclose to the House their
plans for the future government of Ireland during
the continuation of the war." In the course of his
speech Mr. Dillon declared that " it was an absolute
fact that Sir John Maxwell and the present
system of Government acted as better organisers
of disaffection than the organisers of the Sinn Fein
movement." His speech was chiefly notable in that
it contained the first hint of the " Peace Con-
ference " policy afterwards adopted by Sinn Fein.
Mr. Dillon asked : — " When the Government of
this country and their Allies come to consider the
settlement of the terms of peace on the principle
of justice to all small and oppressed nationalities,
how could the claim of Ireland be overlooked ? ):

In his reply to Mr. Dillon, Mr. Asquith sub-
mitted that, despite the failure of the negotiations,
" a new situation in the history of the Irish ques-
tion had been created, a situation which was a
milestone on the road, and from which they could
never go back to the old positions of irreconcilable

14 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

hostility and recrimination." He then, declaring
that " from their (the Government's) point of view
the present was a transitional period, of probably
short duration, and they did not think it desirable
at such a time to make new experiments," an-
nounced the appointment of Mr. Duke as Chief
Secretary and of Sir Robert Chalmers as Under-
secretary.* ' They could not leave Ireland without
a civil Executive, and he trusted the arrangement
he proposed would conduce to the permanent
settlement which everybody in Ireland hoped
and desired." Mr. John Redmond, after express-
ing his feeling that what had happened made a
peaceful settlement in the end absolutely certain,
denned the Nationalist Party's attitude. "After
a few months of chaos in the Government of Ire-
land, the right hon. gentleman proposed as a
remedy merely the setting up of Dublin Castle
again, with the machinery which he himself
had said had broken down. To do this was a very
serious thing. His proposal for all practical pur-
poses was to set up a Unionist Executive in Ire-
land. . . . He (Mr. Redmond) must, in the name
of his colleagues, and in his own name, protest
against any such proposal. This was clear — under
this proposal the Government were taking on their
own shoulders full and open responsibility. Nobody
could say that the Nationalists had any respon-
sibility in the matter. It left their hands clear.
It was done in spite of their earnest protests, and
made it their plain duty, once this Executive was
set up, to watch and criticise and oppose the new
administration how and when and where they
pleased." In conclusion, Mr. Redmond affirmed
that " in the course of this controversy he had not
for one moment forgotten the war. Notwithstand-
ing all that had happened, nothing would have the

* Sir Robert Chalmers was later succeeded as Under-Secretary by Sir
William Byrne.

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 15

effect of altering his view about the war and Ire-
land's duty towards the war. He had declared
everywhere in Ireland that this was so." On the
following day, at a meeting at the House of
Commons, the Nationalist Party passed a resolu-
tion to the effect " that we strongly protest against
the action of the Government in reviving the dis-
credited system of Dublin Castle rule, already con-
demned on all sides, and condemned especially by
the Hardinge Commission, and by the Prime
Minister himself, and that in our opinion the
appointment at this moment of a Unionist
Executive to carry on this system is an outrage on
the feelings of the Irish people."

During the Parliamentary Recess the chief
subject of agitation in Ireland was that of conscrip-
tion. On September 28th the Freeman's Journal,
the official organ of the Nationalist Party, defined
the conditions under which voluntary recruiting
could receive another chance in Ireland. They
were as follows : — " (1) Conscription must never
be introduced in Ireland without Ireland's con-
sent. (2) The abolition of Martial Law. (3) The
dismissal of Sir John Maxwell. (4) The with-
drawal of the Coalition System from Ireland.
(5) No further ' harassing ' of Irishmen tempor-
arily resident in England. (6) Resumption of the
work of preparing the Orders in Council for bring-
ing the Home Rule Act into operation. (7) No
imprisonment of Irishmen without trial. (8) The
treatment of Irish Rebellion prisoners as political
prisoners. (9) The Home Rule Act must provide
for the 'ultimate integrity' of Ireland." The
Freeman said that the observance of these condi-
tions by the British Government would revive
voluntary recruiting in Ireland. On October 9th,
in a speech at a municipal banquet in Dublin, the
Lord Lieutenant estimated that the number of men
of military service who were eligible and could be
spared was, in round numbers, 150,000. He went

16 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

on to say that the Irish Divisions needed 40,000
men before Christmas, " and I venture to suggest
that there is an immediate duty and obligation
which rests upon Ireland with regard to her con-
tribution, which is to keep up the lighting strength
of the Divisions which have won such laurels and
such fame." He added that " although I have con-
templated, I have never advocated " compulsion
in Ireland ; that National Service in any community
was not practicable without a measure of general
assent; that there was no such measure of consent
in Ireland at the present time, but that "I see no
reason why anybody should despair of bringing
home to the Irish democracy the overwhelming logic
of the facts which confront us." Lord Derby subse-
quently announced in the House of Lords that from
the date of the Rebellion to the middle of October
eight thousand five hundred men had enlisted in
Ireland, of whom three thousand five hundred were
Ulstermen.

On October 6th Mr. Redmond, at the Town Hall,
Waterf ord, made his first appearance at a political
gathering in Ireland since the Rebellion. There
was much speculation as to the nature of his re-
ception and the tone of his speech. His arrival at
tne hall was preceded by a small disturbance by
some Sinn Feiners, but his reception was cordial.
The tone of his speech was markedly harsher than
that of his earlier utterances in Parliament. He
devoted much of it to the conscription question
and announced that " on all else besides the war we
must go into open and vigorous opposition." He
said that the first fact they must look in the face
was that a bad blow was struck at the hopes of Ire-
land by the rising in Dublin, engineered by men
who were enemies of the constitutional movement
for Home Rule. The real responsibilty rested on
tne British Government, and it was idle to imagine
that the relations between Ireland and the Govern-
ment could continue as they had been before. Since

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 17

the war commenced the conduct of the Government
towards this country was marked by the most
colossal ineptitude, want of sympathy, and
stupidity, so much so that their conduct would, he
believed, have chilled the confidence of any people,
much less a people like Ireland, whose history had
taught them how dangerous it was to trus^ the
English statesmen; and finally they suppressed
the recent rising with gross and panicky violence,
and they closed, he was sorry to say, their ears to
the plea for clemency. Now they had recon-
stituted Dublin Castle. Ireland was living
under a Tory Unionist Executive. Dublin Castle
was once again a Unionist stronghold, and
Martial Law was in existence in every part of the
country. " And finally," continued Mr. Redmond,
" let me remind you that every day the Unionist
forces in Great Britain and Ireland are observing
what is called by a singular irony the political
truce by doing all they know, by taunts, incite-
ments and threats of conscription, to revive once
more the old racial distrust and passions of the two
peoples. With such a Government with such a
record the Irish Nationalist representatives can
have no relations but those of vigorous opposition."
Having declared that Ireland's attitude so far as
the war was concerned was unchanged, that the
Nationalist Party would " do nothing calculated
to postpone by a single instant the victorious end
of this conflict," and that " I do think it would
be a disgrace to Ireland if the Irishmen fighting at
the front were left in the lurch, and if Ireland did
not go to their assistance," Mr. Redmond pro-
ceeded to deal at length with conscription. He
refused to believe that " malign though are the
influences that are at work, the Government will be
insane enough — there is no other phrase which
would fit the intention — to challenge a conflict with
Ireland on this matter. Conscription in Ireland,

B

18 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

so far from helping the Army and forwarding the
interests of the war, would be the most fatal thing
that could happen. It would be resisted in every
village in Ireland. The attempted enforcement
would be a scandal which would ring round the
whole civilised world. It would produce no
additional men; in fact, the mere threat of con-
scription has to a large extent paralysed voluntary
recruiting." Mr. Redmond concluded : — " Now,
I say this in all good faith to the Government and
the military authorities : the way to continue to
get recruits is far different. Appease the inflamed
feelings of the Irish people, withdraw Martial
Law, make it plain that the Defence of the Realm
Act is to be administered in Ireland in the same
spirit as it is in Great Britain, treat the prisoners
of this unfortunate rising as political prisoners,
put a stop to the insults and attacks upon Ireland,
and recognise generously and chivalrously all she
has done. On these lines the Government will
succeed in recruiting even after all that has
happened; but as for conscription, that way lies
madness, ruin, and disa'ster."

The new policy denned by Mr. Redmond at
Waterf ord was at once put into practice in Parlia-
ment, where the Nationalist Party gave notice of
the following resolution, and asked for the earliest
possible day for its discussion : — " That the
system of government at present maintained in
Ireland is inconsistent with the principles for
which the Allies are fighting in Europe, and is,
or has been, mainly responsible for the recent un-
happy events, and for the present state of feeling
in that country." The meeting also adopted a
resolution " that the time has come when all the
untried prisoners detained in connection with the
Irish Insurrection should be released, and that all
the Irish prisoners convicted of complicity in that
Insurrection should, in accordance with the

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 19

modern practice of civilised States, be treated as
political prisoners." The first resolution was moved
by Mr. Redmond on October 25th; and Mr. Duke in
his reply, declared that anyone who knew the
conditions in the West of Ireland must be con-
vinced of the necessity of putting some restraint
on sympathisers with the late Rebellion. The
obstacle to granting Home Rule, he proceeded,
was that Irishmen themselves were not agreed
upon it. The difficulty in ending Irish grievances
lay in Ireland herself. As soon as it was safely
possible, and not till then, restrictive measures
would be removed.

An incident which occurred in Dublin about
this time was generally associated with the
Nationalist Party's new policy of " open and
vigorous opposition " to the Government. An
agitation had sprung up in the ranks of the Dublin
Metropolitan Police for increased pay and other
improvements in their position. On October 31st,
in moving the money resolution for a Bill designed
to remedy their grievances, Mr. Duke referred .to
" the conditions which had existed in Dublin
during the last few days. Two matters," he said,
" had come into great prominence. One was the
holding of meetings of the police, convened by
people outside, and directed by people outside, for
the purpose of using the condition of the police
as an instrument of pressure on the Government.
Such meetings are held contrary to the regulations
of the force." The second matter was the enrolment
of a considerable body of the police in the Ancient
Order of Hibernians — the sectarian and semi-
secret " Friendly Society " organised by Mr.
Devlin. The police oath forbade membership in
any such society, with the exception of the Society
of Freemasons. A week later the Chief Secretary,
having investigated the situation more fully, said
there had been breaches of discipline, but expressed

20 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

himself as reluctant to believe that any large body
of the police had, in fact, joined the Hibernians.
The risk, he said, was that a body of men would
run away from their discipline, and would have to
be displaced. He did not fear that situation was
going to arise, unless the Dublin Police were egged
on and incited, and provoked to do something
which he did not conceive they had ever enter-
tained. Discipline must be maintained, but the
road would be easy for every man who had not
committed an offence which it was impossible not
to punish to do his duty. Finally disciplinary
action was taken against a few of the leaders of
the movement in the police; at the same time the
oath of service was deprived of its exemption in
favour of the Freemasons. The Irish Unionist
papers demanded urgently that Mr. Duke should
also take action against the civilian agitators who
had tampered in war time with the discipline of
an armed force in the payment of the State; but
nothing more was heard of this aspect of the
trouble.

Apart from this incident nothing further of
importance occurred until near the end of 1916.
The fall of Mr. Asquith's Cabinet and the forma-
tion of Mr. Lloyd George's Government in Decem-
ber created great excitement in Ireland. The pre-
dominance of Unionist Ministers in the new
Administration suggested to Nationalists sinister
possibilities. Their apprehensions were expressed
in a series of resolutions adopted by the Parlia-
mentary Party on December 12th, of which the
first declared that " while the policy of this
Party in favour of the vigorous and successful
prosecution of the war remains unchanged, we
await the declaration of the Irish policy of the new
Government before deciding on our future attitude
towards it," the second that " so long as Ireland
is denied Self-Government, and is held under

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 21

Martial Law and hundreds of Irishmen are in
prison without trial, she must remain a source of
weakness and danger, instead of being, as she
admittedly would otherwise be, one of the most
powerful sources of strength to the Empire in this
crisis;" and the third renewed the "warning that
any attempt to enforce conscription in Ireland
would immediately produce disastrous and far-
reaching results, and would, in our judgment,
gravely interfere with the successful conduct of
the war," and that the Party would accordingly
resist "by every means in our power" any pro-
posal involving the application of conscription to
Ireland.

On December 19th, Mr. Lloyd George, in out-
lining the new Government's policy, made a brief
reference to Ireland. He said that " while he had
not yet been able to devote any time to the Irish
problem, he would consider a settlement as a war
measure of the first importance and a great victory
for the Allied cause." He added that he " still
felt that the solution of the Irish question was
largely one of a better understanding," and con-
cluded by saying that " we shall strive by all means,
and at many hazards, to produce that atmosphere ;
but we ask men of all races and all creeds to help
us, not to solve a political question, but to do
something that Would be a real contribution to the
winning of the war." Mr. Redmond afterwards
expressed his deep disappointment with the Prime
Minister's " vague and indefinite " references to
Ireland. He asked as a Christmas gift to the
Irish people that the Rebellion prisoners should be
released, and said that if the Government would
take its courage in its hands and make a general
jail delivery, it would be doing more to create a
better atmosphere and a better feeling than any-
thing else it could do. Mr. Redmond went on to
say that if the Government intended to deal with

22 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

the final reconciliation of Irish opinion by a settle-
ment of the Irish question there were two or three
things he would like to say. The first was that
time was of the essence of the matter. The worst
thing that could happen to the Irish question was
that it should be allowed to drift further. His
next point was that the Government should deal
with the question boldly on its own responsibility
and initiative. Mr. Redmond did not think any-
thing was to be gained by contemplating further
negotiations. Finally he declared that the Govern-
ment must not mix up this question with conditions
of recruiting or conscription, which must be left
to a change of heart in Ireland. In conclusion he
appealed to the Prime Minister " in Heaven's
name let him not miss the tide."

On the following day, December 20th, Mr.
Dillon renewed the Nationalist demand for the re-
lease of the interned Rebellion prisoners. It had
already been widely rumoured in Ireland that the
prisoners would be released before Christmas.
Some disturbance had meanwhile occurred at the
Frongoch Internment Camp, in North Wales,
owing, as the Nationalists alleged, to an attempt
to make some of the men turn informers, and dis-
ciplinary action had been taken by the camp
authorities. Mr. Duke, in his reply to Mr. Dillon,
explained that there were originally 3,000 arrests,
and went on to deplore the shootings and imprison-
ments under sentences of Courts-Martial. The
Chief Secretary proceeded to show that of those
arrested who had not been dealt with by
Courts-Martial, but merely interned without
trial, only 560 remained interned after the
sifting of the cases by an Advisory Committee.
In the cases of these men, he said, whom the
Committee were unable to advise the Govern-
ment to release, the door was locked on the
inside; they refused to give a required under-

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 23

taking not to engage in sedition during the con-
tinuance of the war. Mr. Duke denned his duty
in Ireland, as he conceived it, as that of taking
care that peace and order and a better atmosphere
—without which a settlement in Ireland would be
utterly impossible — should not be lightly disturbed
by any means against which he could take pre-
cautions. After travelling the districts affected
some two months before he concluded that the time
had not come when these men could be indiscrimi-
nately turned loose on the countryside in the West
of Ireland with any reasonable expectation that
their presence there would be consistent with
public safety. During the past two or three
months he thought there had been a steady im-
provement and appeasement in Ireland; but a
wholesale order of release, which would be irre-
vocable, could not be undertaken without making
sure of the ground; " it could not be done in this
airy way to improve the atmosphere, or to make a
pledge of conciliation and peace to Ireland/' After
this statement there was some surprise when the
prisoners were almost immediately released. They
reached Ireland in small parties, most of them on
Christmas Eve, and there was little demonstration
on their arrival. Among the released prisoners
was Mr. Arthur Griffith, the original founder of
the Sinn Fein philosophy. Their arrival was
followed by an announcement by Mr. John Dillon
in the Freeman's Journal that the Nationalist
Party next proposed to demand investigation of
the cases of those sentenced to penal servitude by
the Courts-Martial, with a view to the revision or
annulment of the sentences. Mr. Dillon expressed
his hope that the Government " would take the
bold and generous step of declaring a general
amnesty."

At the end of 1916, it may be said, the two con-
flicting tendencies which were to dominate Irish

24 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

politics during the following year had begun to dis-
close themselves. On the one hand the release of the
interned prisoners, in accordance with the Govern-
ment's new policy of creating an " atmosphere "
of appeasement, in fact laid the first foundations
for the growth of a militant Sinn Fein policy,
which was shortly to express itself as irreconcil-
ably opposed to a constitutional settlement. On
the other hand, the release of the prisoners was
by a few days anticipated by the first suggestion
of what, in contrast with the Sinn Fein policy,
may be called the Convention policy. Shortly be-
fore Christmas there appeared inconspicuously in
the Dublin newspapers, and with little more than
perfunctory notice in their editorial columns, a
circular issued by the " Irish Conference
Committee." In the formation of this body,
and the issue of its circular, which was addressed
to the Chairmen of the County Councils
and other public bodies in Ireland, the idea first
took coherent shape of an attempt to solve the
problem of Irish government by means of a Con-
ference based on the precedent of those which
secured the passage of the Wyndham Land Act,
and the establishment of the Department of Agri-
culture and Technical Instruction for Ireland.*

The circular issued by the Committee was signed
by Mr. Dermod O'Brien, President of the Royal
Hibernian Academy, and read as follows : — " Be-
lieving that all classes in Ireland are sincerely de-
sirous of finding a solution of the problem of Irish
government which will go as far as possible in re-
conciling divergent views, some gentlemen, whose
names I give below, have met in Dublin with the
object of considering whether a conference could,
with advantage, be called into being. These
gentlemen have elected me as Chairman, pro tern.,

* The " Recess Committee," preceding the latter, was presided over
by Sir Horace Plunkett.

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 25

and it is in this capacity that I am now addressing
you at their desire. Before the recent rising most
Irishmen, watching their country's heroism in the
field, and marking the spirit of comradeship which
was growing up between the men from Ulster and
from the rest of Ireland, had almost come to believe
that out of the supreme trials of many stricken
fields there would emerge some clue to a political
settlement after the war which all Irishmen would
accept. Over these prospects the Rebellion and
its consequences have thrown a cloud of disappoint-
ment. Yet, to many Irishmen, the cloud is not
without its silver lining, and we believe there
exists throughout Ireland a more widespread de-
sire than ever before to find some means of settling
our political differences. In our recent domestic
history we have striking examples of the success
which Irishmen in conference have achieved, not
only in preparing the way for legislation, but in
creating such an atmosphere of mutual helpful-
ness and good-will that difficulties, previously re-
garded as insoluble, have yielded to the treatment
which has led to far-reaching and beneficial re-
sults. Indeed, these circumstances appear to us to
impose on all leading Irishmen the obligation of
coming together and considering in friendly con-
ference what is the best and most generally
acceptable means of solving the problem that lies
before us. It is in this spirit that we ask youij
opinion as to the desirability of holding such a
conference. It need hardly be said that there is
no intention of going behind the recognised Parlia-
mentary leaders. It is believed, on the contrary,
that such a Conference, if brought together, could
not fail to strengthen the hands of those leaders,
and might bring about the settlement so univer-
sally desired."

The names appended to the circular were those
of Lord Monteagle, Lord MacDonnell, Walter
Kavanagh, Sir Algernon Coote, Sir Nugent

26 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Everard, Sir Gabriel Stokes, Captain Fitzroy
Hemphill, Diarmid Coffey, Major J. Crean,
James G. Douglas, Joseph Johnston, F.T.C.D. ;
T. Kennedy, Edward E. Lysaght, J. Creed
Meredith, George Russell (" & "), W. F. Trench,
and H. E. White (Secretary). Several of its
signatories were afterwards members of the Con-
vention, or of its secretariat. Despite its cavalier
treatment by the Irish Press the circular was, on
the whole, well received by the public opinion to
which it was addressed. For its generally favour-
able reception the patient and unobtrusive spade-
work in the interests of settlement which Mr. Duke
had performed during his frequent visits to Ire-
land was probably in a considerable degree re-
sponsible. To that work the Irish Conference
Committee lent a continuous assistance. The
importance of its influence, beginning with the
issue of its circular, in predisposing public
opinion to the idea of settlement by consent which
was later to fructify in the Convention can scarcely
be over-estimated.

It was to be some months, however, before the
Convention idea took formal shape. In the mean-
time the political history of Ireland is largely the
history of the growth and development of the
opposing Sinn Fein idea, which, by a reflex action,
was finally to become the most powerful contribu-
tory cause among the influences making for the
Convention policy. It soon became apparent after
the release of the interned prisoners that what may
be described as the sentiment, the emotion, of Sinn
Fein was gradually being canalised in a policy.
Mr. Arthur Griffith soon resumed the publication
of Nationality in advocacy of the practical
" Hungarian " plan of abstention from Parliament
and passive resistance to Imperial authority in
Ireland. Sinn Fein clubs began to appear up and
down the country, and there was evidence of wide-
spread propaganda and organisation work, on

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 27

political as distinct from the military lines on
which the Irish Volunteers had proceeded before
the Rebellion. The question of recruiting re-
mained in the foreground of Irish affairs during
this period. The Irish Unionist Party continued
to urge conscription. In January, 1917, the Irish
Canadian Rangers (Duchess of Connaught's Own)
Battalion on its way from Canada to the front was
brought to Ireland and toured the country in the
interests of voluntary recruiting; it was every-
where received, if without great enthusiasm in
some places, at least nowhere with overt hostility.
The introduction of the (voluntary) National Ser-
vice Bill, which applied to Ireland despite the pro-
tests of the Nationalist Party, was widely regarded
as the " thin end of the wedge," and increased
the tension in Ireland over the conscription
question. i

The first opportunity for Sinn Fein to show its
strength came early in 1917. A vacancy occurred
in the Parliamentary representation of North Ros-
common, and Count Plunkett, father of one of the
executed signatories of the Irish Republican Pro-
clamation of Easter, 1916, was put forward as
Sinn Fein candidate. His opponents were Mr.
T. J. Devine, a well-known local man, who stood as
the official Nationalist candidate, and was sup-
ported by the Parliamentary Party's organisa-
tions; and Mr. Jasper Tully, a local newspaper
owner, who stood as an Independent Nationalist.
The result of the poll was declared on February
5th. Count Plunkett headed it with 3,022 votes—
a clear majority over both of his opponents, of
whom Mr. Devine obtained 1,708 votes and Mr.
Tully 687. The result of the election came as 2
great surprise to the public, but it was not gener-
ally accepted as a true test of the strength of Sinn
Fein as an active force in Irish politics. The
election presented some curious features. It was

28 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

fought in deep snow, with drifts blocking the
roads and preventing the canvassing and polling
of many of the voters in the districts where the
chief strength of the Parliamentary Party was
supposed to lie. It was in this election that Sinn
Fein tendencies among the younger Roman
Catholic Priesthood first became apparent. The
main driving force behind Count Plunkett was the
Reverend Michael O' Flanagan, Curate of Crosna.
Father O'Flanagan had first come into public
notice at the great public funeral given to
O'Donovan Rossa, the Fenian, in Dublin, where
he delivered the Address. An eye-witness of the
election wrote of Father O'Flanagan that " for
twelve days and nights he was up and down the con-
stituency, going like a whirlwind and talking in
impassioned language to the people at every village
and street-corner and cross-roads where he could
get people to listen to him."

Father O'Flanagan was supported by men from
Dublin, Cork and Limerick, released only a few
weeks before from the internment camps in North
Wales. The burden of all his election speeches
was the same. He argued that conscription
would have been applied to Ireland the year before
but for the rising of Easter week. Count Plunkett's
son had been shot as one of the leaders of the
Rebellion, and two more of his sons were serving
Courts-Martial sentences of penal servitude. By
voting for Plunkett the men of North Roscommon
would be warding off conscription from Ireland.
In these circumstances it was argued that Count
Plunkett won North Roscommon on the anti-con-
scription cry together with his personal appeal to
popular sentiment, and that the election could not
be regarded as a positive endorsement of Sinn Fein
policy. This reading of the event, whatever its
validity at the time, and subsequent events seemed
largely to disprove it, was widely held immediately

after the election. Count Plunkett was given an
enthusiastic reception on his return to Dublin
after the declaration of the poll, and lost no time
in making his position clear. In his speech he
declared that Roscommon had struck a blow
against the false theory of national liberty, of
sending Irish representatives to a foreign Parlia-
ment. It would be necessary to carry on a system-
atic organisation from day to day until the whole
of Ireland's representatives were pledged to re-
main in Ireland — until Ireland had a body of re-
presentatives who were the virtual Parliament of a
free people. Count Plunkett, therefore, enjoyed the
distinction of being the first chosen representative
of the Sinn Fein creed of abstention and passive
resistance, which for years before the Rebellion
Mr. Arthur Griffith had preached in the
wilderness.

The excitement of his election had scarcely died
away when an event of a very different character
raised it to fever pitch. North Roscommon, what-
ever else it did not prove, had at least seemed to
show that Sinn Fein in its new development was
" constitutional/5 and that the physical force idea
had been discarded. Ait rfche end of February,
however, a number of arrests were suddenly made
in Dublin and throughout the provinces under
Regulation 53 of the Defence of the Realm Regula-
tions, which empowered the arrest of any person
" whose behaviour is of such a nature as to give
reasonable grounds for suspecting that he has
acted, or is acting, or about to act in a manner
prejudicial to the public safety or to\ the defence
of the realm/' The arrests were ordered by the
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in Ireland,
and the persons concerned — twenty-eight in all,
some of them lately interned, others hitherto un-
touched, including some prominent Gaelic
Leaguers — were prohibited from residing in Ire-

30 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

land and given free choice of their place of
residence in England. The arrests were under-
stood to be related to a renewed attempt to run
arms on the West Coast of Ireland, and to effect
a test mobilisation of the Irish Volunteers in con-
nection with it. Challenged to justify them in the
House of Commons by Mr. Dillon — who suggested
that they were a sign of a change of policy in
Ireland, and said that for the past year and a
half the Government had been manufacturing
Sinn Feiners by the ten thousand until it had
maddened the country, and the Nationalist Party
were between the devil and the deep sea — the Chief
Secretary declared that the action of the Executive
was taken with regret and was justified by absolute
necessity; some of these men were "up to the ears
in conspiracy." Mr. Duke refused to state the
facts within the knowledge of the Administration
which made the arrests necessary. He went on to
say that five-sixths of the men released from
Frongoch had gone back to their business and were
not engaged in any revolutionary action ; but there
was a minority — a considerable number — of men
who from the day the Christmas holidays were
over had devoted themselves to the endeavour to
revive and set in motion the conspiracy which had
such fatal results in Easter of last year. He
finished by declaring that " in face of all the facts
and in face of a ruthless, unscrupulous enemy,
who thought he had gained a triumph in April, and
who would countenance any sinister action, I as
Chief Secretary came to the conclusion and decided
that in this transaction, although there can be no
charge, and although there can be no trial, it was
essential for the public well-being that these men
should not continue to reside in Ireland while
things in Ireland are as they are."

The arrests apparently precipitated open conflict
between the Nationalist Party and the Govern-

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 31

ment. On March 7th Mr. T. P. O'Connor moved
a resolution to the effect " that, with a view to
strengthening the hands of the Allies in achieving
the recognition of the equal rights of small nations
and the principle of nationality against the
opposite German principle of military domination
and government without the consent of the
governed, it is essential, without further delay, to
confer on Ireland the free institutions long pro-
mised to her." Mr. Lloyd George, in his reply,
said " that the dominant consideration in any pre-
sent settlement must be its effect upon the conduct
of the war. There must be no attempt at settle-
ment which would provoke civil disturbance. The
Government were prepared to confer Self -Govern-
ment on those parts of Ireland which unmistak-
ably demanded it; but they were not prepared to
coerce the North-East portion of Ireland." He
moved an amendment welcoming any settlement
which would conduce to a better understanding
between Ireland and the rest of the United King-
dom, but declaring it impossible to impose by force
on any part of Ireland a form of government which
had not its consent. Mr. Redmond solemnly pro-
tested against the Prime Minister's statement. He
asked whether the Ulster minority were to have
power over the majority for 'ever. The Prime
Minister's statement, he said, would play right
into the hands of those who were trying to destroy
the Constitutional Movement. He agreed that the
condition of Ireland was very serious, that there
were able men in Ireland with command of money
who were bent on smashing the Constitutional
Movement. " If the Constitutional Movement in
Ireland disappears," declared Mr. Redmond, " the
Prime Minister will find himself face to face with
the Revolutionary Movement, and he will have to
govern Ireland with the naked sword." Finally
he called upon his colleagues to withdraw, and the

32 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Nationalist Party in a body thereupon marched
out of the House.

Subsequently the Party drafted and issued a
Manifesto to the United States and the Dominions.
It declared that " the action of the British Govern-
ment since the formation of the Coalition in May,
1915, culminating in the speech of the Prime
Minister last nigjit, has made the task of carrying
on a Constitutional Movement in Ireland so diffi-
cult as to be almost impossible." It described Mr.
Lloyd George's speech as taking up a position,
which, if adhered to, would involve the denial of
Self Government to Ireland for ever. It concluded
in these words :— 'To the men of Irish blood in the
Dominions and the United States of America we
appeal that they should bring pressure on the
British Government to act towards Ireland in
accordance with the principles for which they are
fighting in Europe, and we specially appeal to the
American people to urge upon the British Govern-
ment the duty of applying the great principles
so clearly and splendidly enunciated by President
Wilson in his historical Address to the Senate of
America."

The United States were at this time just enter-
ing the war, and the Nationalist Party's strongly
worded appeal to Irish-Americans was calculated
very gravely to embarrass the action of President
Wilson. This was doubtless not the least cogent
of the considerations which impelled the Govern-
ment on March 22nd to announce, through the
mouth of Mr. Bonar Law, that it had decided to
make, on its own responsibility, another attempt at
an Irish settlement. It was apparent that no
definite policy to this end had yet been determined.
Mr. Bonar Law said that if the attempt again
failed the position would be worse than before.
" But we have decided that, in spite of the risks, it
is worth while for us, on our own responsibility, in

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 33

some way or other to make another attempt." He
reminded the House of the difficulties, and pleaded
" for a little time."

Almost simultaneously Sinn Fein haol made a
forward movement. Count Plunkett addressed
a circular letter to the public bodies throughout
Ireland inviting them to nominate delegates to
attend a conference to be held in the Mansion
House, Dublin, on April 19th. In this document
lie stated that he had been returned by North Ros-
common to recognise no foreign authority in Ire-
land, to maintain the right of Ireland to inde-
pendence, and to initiate Ireland's work of taking
control of her own affairs. To bring that affirma-
tion of the national faith and national will to a
practical issue it was necessary to organise the
whule country. Ireland should at once establish
her own council. The first of its duties would be
to address itself to the Peace Conference with a
view to obtaining the support of the nations which
would be represented there. This assembly would
claim the recognition of the sovereign status of
Ireland. The circular asked every public body to
give its adhesion to the principles and methods of
the movement indicated, and to appoint two dele-
gates to take part in the conference. The recep-
tion of the letter could give no trustworthy indica-
tion of the support which the Sinn Fein policy
enjoyed in the country, in view of the fact that,
owing to the suspension of elections, the public
bodies had largely ceased to be representative. In
some places Count Plunkett's letter was burned;
in many it was simply marked " read." Neverthe-
less a sufficient number of public bodies appointed
delegates to invest the proceedings of the first
Sinn Fein Convention with some authority.

It was held some ten days after the Easter Mon-
day which marked the first anniversary of the
outbreak of the Rebellion in Dublin. The

34 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

anniversary was attended by a good deal of excite-
ment in the capital and throughout the country.
As a measure of precaution assembly and proces-
sion were forbidden in Dublin by the Commander-
in-Chief, Sir Bryan Mahon. On the morning of
Easter Monday it was observed that some daring
spirits during the night had scaled the ruins of
the General Post Office in Sackville Street, the
Sinn Fein headquarters during the rising, and run
up half -mast on the flag-staff the Kepublican tri-
colour, which was also displayed from the build-
ings occupied during the rising. During the
afternoon and evening some rioting occurred,
though not of a serious character. In Cork and
elsewhere demonstrations were attended by some
disorder. On April 19th the Sinn Fein Conven-
tion met and between five and six hundred dele-
gates assembled from elective bodies, labour organ-
isations, and Sinn Fein clubs, including about a
hundred priests. The Convention endorsed the
following declarations : — " (1) That we proclaim
Ireland to be a separate nation. (2) That we assert
Ireland's right to freedom from all foreign con-
trol, denying the authority of any foreign
Parliament to make laws for Ireland. (3) That
we affirm the right of the Irish people
to declare their will as law and enforce
their decisions in their own land without let or
hindrance from any other country. (4) That,
maintaining the status of Ireland, we demand re-
presentation at the coming Peace Conference.
(5) That it is the duty of the nations taking
part in the Peace Conference to guarantee the
liberty of the nations calling for their interven-
tion and the releasing of the small nations from
control of the greater Powers. (6) That our claim
to complete independence is founded on human
right and the law of nations. (7) That we declare
that Ireland has never yielded to, but has always

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 35

fought against, foreign rule. (8) That we here-
by bind ourselves to use every means in our power
to attain complete liberty for our country." After
these declarations steps were taken to effect a
national organisation "to unite Irish advanced
opinion and provide for action as a result of its
conclusion." An Organising Committee was
appointed of nine members, including Count and
Countess Plunkett, Mr. Arthur Griffith, Father
O'Flanagan, and Mr. William O'Brien, President
of the Dublin Trades Council, and the Convention
then adjourned to be called together again as
occasion might require.

Ireland now awaited the disclosure of the
Government's scheme of settlement. Even Sinn
Fein, after the definition of its position at the
Convention, contented itself with a waiting
attitude. The Government's statement, despite
energetic Nationalist pressure in Parliament, was
repeatedly postponed. It was, in fact, not forth-
coming until May 16th. Meanwhile rumours as to
the Government's intentions began to circulate in
Ireland. As the Government continued its sound-
ings of the situation with the object of framing a
policy, it was asserted with ever greater emphasis
and particularity that its plan would ultimately
take the form of the revival of the discredited
"partition" scheme, this time in the shape of a
system of county option, which would permit
counties to vote themselves out of the operation of
the Home Rule Act. These were the circumstances
in which, early in May, a remarkable document
appeared in the Irish Press addressed to the people
of Ireland. It was signed by Cardinal Logue and
Archbishop Walsh of Dublin, sixteen other Roman
Catholic Bishops, and three Protestant Bishops —
those of Tuam, Ossory and Killaloe. Such
collaboration between the bishops of the two
Churches was quite unprecedented in the political

36 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

history of Ireland. The Bishops' Manifesto de-
clared that, while of sectional and individual
protests against the dismemberment of Ireland
there had been an immense volume, " there is still
wanting the national muster-roll of adherents to
the principle of an Ireland one and undivided."
It proceeded : — " We appeal to the people without
distinction, religious or political, and we ask all
who are opposed to partition, temporary or per-
manent, to send their names. . . . Our requisi-
tion needs no urging. An appeal to the national
conscience on the question of Ireland's dis-
memberment should meet with one answer and one
answer alone. To Irishmen of every creed and class
and party the very thought of our country parti-
tioned and torn, as a new Poland, must be one of
heart-rending sorrow. In asking these names we
have no ulterior object in view, and we give an
assurance that they shall be used only to show to
the Government and to the world that the country
is unrelentingly opposed to partition."

The next development was a letter from Arch-
bishop Walsh which appeared in the Nationalist
evening papers on May 8th. In it he said that the
question might be asked why a number of Irish
Bishops, Catholic and Protestant, had thought it
worth while to sign a protest against the partition
of Ireland. " Has not that miserable policy, con-
demned as it has been by the all but unanimous
voice of Nationalist Ireland, been removed months
ago from the sphere of practical politics ? Nothing
of the kind. Anyone who thinks that partition
whether in its naked deformity or under the trans-
parent mask of " County Option," does not hold a
leading place in the practical politics of to-day is
simply living in a fool's paradise." In a character-
istic postscript the Archbishop added : — "I think
it a duty to write this, although from information
that has just reached me I am fairly satisfied that

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 37

the mischief has already been done, and that the
country is practically sold."

This letter of the Archbishop's, with its engaging
postscript, acquired a peculiar significance from
the fact that it was published on the eve of the
polling day in the South Longford election. It was
everywhere recognised that this election was of
greater importance than the earlier trial of
strength between the Nationalist Party and Sinn
Fein in North Roscommon. The contest was a
straight fight between the two parties; the
Nationalists were represented by Mr. Patrick
McKenna, while the Sinn Feiners had selected as
their candidate Mr. J. P. McGuinness, a local man
who was serving a Court-Martial sentence of
penal servitude in connection with the Rebellion.
The Nationalist strength in the -constituency was
known to be great, and the Sinn Feiners freely
declared that if they could carry South Longford
they could carry any seat in Ireland. The Nation-
alist leaders, Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin, inter-
vened in person on behalf of Mr. McKenna, in
whose support the whole force of the Nationalist
organisation was concentrated in the constituency.
The Sinn Feiners received unexpected aid at the
last moment from the arrival of four of the men,
including Mr. Darrell Figgis, who had been de-
ported some weeks earlier, and had returned to
Ireland secretly in defiance of the order prohibit-
ing their presence in the country. Mr. Dillon
admitted the gravity of the issue, which he de-
clared was now clear, as it had not been in North
Roscommon. " South Longford was faced with a
clear political issue of the most far-reaching im-
portance."

It was doubtful, however, whether the election
could in fact be regarded as a clear issue between
the Constitutional Movement and the Sinn Fein
policy, which, indeed, at the time was still rather

38 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

a mere assertion of a political principle than a
coherent policy. The Sinn Feiners themselves,
whose organisation in the constituency was
singularly energetic and efficient, did not rely in
any considerable degree upon appeals on the
academic question of constitutionalism versus re-
publicanism. They fought the contest rather on
" live " issues of immediate practical politics. The
imprisonment of their candidate was turned to
account : " put McGuinness in to get him out,"
was the device emblazoned on their numerous
motor cars. The conscription cry was used with as
good effect as in North Roscommon. Finally, most
effective use was made of Archbishop Walsh's
letter with its declaration that the country was
" practically sold " into partition, and copies of it
were lavishly distributed at every polling booth.
The result of the polling, declared on May 10th,
showed that the Sinn Fein candidate had won by
the narrow majority of thirty-seven votes. The
result of the election was, admittedly by both sides,
doubtful up to the very last moment. There could
be no question that it was decided in Mr.
McGuinness's favour by Archbishop Walsh's
letter. Whatever other moral might be drawn
from the election, therefore, it was an unmistak-
able endorsement of the Bishop's appeal to the
country in their Manifesto to show itself " unre-
lentingly opposed to partition." The result of the
election determined absolutely the reception which
the Government's plan of settlement, published less
than a week later, on May 16th, was bound to meet
at the hands of the Nationalist Party.

It was contained in a circular letter addressed
by Mr. Lloyd George to Mr. John Redmond, Sir
John Lonsdale (Ulster Unionist Party), Mr.
William O'Brien (All-for-Ireland Party), and
Viscount Midleton (for the Unionists of the
South and West). The Prime Minister wrote that

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 39

the Government approached the subject " with a
deep desire to put an end to a state of affairs which
is productive of immense evil, not only to Ireland,
but to Great Britain and the Empire." He went
on to say that any settlement proposed during the
war must be one which would be substantially
accepted by both sides, and that therefore " the
idea of the Government has been to try to effect
an immediate settlement conceding the largest
possible measure of Home Rule which can be
secured by agreement at this moment, without pre-
judice to the undertaking by Parliament of a
further and final settlement of the questions most
in dispute after the war." The Government's pro-
posals to this end, which were at once found un-
acceptable, need not be recorded at length. Briefly,
they contemplated the immediate application of
the Home Rule Act to Ireland, excluding the six
north-eastern counties of Ulster, this arrangement
to be subject to reconsideration by Parliament at
the end of five years ; in the meantime the establish-
ment of a Council of Ireland, composed of the
members of Parliament of the excluded area and
an equal delegation from the Irish Parliament,
with powers to pass legislation affecting the whole
of Ireland ; and a reconsideration of the financial
clauses of the Act.

After setting forth this scheme the Prime
Minister, in resort as it were to an expedient
almost of desperation, proposed the Convention
plan. " There remains an alternative plan which,
though it has been sometimes seriously discussed,
has never been authoritatively proposed — that of
assembling a Convention of Irishmen of all parties
for the purpose of providing a scheme of Irish
Self-Government. As you will remember, the
Constitution of the Union of South Africa was
passed, despite most formidable difficulties and
obstacles, by a Convention representative of all

40 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

the interests and parties in the country, and the
Government believes that a similar expedient
might, in the last resort, be found effectual in Ire-
land. Would it be too much to hope that Irishmen
of all creeds and parties might meet together in a
Convention for the purpose of drafting a Constitu-
tion for their country which should secure a just
balance of all the opposing interests, and finally
compose the unhappy discords which have so long
disturbed Ireland and impeded its harmonious
development? The Government is ready, in
default of the adoption of its proposals for Home
Rule, to take the necessary steps for the assembling
of such a Convention."

Mr. Redmond, in his reply, at once rejected the
Government's scheme and welcomed the alternative
proposal of a Convention. Observing that he could
not accept the proposition that the Government
was limited to proposing a settlement "which
would be substantially accepted by both sides," he
said that he and his Party had carefully con-
sidered the two alternative proposals contained in
the Prime Minister's letter, and that " the first
proposal would, in their opinion, find no support
in Ireland, and they desire me to inform you they
are irreconcilably opposed to this scheme, and that
any measure based on it will meet1 with their
vigorous opposition." The alternative of a Con-
vention Mr. Redmond described as having " much
to commend it." " We are prepared to recommend
this proposal most earnestly to our countrymen,
on condition that the basis on which the Conven-
tion is to be called is such as to secure that
it will be fully and fairly representative of Irish-
men of all creeds, interests, and parties, and,
secondly, that the Convention be summoned with-
out delay. If this proposal is put into operation
I can assure you that no effort on the part of my
colleagues and myself will be spared to realise the

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 41

high and blessed ideal pointed to in the concluding
paragraph of your letter." Viscount Midleton,
on behalf of the Southern Unionists, rejected the
partition scheme and undertook to recommend the
acceptance of the Convention plan on condition
that it was fully representative and that its re-
commendations were subject to review by Parlia-
ment. The Irish Unionist Alliance subsequently
ratified his acceptance. Mr. William O'Brien in his
reply to Mr. Lloyd George, rejected the partition
-scheme and Welcomed the proposal of a Conven-
tion as giving effect to " a principle we have so
long contended for." Subsequently, however, he
refused to agree to the constitution of the Conven-
tion, and the All-for-Ireland Party took no part
in it.

Sir John Lonsdale, on behalf of the Ulster
Unionist Party, after restating the Ulster Unionist
case in his reply, said that his Party would re-
commend the Government's proposals for careful
consideration to the Ulster Unionist Council.
That body did not meet until June 8th, when it
was addressed in private by Sir Edward Carson.
It then passed a resolution to the effect that " being
largely influenced by the representations which
have been made to us by the Government that an
agreement on the Irish question would materially
help in the prosecution of the war to a victorious
conclusion, and relying on the assurances of the
Government, that every form of proposal will be
open for consideration at the Irish Convention,
that in the event of no agreement being come to
no party will be bound or committed in any way by
the proceedings of the Convention, and that no
scheme will be forced upon the Ulster Unionists
with which their representatives are not in agree-
ment— (we) hereby accede to the Government's in-
vitation that representatives should be sent to
the Convention." A Committee of the Council

42 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

was appointed which, besides advising on the
selection of representatives and recommending
names for the consideration of the Government
as nominated members, was further empowered
" from time to time during the holding of the Con-
vention to take counsel with the representatives of
the Ulster Party at the Convention." No such
limitation upon the plenipotentiary powers of its
representatives was imposed by any other party.
Ail other representatives entered the Convention
as free agents; the representatives of the Ulster
Unionist Party alone were limited in their freedom
of action in the Convention by the condition of
having to refer to the Committee of the Ulster
Unionist Council.

The attitude of Sinn Fein towards the Conven-
tion was semi-officially defined in the first instance
by Count Plunkett. He declared that the Conven-
tion could not be a free and representative gather-
ing, for, without a new register and a general
election, neither the Nationalist Party nor the
elected Councils had any claim to speak for the
people. Even if a majority of the Convention
demanded complete freedom, it would be put out
of court, since no scheme would be officially re-
cognised unless it kept Ireland " within the
Empire," and maintained the supremacy of the
English Parliament. The Sinn Fein Party would
turn to the Peace Conference, and to their own
resolves, for liberty. At a meeting of the Executive
of the National Council of Sinn Fein, held on May
22nd, it was unanimously resolved that Sinn Fein
should decline to participate " in any Convention
called by the English Government in Ireland,
ostensibly to settle the Irish question, unless (1)
The terms of reference to such a Convention left
it free to decree the complete independence of
Ireland; (2) the English Government publicly
pledged itself to the United States and the Powers

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 43

of Europe to ratify the decision of the majority
of the Convention; (3) the Convention consists
of none but persons freely elected by adult suffrage
in Ireland; (4) prisoners of war treatment was
accorded to the Irish prisoners at Lewes and
Aylesbury." At this meeting Mr. Arthur Griffith,
President of Sinn Fein, said that by its pledge to
the Ulster Unionists not to force them to accept
the decision of the majority of their countrymen
the failure of the Convention was secured before-
hand by the English Government, which would
then be enabled to say to the United States and to
the Powers of Europe that England had left the
Irish question to the Irish themselves and that the
Irish had failed to find a solution. This was
England's plan to obstruct Ireland's appeal to the
Peace Conference. The Dublin Trades' Council
adopted the same attitude towards the Convention
as Sinn Fein.

The Prime Minister, however, had awaited no
party's formal definition of its jattitude before
proceeding with the summoning of the Conven-
tion. On May 21st he announced that the Govern-
ment proposed " to summon immediately, on be-
half of the Crown, a Convention of representative
Irishmen, in Ireland, to submit to the British
Government and to the British Parliament a
Constitution for the future government of Ire-
land within the Empire." He went on to say that
the Convention must be representative of all lead-
ing interests, classes, creeds and phases of thought
in Ireland — not a Convention merely of political
parties, though all these must necessarily be re-
presented, including, he hoped, Sinn Fein. " In the
main the view of the Government is that it ought
to consist of representatives of the local
governing bodies, the Churches, the trade unions,
the commercial interests, the educated interests —
in fact a real representation of Irish life, thought,

44 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

and activity in all the leading aspects." So far
as possible the Government would invite delegates
to be chosen by the bodies whom they represented.
Recognising, however, that it would be desirable
to have Irish interests represented which might
not be chosen by any of these categories, the
Government proposed to nominate members to
secure that every element of Irish opinion was pre-
sent. It was suggested that the Chairman should be
nominated by the Crown, but this course was
afterwards abandoned in favour of that of allow-
ing the Convention to elect its own Chairman. Mr.
Lloyd George next made it clear that no proposal
on any side for the better government of Ireland
could be shut out from discussion, and that no one,
by the mere fact of going into the Convention,
could be assumed to be pledged to the acceptance
or rejection of any particular proposal or method
for the government of Ireland. Finally, on behalf
of the Government he gave a pledge that " if sub-
stantial agreement should be reached as to the
character and scope of the Constitution framed by
the Convention for the future government of Ire-
land within the Empire, we will accept the re-
sponsibility for taking all the necessary steps to
enable the Imperial Parliament to give legislative
effect to the proceedings of the Convention."
He added a promise that, so far as the financial
aspect was concerned, " should the Convention
happily come to an agreement, we will not forget
that restitution and reparation should begin at
home."

While negotiations for the constitution of the
Convention on the basis thus outlined by the
Prime Minister were in progress an unhappy in-
cident occurred in Dublin. A public meeting was
called in Beresford Place on Sunday, June 10th,
to demand the release of the Rebellion prisoners.
The holding of this meeting was prohibited by a

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 45

Proclamation issued the previous day by Sir
Bryan Mahon. Notwithstanding this prohibition
a large crowd assembled when Count Plunkett
and a companion arrived on a hackney car and
attempted to address the audience outside Liberty
Hall, sometime the Headquarters of the Citizen
Army. The two men were placed under arrest by
the police and conveyed to an adjoining police
station. On their way the police were hustled by
the crowd, and Inspector Mills, in command of
the police force, was felled from behind by a
hurley stick, and died during the night as a result
of his injuries. The vicinity of the meeting re-
mained disturbed for some hours. Subsequently
Count Plunkett was removed from police control
by the military, and placed in Arbour Hill
barracks.

On the day after this affair Mr. Lloyd George
announced that the constitution of the Convention
had been settled. He explained that the total
number of the Convention would be 101 — an un-
wieldy number, he admitted, but it was impossible
to have a small body in which all interests would
be represented, as it was essential they should be,
if an agreement was to secure the adhesion of the
country. Fifteen members would be nominated by
the Crown; thirty-three would be Chairmen of
County Councils, and six Lord Mayors and
Mayors of County Boroughs — these, in Mr. Lloyd
George's words, to represent " the everyday life of
the country." In addition the Chairmen of the
Urban Councils were to be invited to select two
members in each of the four provinces — eight in
all. The Churches were to be represented by four
of the Roman Catholic Bishops, the Primate and
the Archbishop of Dublin for the Church of Ire-
land, and the Moderator of the General Assembly
for the Presbyterian Church. As spokesmen of
commerce the Chairmen of the Chambers of Com-

46 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

merce of Dublin, Belfast and Cork were to be in-
vited, and as spokesmen of labour, representatives
of the Trade Councils in Dublin and in Cork and
of Trades Unions in Belfast — in all five repre-
sentatives of labour. For the direct representa-
tion of organised political opinion the Nationalist
Party, the Ulster Unionist Party, and the Irish
Unionist Alliance, for the Unionists of Southern
Ireland, were to appoint five members each, and
Mr. O'Brien's party and the Irish Representative
Peers two each. Five seats were also reserved for
Sinn Fein. In accordance with the resolutions
passed by the National Executive, Sinn Fein re-
fused the invitation to appoint delegates. The same
course was followed by Mr. O'Brien's AU-for-Ire-
land League, and the Kerry County Council also
declined to permit its Chairman to attend. These
abstentions reduced the complement of the Conven-
to ninety-three. Two more labour representatives
were added to the original five, so that the Con-
vention, as finally constituted, numbered ninety-
five members.

In announcing the constitution of the Conven-
tion the Prime Minister referred to the death of
Major William Redmond, who a few days before
had been killed in action at Messines. " We all
remember," Mr. Lloyd George said, " his last
appeal to us, and I think that, now that this Con-
vention is being launched on its career, I cannot
do better than read his words : — ' While English
and Irish soldiers are dying side by side must the
eternal conflict between the two nations go on ? In
the name of God, we here, who are, perhaps, about
to die, ask you to do that which largely induced us
to leave our homes; that which our fathers and
mothers taught us to long for; that which is all
\ we desire, to make our country happy and con-
tented and enable us when we meet Canadians,
Australians, or New Zealanders side by side, to

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 47

say — Our country, just as your country, is self-
governing within the Empire.' ' The Prime
Minister added : — " He was carried tenderly and
reverently from the battlefield by Ulster soldiers
in an Ulster ambulance. The solemn appeal which
I have read comes to us anew from an honoured
grave on the frontier of the land he gave his life
to liberate."

The death of Major Redmond, however, was to
do something else besides provide an inspiration
for the work of the Convention. It was to provide
the occasion for the event which, even while the
Convention was assembling, was at once to disclose
the full strength of Sinn Fein in the country and
confirm its hold on the popular imagination — the
East Clare election. On June 17th, rather more
than a month before the first meeting of the Con-
vention, all the Rebellion prisoners serving Court-
Mar tial /sentences had been unconditionally re-
leased. Their release was announced by Mr. Bonar
Law in the House of Commons two days earlier.
He said that it was " beyond measure desirable
that the Convention shall meet in an atmosphere
of harmony and good-will in which all parties can
unreservedly join. Nothing could be more re-
grettable than that the work of the Convention
should be prejudiced at the outset by embittered
associations." The Government in deciding to re-
lease the prisoners in order to remove one of the
most serious causes of misunderstanding, had
satisfied itself " in the first place that the public
security will not be endangered by such an act of
grace ; and secondly, that in none of the cases con-
cerned is there evidence that participation in the
Rebellion was accompanied by individual acts
which could render such a display of clemency
impossible." He concluded by saying that the
grant of a general amnesty was inspired by the
sanguine hope that it " will be welcomed in a spirit

48 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

of magnanimity, and that the Convention will
enter upon its arduous undertaking in circum-
stances that will constitute a good augury for that
reconciliation which is the desire of all parties in
all parts of the United Kingdom and the Empire/'
The released prisoners arrived in Dublin on
June 20th, having been brought to Pentonville
Prison from Parkhurst, Maidstone, Portland and
Lewes, and sent off to Ireland by special train,
leaving Euston on the previous Sunday evening.
Madame Markievicz was not released from Ayles-
bury prison until Monday evening. They were met
on arrival by an enormous crowd and .driven
through the streets in procession. Throughout the
day there was a considerable display of Republican
colours in the streets, and there were some dis-
turbances in the town at night, which were re-
newed three days later when Madame Markievicz
arrived and was driven in procession to Liberty
Hall. In Dublin, however, though there was much
excitement, no serious disorder occurred. In Cork,
on the other hand, the return of the prisoners
was followed by rioting which the Press
described as " the worst seen in Cork for
forty years." Much damage was done to property.
Order was not restored until the military were
called out, and machine guns mounted in the
streets. In the course of the earlier disturbances,
when the police made numerous baton charges and
revolver shots were freely exchanged, one man was
killed and several injured. Everywhere through-
out the country as the released men reached their
homes they were received with tremendous
enthusiasm. Many of them left home again almost
immediately to support Mr. de Valera, who had
emerged almost immediately as the most pro-
minent of the released prisoners, and had been
selected as the Sinn Fein candidate for the vacant
seat in East Clare.

ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION 49

During the early part of July public attention
was divided between this election and the selection
by the various bodies of delegates to the Conven-
tion. We deal with the East Clare election in our
next chapter. The Convention held its first meet-
ing on July 25th under the shadow of Mr. de
Valera's overwhelming victory. The first meeting
was preceded by a picturesque incident — a Service
for delegates in St. Andrew's Church, Suffolk
Street, Dublin, which was in former days very
closely connected with the Irish House of Com-
mons, whose members assembled there for worship
on all great occasions. The Convention met in the
Regent House, Trinity College, a commodious
block of buildings placed at its disposal by the
Provost, and made what was generally regarded
as an auspicious beginning by unanimously elect-
ing Sir Horace Plunkett as its Chairman.

CHAPTER II.

THE SINN FEIN POLICY.

IT is probable that of the four Sinn Fein electoral
victories in 1917, that at Longford was the most
important. The division had always been regarded
as one of the safest of the Party seats (unlike Ros-
common, Kilkenny and Clare, which had all cer-
tain neo-Fenian traditions), and Sinn Fein itself
hardly hoped for success. An English newspaper,
The Manchester Guardian, described the return
of Mr. McGuinness as the equivalent of a serious
British defeat in the field ; and the event undoubt-
edly played a part in inducing the Government to
that reconsideration of its non-possumus attitude
of March in regard to Irish settlement, which
finally produced the Convention. But in pictur-
esque character the contest in East Clare outdid
others. The circumstances of the case made
attention emphatic, for the vacancy had occurred
through the death of Mr. John Redmond's brother,
Major Redmond, a victim of the war whose
gallantry was in the mouths of all, and Sinn Fein
proposed to fill the vacancy with a man who had
been sentenced to execution for a cause seemingly
opposite to that for which Major Redmond had
died. Mr. de Valera went straight from prison
to Clare, where his personality evoked immense
curiosity. He was a man of about 35, who had
worked for many years in the Gaelic League, and
was by profession a school-master. There were
unfounded rumours, suggested perhaps by the
foreign name, that Mr. de Valera had a past of
extraordinary revolutionary adventure in foreign
lands. In fact, though born in New York, his
childhood and youth had passed quietly in Ire-

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 51

land. He had a Spanish-American father,
but his mother's family was Irish and resided in
Co. Limerick. Good reports were spread concern-
ing his leadership and conduct during the rising
as rebel Commandant at Boland's Mills in Dublin,
and these emanated not only from his followers
but also from friends who were his political
opponents.

Clare took to Mr. de Valera at once, and the
Sinn Fein progress was a triumphal one. The name
itself of the hero seemed to delight the lips of
all, especially those of children. Yet Mr. de
Valera was little of an orator, and when he spoke
he seemed rather to be arguing with himself aloud
than trying to convince an audience. His sup-
porters at the election relied largely upon a destruc-
tive criticism of the Irish Party's recent policy.
Many priests in the constituency, including the
Bishop, had turned anti-Redmondite on the Ulster
question, but the chief question at issue was
whether " the Crown Prosecutor " — Mr. de
Valera's opponent, Mr. Lynch, had held the
position of a Crown Prosecutor — should be pre-
ferred to a comrade of "the men who had died for
Ireland." The Party itself put little energy into
the combat, and Mr. Lynch, while expressing
himself as a follower of Mr. Redmond stood " un-
officially." The result was quickly seen to be a
foregone conclusion ; but the figure of 3,000, which
was Mr. de Valera's majority, caused consterna-
tion amongst the Parliamentarians.

Mr. Lennox Robinson, the Irish critic and play-
wright, has very pleasantly described the final
scenes in Ennis, that " town of streams and grace-
ful bridges." " The gate opens at last and we are
swept through it. But there is no rowdyism, no
disorder. The Sinn Fein Volunteers take entire
possession of the situation; they organise the
crowd ; they form ranks in front of the Courthouse

52 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

steps; the discipline is perfect; we mere outsiders
are pushed back, we are like civilians at a military
review. A line of bored police at the foot of the
steps faces the Volunteers; a D.I. strangely aloof
from the situation stands at the foot of a granite
pillar. . . . There is no longer any doubt about
it, de Valera is in, the Volunteers cheer again and
again, and the man capers. We breathe a sigh of
relief when he is pushed aside and the hero of the
day, in Volunteer uniform, comes forward.
Young, dark, eager, vivid, the very counterpart
of these young men around us. If personality
counts for anything, if like be attracted by like,
we understand why he has won. . . ."

" ' Going and going ! ' What will you bid? The
Unionist bids one thing, the Nationalist another,
William Redmond throws his life into the scale,
de Valera boldly bids an ' Irish Republic.' This
last extravagant bid is rather like that of a man
who, with a balance at his bank of a hundred
pounds, offers you a cheque for a million; but five
thousand Claremen have accepted his promise as
good, and the bidding has been pushed up. ' Going,
going.' What will you bid ? What will the Con-
vention bid? It must bid high and boldly."

Just after his victory in Clare, Mr. de Valera
devoted much of his time to the constituency. He
had apparently established a remarkable personal
ascendancy over the young men in this county, and
during the early autumn he addressed many large
meetings and parades of his Volunteers. His
speeches, as reported in the newspapers, suggested
that a " second Easter Week " might be in con-
templation. It is true that the Sinn Fein leader
had often to correct these reports, and that the
more fiery passages, when carefully read in their
proper context, usually contained important re-
servations. Journalists were, at all events, attracted
to the County Clare, and a Daily Mail " special

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 53

representative " " wrote up " the progress of the
Sinn Fein leader, and described, in a tone at once
jocose and wondering, "the splendid manhood"
at his command, and the " colleens " who laid gifts
at his feet. Suddenly the Government seemed
to regret that it had released the prisoners
from penal servitude, and a period of scares en-
sues. Stringent orders had been issued on the
eve of the Convention's meeting against drilling
and the carrying of arms. When these were
disobeyed arrests were promptly made. Large
numbers of the men of Easter Week found
themselves again in jail, under sentences varying
from two months to three years. Mr. de Valera
himself remained unmolested. The Parliamentary
representative of Kilkenny City, a popular mem-
ber of the Irish Party, died, and this urban con-
stituency promptly endorsed the Sinn Fein pro-
gramme by returning Mr. Cosgrave, one of Mr.
de Valera's colleagues, at the head of the poll.

The tension had grown very acute. One of the
most prominent of British publicists, Mr. Austin
Harrison, arrived in Ireland and insisted in
urgent articles and letters that no treaty of peace
between Great Britain and Ireland would be worth
the paper it was written on unless signed by Sinn
Fein. But Mr. Harrison failed to impress either
the Government or Sinn Fein. He wanted the
latter to associate itself with a so-called " Inter-1
national Magna Ckarta," which was a proposed
demonstration in favour of peace on the lines of
democracy and the self-determination of nation-
alities. In return, Mr. Harrison suggested, the
Sinn Fein claim would receive favourable con-
sideration from the progressive forces of the
allied countries. The leaders of Sinn Fein scented
some deep-laid conspiracy on the part of Mr.
Harrison, and withdrew from the negotiations;
Mr. John MacNeill, however, expressed an inter-

54 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

esting personal opinion on Ireland's position in
regard to internationalism, and on the general
issues which had been raised, in the English
Review, Mr. Austin Harrison's magazine.
" Several of the belligerent powers," he said, " have
themselves questioned the right of sovereignty.
Great Britain and France have echoed the declara-
tions of America and Russia. The doctrine of the
rights of nations has been set up against the
doctrine of absolute sovereignty." Mr. McNeill
for his part accepted the former doctrine, the
application of which would lead in the case of
Ireland to a situation of interdependence. Ire-
land claimed," he said, " national liberty not less
than that of any other nation," but no country
would have a greater interest in the world's peace,
and in a reorganised Europe there would be no
danger to England of her entering into entangling
alliances or engagements. The English military
and naval objection to the separation of Ireland
presumed the doctrine of absolute sovereignty as
opposed to the doctrine of national rights and was
therefore not in keeping with Allied professions.
As regards the economic side of the question, Mr.
MacNeill conceded that in any circumstances the
most intimate commercial relations would con-
tinue to exist between the two countries, and in
this way dissociated himself from the doctrine
of economic nationalism preached by Mr. Arthur
Griffith and the orthodox Sinn Feiners. In the
same number of the English Review the Editor
described the situation thus : — " The Government
Castle rule is now recognised by all as doomed, yet
still this government exists and still it has to
govern; and against it there stands ranged Sinn
Fein, which the Government regards as a re-
volutionary party, and so without status. Be-
tween these there is Nationalism, which probably
at the polls would not return ten members. . . .

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 55

The danger lies in the anomaly that Sinn Fein
is not recognised as a party."

The philosophical " conversations " between
the Sinn Fein leaders and the English Editor did
not relieve the tension* The prisoners in Mount-
joy jail went on hunger strike, were forcibly fed,
and on September 30th one of them, Thomas Ashe,
died. Ashe, a native of Dingle, Co. Kerry, who
was a schoolmaster in County Dublin, had been a
very popular member of the Gaelic League, and
during the Rebellion had led the Volunteers in a
victorious and bloody affray with the police at
Ashbourne in County Meath. After his return
from an English prison he soon found himself in an
Irish prison convicted on the charge of seditious
speech. Ashe died in hospital a few hours after
being removed in an exhausted condition from
Mountjoy Prison. Preparations were at once
made for the organisation of a funeral, which
should be the occasion of such a procession through
the streets of Dublin as had not been witnessed
since the death of Parnell. The funeral was, in
truth, an impressive spectacle. Thousands upon
thousands of Irishmen and women, country and
townfolk, lined the " ancient way " to Glasnevin.
Nothing could have been more orderly than their
conduct, and the contrast with the public funerals
of Irishmen in former times (which ended always
with jovial night scenes) was the subject of much
comment. Had Ireland become militarised, dis-
ciplined, docile ? The dominant feature of the day
was the reappearance of the Volunteers in uni-
form and marching order — a breach of the
military regulations of which no account was
taken.

A month was occupied with the inquest on
Ashe. During the proceedings the jury proposed
that the Chief Secretary might have useful
evidence to impart. But Mr. Duke did not put in

56 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

an appearance at the Coroner's court. The
Prisons Board pleaded privilege. Mr. Healy,
M.P., who appeared for Ashe's relatives, seemed
uncertain as to whether the English Government
or the Prisons Board, or the doctor who had ad-
ministered the forcible feeding should be the
object of his attack. At the head of the Prisons
Board, as it happened, was Mr. Max Green, who
was the son-in-law of Mr. Redmond himself.
Finally the jury, which was by no means Sinn Fein
in its composition, delivered its verdict as
follows : — " We find that the deceased, Thomas
Ashe, according to the medical evidence of Pro-
fessor McWeeney, Sir Arthur Chance, and Sir
Thomas Myles, died from heart failure and con-
gestion of the lungs on September 25, and that his
death was caused by the punishment of taking
away from his cell his bed, bedding, and boots,
and being left to lie on the cold floor for fifty
hours, and then being subjected to forcible feed-
ing in his weak condition, after a hunger strike of
five or six days. We censure the Castle authorities
for not having acted promptly, especially when the
grave condition of the deceased and other prisoners
was brought under their notice on the previous
Saturday by the Lord Mayor and Sir John Irwin ;
and find that the hunger strike was adopted against
the inhuman punishment inflicted, and as a protest
against their being treated as criminals after they
demanded to be treated as political prisoners in
the first division. We condemn forcible or
mechanical feeding as an inhuman and dangerous
operation, and say that it should be discontinued.
We find that the assistant doctor that was called
in, having had no previous practice in such opera-
tions, administered forcible feeding unskilfully;
and that the taking away of the deceased's bed,
bedding and boots was an unfeeling and barbarous
act. And we censure the Deputy-Governor for

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 57

violating the prison rules, and inflicting punish-
ment which he had no power to do. We infer that
he was acting under instructions from the Prisons
Board at the Castle, which refused to give evidence
and documents asked for. We tender our
sympathy to the relatives of the deceased in this
sad and tragic occurrence."

Concessions were made by the Irish Government
in regard to the treatment of imprisoned Sinn
Feiners (who had demanded the status of political
prisoners); and if these concessions did not
altogether satisfy the national sentiment, they at
least made it likely that another tragedy like that
of Ashe would be avoided. Dublin Castle made it
clear that while drilling would not be tolerated,
a considerable latitude would be allowed to the
expression of Sinn Fein opinion. The crisis, how-
ever, lingered on, and numbers of arrests of the
smaller fry of the movement continued to be made.
In the month of October Nationalists were made
very indignant by the action of the police, acting
under military instructions, in making extensive
raids for the arms belonging to the old Redmond-
ite or " constitutional " Volunteers. It was charged
to the partiality of the Government that the
arsenals of the Northern Unionists were left un-
invaded. Mr. Duke defended himself as follows :—
Colonel Moore, who before the split among the
Nationalist Volunteers had been one of the prin-
cipal officers and leaders of the movement, now
proposed to reorganise the force. But Colonel
Moore, although not a Sinn Feiner, no longer saw
eye to eye with Mr. Redmond on political matters,
and the force, if reorganised as proposed, would
have been emancipated from the control of the
Irish Parliamentary Party. There was the
possibility of a rapprochement with the Sinn
Fein Volunteers. The Irish Command enquired
of Colonel Moore whether he could give a

58 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

guarantee that the possessions of his Volunteers
would not fall into undesirable hands. Colonel
Moore was unable to do this, and therefore in the
interests of public safety orders were given for
the disarmament of his men.

This statement was made in a debate in Parlia-
ment on October 23rd, on a motion by Mr. Red-
mond, deploring the policy of the Irish Executive.
He described the situation in Ireland as one of
extreme gravity, and referred to the seizure of
arms, and the arrest and treatment of Sinn Fein
prisoners, and the death of Thomas Ashe as in-
stances of an irritating policy. The Chief
Secretary, in his reply, agreed with Mr. Redmond
that " this is a time in Ireland of grave crisis and
peril, but it is also a time of unprecedented and un-
equalled opportunity." He proceeded to defend
the policy of the Executive on the ground that
" the young men of Ireland — 200,000 of them — are
being enrolled for the purpose of creating a new
Rebellion in Ireland. . . . Week by week, ex-
tending over a period of several months, there has
been steadily growing, in every parish in Ireland,
a new organisation of Irish Volunteers." Refer-
ring to the deportations in February, he said that
the deportation of "a certain number of people
who had been engaged, and are now engaged, in
this conspiracy," was ordered because " the help-
ing hand of Germany was being held out again,
and His Majesty's Government knew it well." Mr.
Duke went on to declare that " half of the trouble
in Ireland during recent weeks has arisen because
the Convention is doing well. The design of the
leaders of the Sinn Fein movement requires the
failure of the Convention." To an interrogation
asking why Mr. de Valera was at large, the Chief
Secretary replied that for mere political contro-
versy, however extreme, while a new Constitution
for Ireland was in the making, there should be no

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 59

arrest which could be avoided. Nothing could be
more helpful to the propaganda of secession. He
concluded by saying that there had been, and there
would be, no arrests except of people who directly
incited to violence, or for the deliberate infringe-
ment of public safety. Later Mr. Lloyd George
intervened in the debate. Mr. de Valera's speeches,
he said, were " calm, deliberate and almost cold-
blooded incitements to rebellion." The Govern-
ment could not possibly forget what had previously
happened when speeches of the same sort were
delivered, and there was the same kind of drilling,
and the same sort of information about intrigues
to get German rifles into Ireland. It was essential
that the Government should take action — not pro-
vocative action but firm action. The Prime Minister
added that there were three things which the
Government must make quite clear in the interests
of the Convention and of Ireland. First of all,
the incitements to rebellion could not be tolerated,
and the language of Mr. de Valera was language
that could have no other meaning. Anything that
was part and parcel of an organisation for
rebellion must be stopped. In the next place, as to
the Sinn Fein demand for sovereign independence,
" the Government could not accept anything of
that sort." Finally the Prime Minister repeated in
specific terms the Government's undertaking to
give legislative effect to any finding of the Conven-
tion which commanded " substantial agreement."
The death of Ashe had exalted and extended
the sentiment of Sinn Fein. Nevertheless, as the
Convention continued to do its work, the hope of
a constitutional and peaceful settlement began
to grow very strong throughout the country. The
militarism attributed to Mr. de Valera received
a set back, even in communities which remained
wholly Sinn Fein in sentiment. A clerical party
which was by no means dependent on Mr. Red-

60 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

mond but yet disliked greatly the doctrine of
physical force began to establish its influence.
Dr. O'Dwyer, the Sinn Fein Bishop of Limerick,
Sir John Maxwell's antagonist, was dead, and
his mantle of patriot had fallen to some extent
upon Dr. Fogarty, Bishop of the neighbouring
See of Killaloe. Dr. Fogarty had voted for
Mr. de Valera at the East Clare Election,
and had written a very popular comment on the
Ashe case. But Dr. Walsh, the Archbishop of
Dublin, whose intervention in the Longford con-
test had proved of inestimable benefit to Sinn
Fein, was now silent. Such dignitaries of the
Church as spoke uttered what were described as
" solemn notes of warning." They besought their
countrymen not to forsake the paths of constitu-
tional agitation, and quoted Papal dicta in regard
to the need of obedience to lawful authority. These
pronouncements were directed evidently against
the Volunteers rather than against the Sinn Fein
movement proper. The Volunteer and Sinn Fein
organisations had been formally recognised as
separate from each other at the Sinn Fein Con-
vention of October 25th, the details of which are
given below. Mr. de Valera and other leaders re-
plied to the Bishops; denied that another rising
was in contemplation ; but demurred to the descrip-
tion of British Government as a lawful
authority. Towards the end of November
Cardinal Logue issued a long statement on the
war, on Ireland and the Convention. He expressed
his regret that Europe had refused to be guided
to the conclusion of a Christian peace by the
admonitions of the Vatican. Ireland surely, he
continued, would not add to the general misery of
the world by any rash, foolish or un-Christian
action of her own. Any pacificist might have sub-
scribed to the Cardinal's statement, which, never-
theless, contained several direct reproaches of
Sinn Fein. Cardinal Logue characterised the Re-

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 61

public propaganda as an insane one, and asserted
that the whole hope of Ireland depended on a
successful outcome of the Convention.

It appears that during the month of October
very considerable pressure was exercised upon the
military and civil authorities of Dublin Castle,
with the object of inducing the arrest of Mr. de
Valera and the complete suppression of Sinn Fein.
We have already mentioned the Irish debate in the
House of Commons in which the Premier had
quoted some strong passages from Mr. de Valera's
speeches, and had indicated that at any moment
the Government might cease to tolerate Republican
propaganda. He had replied with the word
" never " to the Sinn Fein demand for the com-
plete " self-determination " of Ireland, and de-
clared that in no circumstances would Great
Britain grant to Ireland the right of secession. The
interests and influences represented by the
militarist Morning Post asserted that the natural
corollary of such declarations was the application
of force. Conscription offered the remedy; for
conciliation and compromise had been tried and
found wanting — as the Sinn Fein attitude towards
the Convention showed. Towards the end of the
first week in November the Nationalist Press of
Dublin and the provinces began to display signs
of extraordinary alarm. It was widely reported
on the one hand that another rising was contem-
plated, and on the other hand that the Govern-
ment had decided to arrest Mr. de Valera. It
had been announced that there would be a parade
of Volunteers through Dublin on the following
Sunday, November 4th, and that a Sinn Fein meet-
ing, to be held at Newbridge, near the Curragh,
had been proclaimed by the military authorities.
The Independent newspapers published alarming
appeals to Sinn Fein to desist from any action
that might lead to bloodshed, and there were wide-

62 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

spread and extravagant rumours as to the im-
mense military preparations and precautions that
had been taken. The rumours, in fact, coincided
with extensive troop movements which, as it proved
afterwards, had no connection with the state of
Ireland. In face of the police preparations the
proclaimed meeting was abandoned. In many
parts of the country, including the outskirts of
Dublin, contingents of the Irish Volunteers held
uniformed parades and route marches, but nothing
happened in the end; the dreaded Sunday passed
off quite quietly The scare was, however, the sub-
ject of newspaper comment for many weeks, during
which the Freeman's Journal discoursed on the
attempts of a " hidden hand " to provoke trouble
in Ireland with the object of hampering the work
of the Convention.

A speech by Lord Wimborne, the Viceroy,
in the House of Lords some days later lent colour
to this view of the situation. Lord Wimborne
said that the Government had been circum-
stantially informed that there would be a rising,
" but the Chief Secretary, with my full concur-
rence, refused to take advice tendered as to what
his duty was. Far from there being a rising, or
even an armed demonstration, or indeed any demon-
stration at all, not a dog barked." He added that
had preventive action been taken it would inevit-
ably, " as perhaps was intended," have killed the
Convention. In the same speech the Lord
Lieutenant said that the Government possessed an
adequate military establishment for the enforce-
ment of law and order, that the drilling in the
south and west had at present no military signifi-
cance, and that in these circumstances " the policy
of the Irish Government must be not to seek
trouble, but if trouble came to be ready to meet it."
The governing factor in the Irish situation was
the Convention. The Irish Government had a

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 63

double duty to perform : its duty to Ireland was
to pursue the policy of appeasement and recon-
ciliation ; its duty to the Empire to protect it from
untoward and hampering perils in the prosecution
of its task. Both these duties, Lord Wimborne de-
clared, were being faithfully performed.

Let us now retrace our steps a little and allow
Sinn Fein to speak for itself, officially, as it did
at the Sinn Fein Convention which assembled in
the Dublin Mansion House on October 25th, and
concluded its proceedings on the following day.
These proceedings threw some new light on its
quality and strength. Observers were much im-
pressed by their dignity, order, and self-discip-
line, and by the general freedom of the movement
from the meaner political vices and those personal
jealousies and suspicions which have commonly
infected Irish politics. A report read by Dr. T.
Dillon, one of the secretaries, showed the progress
made by the Sinn Fein organisation during the
past year. It stated that the past eight months
had been a period of unprecedented growth and
activity in regard to the movement for the achieve-
ment of Irish independence. The tremendous
victories of East Clare and Kilkenny were the first
fruits of the amalgamation of all the national
political organisations. There were at present
affiliated to the organisation close on twelve
hundred clubs, representing a membership of a
quarter of a million. The Convention consisted of
seventeen hundred delegates, representing rather
more than a thousand clubs.

Mr. Arthur Griffith, in his Presidential
Address, said that the fundamental position
for which Sinn Fein strove had been gained :
Ireland had renounced the British Parliament,
and with that renunciation she had destroyed
the moral sanction of British authority in the
country. He proceeded to deny in emphatic

64 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

terms the allegation of " German gold." The
money received and spent by Sinn Fein was set
out in their balance sheet, and every penny of it
was subscribed by the Irish people. The balance
sheet, adopted earlier in the proceedings, had
shown that the subscriptions and other receipts
up to September 30th amounted to £4,566, with
an expenditure, chiefly on organisation and elec-
tion expenses, of £3,315, leaving a balance in hand
of £1,251. If their opponents were surprised at
the resources of Sinn Fein, said Mr. Griffith, he
replied to them that for almost all the work of the
movement the workers gave their services and
their energies voluntarily and without pecuniary
reward. After recalling the circumstances in
which Sinn Fein had refused the offer of repre-
sentation on the Irish Convention, the President
went on to say that Ireland's case at the Peace
Conference could only be heard under two condi-
tions. The first was the destruction of the Irish
representation in the English Parliament, for if
that representation were to remain it would be
taken as a repudiation of Ireland's demand for
sovereign independence. In default of a general
election, however, they must have a Constituent
Assembly chosen by the whole people, which would
speak with authority for the people. They must
see that every constituency selected its representa-
tives to meet afterwards in Dublin in an assembly
which would speak for Ireland at the Peace Con-
ference. When that assembly sat they would have
taken a longer step towards Irish independence
than had been taken for the last hundred and
twenty years. Finally Mr. Griffith spoke of the
danger of a split in the movement. All differences
on minor points must be subordinated to the great
issue, to carry out to the fullest degree the object
for which men had died in every generation — the
complete independence of Ireland.

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 65

Mr. Cathal Burgess, seconded by Mr. Sean
Milroy, then proposed the adoption of the Con-
stitution. This Constitution, embodied in a lengthy
document, contained as its essential clauses the
following : — " Sinn Fein aims at securing the
international recognition of Ireland as an inde-
pendent Irish Republic. Having achieved that
status the Irish people may, by referendum, freely
choose their own form of government. This object
shall be attained through the Sinn Fein organisa-
tion, which shall, in the name of the sovereign
Irish people : — (a) deny the right, and oppose the
will, of the British Parliament or British Crown,
or any other foreign Government, to legislate for
Ireland; (b) make use of any and every means
available to render impotent the power of Eng-
land to hold Ireland in subjection by military force
or otherwise. And whereas no law made without
the authority and consent of the Irish people is
ever, or can be, binding on the Irish people, there-
fore, in accordance with the resolution of Sinn
Fein, adopted in Convention, 1905, a Constituent
Assembly shall be convoked, comprising persons
chosen by the Irish constituencies, as the supreme
national authority to speak and act in the name
of the Irish people, and to devise and formulate
measures for the welfare of the whole people of
Ireland." The clauses of the Constitution were
carefully scrutinised by the Convention, but it was
finally adopted with no substantial modification.
The most notable incident in this part of the pro-
ceedings was the moving of an addendum to the
Constitution insisting on the right of Irishmen to
drill and arm for the defence of Ireland, and
declaring that men of military age should be
educated in the use of arms. After the President
had suggested the advisability of entangling the
political organisation of Sinn Fein with the
military organisation of the Volunteers, and

E

66 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Father O'Flanagan had declared that for Sinn
Fein to attempt to enforce conscription as their
method of defending Ireland would lead them to
disaster, it was decided to adopt the proposal as
an expression of opinion, but not to embody it in
the Constitution.

After some resolutions dealing with labour
questions, the Convention next proceeded to the
election of officers. Count Plunkett and Mr.
Griffith then announced their withdrawal from
candidature for the Presidency in favour of Mr.
de Valera, who was unanimously elected President
— an office which Mr. Griffith has previously filled
for six years. When the name of Mr. John
MacNeill was mentioned as a member of the
Executive, Madame Markievicz protested against
his election on the ground of his attitude at the
time of the rising. Mr. de Valera intervened in a
somewhat embittered discussion to say that he
knew what happened better than any living man,
and that, while fault might be found with Mr.
MacNeill's judgment, there was no tribunal under-
standing what took place would do other than
acquit him of anything like cowardice or dis-
honesty. Finally he closured the discussion with
the remark that it was for the delegates by their
votes to say whether Mr. MacNeill did not deserve
to be honoured by his countrymen. In the sub-
sequent voting Mr. MacNeill was returned as first
member of the Executive Committee. In the
voting for the V ice-Presidents Count Plunkett
received 386 votes, Mr. Griffith, 1,197, and Father
O'Flanagan 786. The two last named were thus
elected Vice-Presidents; Mr. W. T. Cosgrave and
Mr. Ginnell were elected Hon. Treasurers, and Mr.
Austin Stack and Mr. Darrell Figgis Hon. Secre-
taries, while the Executive Committee was con-
stituted of twenty-four persons. Most of the first
day's sitting was occupied by a protracted dis-

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 67

cussion, which extended into the second day, on
schemes of organisation prepared by Mr. de
Valera and Mr. Cathal Burgess. The latter's
scheme favoured a small business-like Executive;
Mr. de Valera recommended a scheme which pur-
posely made the representation on the National
Council large, in order to show the country that
Sinn Fein was a democratic organisation, that it
would be run by the people themselves, and that
those they elected would not be able to machine
them. Finally the scheme submitted by Mr. de
Valera was adopted. It was agreed that the
membership fee should be one shilling a year, and
that a club having a paid up membership of 150
should be entitled to three delegates on the
National Council, 200 to four delegates, and 250
to five, on payment of £1 in addition to the affilia-
tion fee for each delegate above two, no club in any
case to have more than five delegates.

After Mr. Ginnell and Mr. McGuinness had
moved and seconded a resolution expressing the
gratitude of the Convention to Count Plunkett and
Mr. Griffith for having withdrawn from the con-
test for the Presidency in favour of Mr. de Valera,
the new President addressed the Convention. Mr.
de Valera said that by his unanimous election the
people of Ireland had endorsed the vote of the
people of East Clare, and declared to the world
that the policy which he had put before the
electors of East Clare was the policy of the people
of all Ireland. In the course of his speech he re-
ferred to theological criticism of the Sinn Fein
movement, and said that the condition of reason-
able hope of success which justified rebellion
against an oppressive authority was one of which
they should take advantage.

Their flag was the flag of the Irish Republic.
" We have," concluded Mr. de Valera, " nailed
that flag to the mast ; we shall never lower it, and I

68 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

ask you all, in the words in which Grattan saluted
Ireland a nation in his time, to salute that flag,
nailed to the mast, which we will never lower, and
say ' Es to perpetua.' ' Before the Convention
closed resolutions were passed calling on all
nations at the Peace Conference to sanction Ire-
land's claim to independence; "repudiating an
English nominated Convention."

In connection with the Sinn Fein Convention
we may note a certain divergence which had earlier
become manifest between the extreme political
Nationalist movement and the Irish Labour move-
ment, though the two movements had for a moment
fused and met in the Rebellion of 1916. The Con-
vention passed two resolutions dealing with labour
questions. One asserted the right of Labour to
fair and reasonable wages; the other called upon
Irish workers who were members of trade unions
with headquarters in Great Britain to sever their
connection with such organisations. Spokesmen
of the Labour movement, which shortly after-
wards established an independent weekly news-
paper under the general direction of Mr. Thomas
Johnston, Past President of the Irish Trades
Union Congress, were quick to join issue with
Sinn Fein on these resolutions. They pointed
out that the first was of a platonic character to
which any association of employers might have
assented without demur, and that the second
ignored the conditions of the development of the \
Irish Labour movement, which could not afford
to match the political nationalism of Sinn Fein
with industrial nationalism. Against this
doctrine they urged that, apart from the largely
unskilled labour indifferently grouped and organ-
ised in the Irish Transport Workers' Union,
skilled workers in Ireland were relatively too few
and too dispersed to stand aside from the British
trade union system; the most important bodies of

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 69

skilled workmen in Ireland — such as the railway-
men, the engineers and allied tradesmen, and the
builders — depended so much in the present stage
of their development upon their unions and
federations with headquarters in Great Britain
that to sever them from the British labour
movement (especially at a. time when that move-
ment was taking active steps to extend its influence
in the national life) would compromise the whole
basis of the growth of trade union organisation
in Ireland.

A divergence between Sinn Fein and the Irish
Labour movement was, indeed, inevitable. The
mating of insurgent Nationalism and insurgent
Labour in the Easter Week rising was inherently
an instable union. The whole gospel of James
Connolly, the real driving force behind that rising,
was a preaching of nationalism in economic
terms : he sought always to interpret and express
the Irish struggle for political freedom in terms
of, and as an integral part of, the international
struggle for the economic emancipation of the pro-
letariat. Connolly did not die for Irish national-
ism in the political sense; he died, in Mr. Robert
Lynd's apt phrase, as " Ireland's first Socialist
martyr." But Sinn Fein in its later manifesta-
tion, implicated as it were almost by accident in
what was essentially a revolt of the Dublin slums
and acquiring afterwards the reflected glory of
his martyrdom in the cause of Socialism, did
not perpetuate his gospel. Sinn Fein developed as a
Nationalist movement, pure and simple. Its
economic theories were not necessarily, or even
probably, those which claim the allegiance of the
modern Labour movement. It had not seriously
modified the concept of freedom as it was preached
by the essentially political revolutionaries of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its outlook
and ideals were not manifestly less bourgeois than

70 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

those of Young Ireland. Alone among the strictly
Sinn Fein leaders — apart from representatives of
the Labour wing who still acted with Sinn Fein
like Madame Markievicz — Mr. Darrell Figgis
devoted some attention to social problems. Mr.
de Valera, in his references to the question in his
speeches, sought rather to postpone the considera-
tion of Labour's claims until after the achievement
of political freedom.

Though a measure of contact was still main-
tained, the Irish Labour movement had already
taken steps to establish a strong and independent
working-class political party in Ireland. At the
Derry Trades' Union Congress in August, 1917,
a scheme was adopted for organising those active
members of the trade unions who desired to
promote the growth of a political Irish Labour
Party. The industrial organisation of the Irish
Labour movement, though still weak, had now
reached a point which provided an adequate basis
for political action. Within the past two years
trade unionism in Ireland had undergone a very
considerable development. The most powerful
body of trade unionists, the Irish Branch of the
National Union of Railwaymen, had increased its
own membership many-fold, and, utilising to the
full its unequalled opportunities for carrying pro-
paganda into every part of the country, had
given a great impetus to the trade union move-
ment in general. A basis had been established for
a " triple alliance " of Irish Labour composed of
the railwaymen, the transport workers, and the
agricultural labourers — which last almost entirely
unorganised class had been made the special objec-
tive of the propaganda conducted by the railway-
men. Upon this foundation of expanding trade
unionism was established the political Irish
Labour Party. After the Derry Congress a
circular letter was addressed by the National

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 71

Executive of the Congress to the branches
of affiliated unions urging them to adopt the
scheme and secure as large a number of subscrib-
ing members as possible. The scheme proposed
that, where trade unions did not join the party
collectively, individuals who were bona fide
members of trade unions should be eligible for
membership. These provisions recognised, on the
one hand, that " the affiliated unions contain a
proportion of members who are in definite active
sympathy with the Irish Labour Party, but having
a large number who, while vaguely sympathetic,
are not conscious of any personal association with
the party; " and on the other hand that " there are
societies or branches of societies which are as a
whole opposed to the Irish Labour Party, but
which contain a minority who desire to become
actively associated with us " — this applying
chiefly, of course, to North East Ulster. Before
the end of 1917 more than a hundred thousand
members had already subscribed; a very remark-
able number if industrial conditions in Ireland
are borne in mind. In this situation industrial,
as apart from purely political, discontent tended
more and more to group itself behind the Irish
Labour Party rather than behind Sinn Fein.

Before resuming our narrative of events in Ire-
land during the sitting of the Convention we must
make a further and larger digression, and devote
some space to the Sinn Fein proposition that the
case of Ireland would be considered at the Peace
Conference. " By this they (the Sinn Feiners)
mean," wrote Mr. Bernard Shaw, " that when the
quarrel between the Central and the Ottoman
Empires on the one side, and the United States of
America, the British Empire, the French Republic,
Italy, Japan, &c., &c., on the other, comes to be
settled the plenipotentiaries of these Powers, at
the magic words, ' Gentlemen, IRELAND ! ' will

72 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

rise reverently, sing ' God Save Ireland,' and post-
pone all their business until they have redressed
the wrongs of Rosaleen/ It is easy, of course, to
be funny at the expense of this aspect of the Sinn
Fein programme, but the basis of the Sinn Fein
claim for Irish representation at the Peace Con-
ference is worth examining. When Mr. Asquith
spoke in the first autumn of the war (in Dublin,
curiously enough) of a settlement of Europe on
national lines — " Room," he said, " must be found,
and kept, for the independent existence and free
development of the smaller nationalities " — he
was at once challenged by Mr. Arthur Griffith and
other editors of Sinn Fein newspapers to apply
that principle to Ireland. It was at that time, how-
ever, sufficient to say that Ireland, whatever her
abstract and historical rights, as compared with
those of Belgium, Serbia, Bohemia, might amount
to, had, through Mr. John Redmond, given her
consent to be regarded as a British and domestic,
not as an international, problem. The situation
changed when, as a sequel to the rising, the Sinn
Fein Republicans, openly separatist, began to dis-
place the Redmondites at bye-elections : when, in
other words, it seemed possible that, were full con-
sideration to be given to the local national desire,
acting by way of a plebiscite, an Irish Republic
would be the result. Thus Irishmen read in the
newspapers that the peace of Europe would be a
nationalist peace — a peace, that is, which would
include not only the restoration of Belgium and
Serbia, but also the creation of new national
States and the cohesion of old ones, along the lines
of the ascertained will of majorities. How would
an Ireland, voting Sinn Fein, be left out of such
a peace ? If the Tcheko-Slovaks should have inde-
pendence— vide the Allied terms of January, 1917
— why not the Irish ? And as for the question of
minorities, were not the Germans in Bohemia more

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 73

numerous than the "British Garrison" in Ire-
land ? It was argued that no comparison could be
made beween the German rule of subject States
and me British government of Ireland : that within
the British Empire " room " could — nay, had —
been found for the development, etc., of free
nationalities; compromise and give and take were
possible here as they were not in Central Europe.
But if the Irish persistently held the contrary
opinion, what then? Great Britain had, through
authentic spokesmen, scrapped not only the Union-
ist case of the historical necessity of the absorption
of small nations by large, but also had certainly
weakened the Home Rule case, which laid stress
on compromise and renunciations for the average
good; the principle of self-determination, fully
conceded, would permit Ireland to go to the devil
in her own fashion. The question became a matter
of Irish choice purely, not a matter of what might
be wisest for Ireland, or best for the Empire as a
whole, or for the world. Mr. Bernard Shaw, who
did not believe in " small nationalities," and had
even thrown doubt on Belgian integrity, had the
right of remaining unaffected by the logic of Sinn
Fein; but what of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith,
and even of Mr. Balf our ?

We pass from the logic of the Sinn Fein pro-
posal to its practical possibilities. Early in the
war the Irish extremists of the Republican
Brotherhood, relying on the policy of Casement,
put their trust in German victory. Casement in
his published statements did not attribute to
Germany any peculiar devotion to the principle
of nationality. He merely argued that the crea-
tion of an independent State which looked out
upon the Atlantic would be to the interests of
many. He assumed a peace dictated by Germany.
In that case Germany would raise the questions of
Ireland, Egypt, India and Poland; not for the

74 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

love of the beaux yeux of these places but because
it would pay her to adopt the principles of national
self-determination where they affected the Entente
countries. When it became evident that Germany
would not dictate the peace the prophetic part of
Casement's writings had to be discarded. Even
before the rising of 1916, the German aim was a
negotiated peace, a peace from which Germany
might, indeed, secure great advantages, but which
certainly ruled out any attempt on her part to
weaken Great Britain at the vital point of Ire-
land. There was still the chance of a complete
Allied victory, and what had Sinn Fein tc
expect from that? Not much on their own
showing, so long as they represented the British
professions in favour of small nations as merely
hypocritical ! In any evidence there might be as to
the attitude of France, in most of the evidence as
to the American attitude, lay little hope enough.
America and the British Dominions would not go
further than to urge Ireland's right to Home Rule
of the Redmondite pattern. We imagine that
" Prussian Militarism is' finally destroyed," that
Alsace-Lorraine, German Poland, Belgium,
Serbia are restored, and Austria split up;
simultaneously the Irish people by a clear majority
claim a desire for independent statehood. Great
Biitain refuses (as, according to the Sinn Fein
conception of her character, she must refuse) to
accede to that desire. The net gain of the Sinn
Feiners is the mere satisfaction of being able to
say, " we told you so." There remained the likeli-
hood of a " drawn war," a peace of bargain and
barter, in which case Great Britain would surely
speak with some moral Consistency when she
negatived the separatist proposals of Sinn Fein.
She might quote what Herr Kautsky, the German
minority Socialist, said in reference to the sugges-

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 75

tions of Count Reventlow for a division of the
British Empire : —

" The falling apart o± a great State into several
small States is particularly alarming if it is a
consequence of a falling off in its power, and a
consequence of its increasing democratisation,
while meanwhile a great neighbouring State still
exists with unbroken power. The splitting up of
the great democratic State into several smaller
States, then, signifies nothing more than the weak-
ening of its democratic power of defence against
its neighbours' weapon of power."

In a sense, however, Ireland has already " gone
to the Peace Conference." The terms upon which
the war should be concluded have been publicly
debated among the Governments and parties of
the belligerent Powers; in these debates the name
of Ireland has been mentioned more than once ;
and it was undoubtedly owing to the growth of
Sinn Fein that the settlement of the Irish prob-
lem took on the character of a "war necessity"
for the British Government. The German Govern-
ment, the Russian Bolsheviks and a section at least
of American opinion all asked " What of Ireland ?"
as a test of Great Britain's sincerity in proposing
to redraw the map of Europe. It was an awkward
question, to say the least of it, for British states-
manship. Although neither President Wilson in
his various messages, nor the Pope in any of his
peace appeals, alluded to Ireland, the general prin-
ciples which they had enunciated could be
interpreted in the Sinn Fein sense of a plebiscite.
Certainly the right of Ireland to a liberal measure
of Home Rule might be deduced from the
President's pronouncements. As regards other
peace proposals, those of the German majority
Socialists mentioned Ireland by name; and here
the solution of self-government within the Empire

76 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

was openly suggested. The German Socialists re-
jected the solution of independence for subject
nationalities of both Allied and enemy Powers.
From Italy and France no utterance on the sub-
ject of Ireland has been reported. The British
Labour Party supported the Georgian proposals
of a Convention. On the other hand, the left wing
of English Radicalism, the pacificist, intellec-
tuals, revolutionists, had no objection in theory to
the complete independence for Ireland. But, as
their attitude on the question of the Slav nation-
alities in Austria-Hungary showed, they objected
to a further deluge of blood for such ends. The
Russian position was somewhat similar. Trot-
sky and Lenin proposed a peace of renunciation,
and were themselves ready to renounce portions of
historical Russia in the name of the principle of
self-determination. But they hardly expected the
Central and Entente Powers to follow their ex-
ample to the full. " You are too logical," an
English newspaper correspondent told Trotsky.
" No," Trotsky replied, " if we were logical we
would declare war against England on Ireland's
account."

In January, 1918, both the British Premier and
the American President made important state-
ments on war aims, in the course of which it
appeared that the idea of breaking up the Austro-
Hungarian Empire into independent fragments
had been abandoned. Here again the Home Rule
solution appeared. It is at the time of writing a
far cry to that disintegration of Empires, that
" Russian " peace of mutual renunciations, which
alone will bring the establishment of an Irish
Republic within the sphere of practical politics.
Sinn Fein, it is conceded, has caused discomfort to
British statesmen, and perhaps the Rebellion has
even reacted upon a foreign audience. But if Ire-
land were truly an acute international problem

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 77

she would be, with Alsace-Lorraine and Poland,
one of the obstacles to peace — and this, of course,
she is not.

After the Sinn Fein Convention and the scare
at the beginning of November the public activity
of the Party appeared to be somewhat diminished
for the remainder of the year. Mr. de Valera and
other leaders addressed one or two meetings, but
for the most part the remainder of the year was
devoted quietly to organisation work. In the
course of November Sinn Fein extended its in-
fluence in a new direction. A circular was
addressed to the clergy of various denominations
throughout Ireland setting forth that " the grave
danger of food shortage during the coming winter
and until next harvest, owing to excessive exporta-
tion of Irish food products, the consumption by the
large garrison now stationed in Ireland, and the
submarine obstacle to importation, imposes a
common duty upon us all, and has led the Sinn
Fein Executive to found a Food Committee to
organise and co-ordinate local effort, to avert a
repetition of the calamity of 1847, by retaining in
Ireland sufficient food for the entire population,
and making arrangements to have it available in
time and measure necessary for distribution in
Dublin and other cities, in County Donegal, and
wherever else famine is to be dreaded." The cir-
cular proceeded to invite information as to local
stocks and kindred matters " for our guidance in
constructing a scheme embracing the whole
country." The Food Committee continued the
activity thus begun, and its intervention in the
question of food shortage, which was exciting some
public concern, assisted materially in promoting
the popularity of Sinn Fein.

Towards the end of 1917 the Irish Unionist news-
papers began once more to write gravely about
" the state of Ireland." They were moved to pro-

78 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

tests by a new manifestation of "unrest" which
had made its appearance in those districts in the
south and west where the Sinn Fein influence was
predominant. About the beginning of December
bands of masked and armed men began to raid
country houses and farms by night in search of
arms, which they seized. In the course of Decem-
ber and January a number of raids of this nature
took place, sometimes having as their objective the
rifles of soldiers home on leave. In the majority
of cases no violence was offered, but in one such
affair in Tipperary an old man was killed in
endeavouring to resist the seizure of his son's rifle.
In January an attack was made on a police post
near Ennis in County Clare. Two more remark-
able incidents occurred — in Donegal and Cork —
when bands of masked and armed men forcibly
rescued deserters from the custody of military
escorts.

At the beginning of 1918 a new opportunity
offered for Sinn Fein to try its strength against
the Parliamentary Party, this time in Ulster. A
vacancy occurred in the representation of South
Armagh, a Nationalist seat in one of the " six
counties," with a strong Unionist minority. Sinn
Fein had now won seats in all the three southern
provinces, and, after some slight hesitation, it
decided to put to the test the effect of its propa-
ganda, which had been actively conducted through-
out the northern province, upon the Nationalists
of Ulster. The Parliamentary Party's candidate
was Mr. Patrick Donnelly, a Newry solicitor of
much local popularity. Sinn Fein selected as its
candidate Dr. Patrick McCartan, who was at the
time under detention at Halifax, Nova Scotia,
where he had been stopped while endeavouring to
make his way back to Ireland. Dr. McCartan had
gone to America in the capacity of " Ambassador
of the Irish Republic to the United States " ; and

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 79

here we may conveniently glance for a moment
at the relations of Sinn Fein with that
country.

Under date " Washington, 23rd July, 1917," the
New York World announced that " President Wil-
son received to-day two communications from the
Sinn Fein organisation setting forth plans for
American aid to obtain complete independence and
the establishment of a Eepublic for Ireland. The
same two communications were also delivered to
Congress." The World's message added that one
communication was signed by Dr. McCartan " on
behalf of the Provisional Government of the Irish
Republic " ; the other by twenty-six officers, headed
by Mr. de Valera — " of the forces formed inde-
pendently in Ireland to secure the complete libera-
tion of the Irish nation." Dr. McCartan's letter
reminded the President and Congress of the part
which Irishmen had played in the development of
the United States and their defence in time of
war, and recounted that Ireland had maintained
a struggle for independence for seven hundred and
fifty years. It questioned England's good faith at
any time in granting genuine Home Rule, and
asserted that Irish Unionists " were encouraged
by the Royal Family and aristocracy of England
to threaten civil war rather than submit to a Home
Rule Government." It declared that recent elec-
tions in Ireland had demonstrated anew the
established fact that the Republicans represented
the vast majority of the people of Ireland, and con-
cluded : — " We have no doubt about the good- will
of the American Government and people, and,
while prepared when the opportunity arises to
assert our independence by the one force that com-
mands universal respect, and to accept aid from
any quarter to that end, we hope Americans will
see their way to aid in doing for Ireland what they
did for Cuba. We feel that they will assist in re-

80 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

paying to Ireland the sacrifices and contributions
made by her sons in the cause of America."

The next public news of Dr. McCartan came on
October 24th, when a Renter message from New
York announced the arrest there by the Secret
Police of Baron von Recklinghausen, a Ger-
man agent who was declared to have intimate
associations with Sinn Fein, and of William
Mellowes, who led the rising in Galway in Easter
Week, 1916, and, after hiding in a remote part of
Connemara, ultimately succeeded in making his
escape to America by a South of Ireland port. It
was simultaneously announced that the Canadian
authorities had arrested Dr. McCartan at Halifax
on an outward bound ship in the port. The New
York message declared that all three men were
implicated in a plot to bring about another re-
bellion in Ireland, and that the American author-
ities, learning of Mellowes's association with Dr.
McCartan, whom he proposed to follow to Ireland,
advised the Canadian authorities, who then
effected the arrest at Halifax. These arrests, the
New York Times asserted, frustrated a rebellion
planned for Easter, 1918, -

Dr. McCartan, before this adventure, had been
a dispensary doctor in County Tyrone, and had
been identified with the Nationalist Volunteers
from their inception. He lent his motor-car for
the Larne gun-running exploit of 1914, when the
Ulster Volunteers imported quantities of arms and
ammunition, justifying his action on that occa-
sion on the ground that he was ready to assist any
effort to secure arms for Irishmen of any section.
After the Easter rising of 1916 he disappeared for
some time. Returning to Tyrone at the end of
1916, in the following February he was among
those deported to England, whence he returned to
take part in the Longford election, afterwards
working his passage to America as " Ambassador

THE SINN FEIN POLICY 81

of the Irish Republic," as an ordinary seaman.
During the South Armagh election Sinn Fein
speakers contrasted this incident with Mr. T. P.
O'Connor's mission to the United States in a
British cruiser. Entering the field in the election
somewhat late Sinn Fein conducted a whirlwind
campaign in the constituency, under the personal
direction of Mr. de Valera. Large numbers of
Irish Volunteers were drafted into the district.
Sinn Fein suffered from the fact that, in an elec-
tion held in the precincts of the ecclesiastical
capital of Ireland, and under the immediate
shadow of Cardinal Logue's warning issued a
month earlier, Dr. McCartan's candidature re-
ceived little or no open support from the priest-
hood, who, however, were not conspicuously active
on the side of the Parliamentary Party. The
Nationalists also brought the full force of the
party machine to bear in the election under the
guidance of Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin. The
(Jnionist vote, numbering more than a thousand
on a register of about six thousand, was recog-
nised as capable of playing a decisive part in the
election. Officially no action was taken by the
Ulster Unionist Council, but an unofficial Unionist
and temperance candidate was put forward — it
was suggested with the Machiavellian object of in-
directly assisting Dr. McCartan's candidature and,
in the event of his success, providing the Ulster
Unionists with a new argument against Home
Rule. Under pressure of the general Unionist
opinion, however, this candidature was withdrawn
before the polling day. The majority of Unionists
in the constituency abstained from voting; those
who did vote voted for the Parliamentary Party's
candidate. After an exciting contest, which pro- '
duced no new arguments, the result of the poll
was declared on February 2nd. It showed that
Sinn Fein had suffered its first electoral defeat.

82 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Mr. Donnelly, the Parliamentary Party's can-
didate, headed the poll with a majority of more
than a thousand — a majority which exceeded
all expectations, and could not be ascribed to
the Unionist vote. The South Armagh election
result, declared twelve months almost to a day
since Sinn Fein's first victory in South Ros-
common, came at a time when the deliberations of
the Irish Convention had reached an acutely
critical stage and the Government had decided
upon intervention.

CHAPTER III.

•f '

THE CONVENTION.

HUMANLY, if not politically, speaking, the Irish
Convention was a representative body of the
nation. All types of Irishmen, if not all the
opinions of Irishmen, were to be found at the
meetings at Eegent House, Trinity College, and in
Belfast and Cork. " How many orators there
are," wrote an Englishman the other day as he
contemplated the historical portraits in the Dublin
National Gallery — " how many duellists, patriots,
rebels of whom nothing but their personal attrac-
tiveness is remembered."* The normal Irishman,
this English observer added, does not seem to be
creative ; but he is dramatic and expressive, highly
endowed with wit and social gifts. It was a
generalisation of which the Irish Convention re-
minded one. That this assembly had any general
quality of greatness no one could pretend. But it
was rich in personality, in men of versatile natures
whose names would reach posterity not in books,
but in the oral traditions of their country.

Perhaps a score of the ninety odd members had
a topical reputation — were persons, that is to say,
with whom the newspapers had established a cer-
tain familiarity ; and of this score, three, let us say,
were assured already of a place in history. These
were Mr. Redmond, Sir Horace Plunkett, Mr.
George Russell — the one a leading Parliamen-
tarian of his time, the other an initiator in the field
of social reform,, the third the poet " JE," comrade
of George Moore and Yeats in Irish literary enter-
prise, who in rectent years had appeared as a

* Explorations and Reflections. By an Englishman. Dublin :
Maunsel & Co.

84 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

pamphleteer and a political idealist. To most
Englishmen Mr. Redmond for his Parliamentary
tact and eloquence, Sir Horace Plunkett for
his public spirit and leadership in the agri-
cultural co-operative movement, represented what
was most distinguished in contemporary Ireland.

Mr. Redmond, now in his 67th year, had entered
the House of Commons in 1881 as member for
New Ross. He had stood by Parnell during the
" Split " of 1891, and he subsequently led a
minority of the National Party with tact and
eloquence. When the parliamentary movement re-
united it was under his Chairmanship. Always
regarded at heart as a Moderate — certain of his
speeches in America notwithstanding — Mr. Red-
mond, owing to his attitude on the war, enjoyed at
the time of the summons to the Convention a very
considerable popularity among his Unionist fellow
countrymen. " He had fought for Home Rule for
thirty years," says a German admirer, the trans-
lator of Synge, " and had directed his life to turn-
ing a dream into a reality. . . . The name Red-
mond sounds hard and weighty; and hard,
stubborn and weighty is the man."

Sir Horace Plunkett, a younger man by three
years, had led a varied life. The son of an Anglo-
Irish peer, he was educated at Eton and Oxford,
and had engaged during his youth in cattle ranch-
ing in America ; he returned to Ireland to promote
agricultural co-operation, was for a short time a
Unionist M.P., when he displeased the extremists
of his party, but won the confidence of Mr. Balfour
and the leaders of English Conservatism. He was
Vice-President of the Irish Department of Agri-
culture from 1899-1907. During the Ulster crisis
he threw out many suggestions for compromise in
letters and addresses, which won a great measure
of attention from the Press. In 1914 he made a
striking proposal that Ulster Unionists should

THE CONVENTION 85

consent to give the Home Rule Parliament a tempo-
rary trial, exclusion, if they wished for it, to take
place after a fixed number of years. The proposal
was, however, rejected by the party concerned.

" JE " too had his fervent admirers outside of
Ireland as well as within it — and not only among
readers of poetry and students of mysticism, but
also among statesmen and economists. An Ulster-
man and a Protestant by birth, by poetic tempera-
ment a sympathiser with the hero legends of Gaelic
Ireland, long editorship of an agricultural
journal, the Irish Homestead, had brought him
into contact with the practical realities of the
social and political situation in his country. In
his National Being, published in 1916, he had
sought to describe an order of society in which
democracy would prevail in the economic life of
Ireland, and aristocratic ideals in her political
and intellectual life. The book was an " imagina-
tive meditation on the state of Ireland"; but it
contained many very " actual " suggestions with
regard to systems of representative government,
the proposals set out in Chapter XIV. for repre-
sentation of particular interests in the Irish
government reminding one of P. J. Proudhon's
application of his famous " federative principle."
In his pamphlet of 1917, Thoughts for an Irish
Convention, Mr. Russell addressed himself more
directly to the actual crisis in Irish affairs. After
explaining with a notable impartiality the point
of view of the Sinn Feiners, the Nationalist Parlia-
mentarians and the Unionists, he reached the con-
clusion that the natural compromise for Irishmen
to adopt would be the solution of Dominion Self-
Government with fiscal liberty. The pamphlet,
if it did not carry conviction to the Ulster
minority, created a remarkable impression among
the Unionists in the south of Ireland, and among
Nationalists of every variety; and it seemed that

86 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

the Government had taken a very proper course
when subsequently Mr. Russell's name appeared
in the list of the fifteen nominated members of
the Irish Convention.

Among the politicians present at the Conven-
tion next in importance to Mr. Redmond was Mr.
Joseph Devlin, the Nationalist member for West
Belfast, whose future as Irish leader had, before
the rise of the Sinn Fein movement, seemed to be
assured. To no other man, personally, did the
success of the Convention mean so much as to Mr.
Devlin. Through it he might regain a lost ascend-
ancy in Irish politics; failure here would involve
in all probability the final conquest of Ireland by
Sinn Fein or some new group of politicians, and
the extinction of the political career of a man, un-
questionably able and energetic, and not yet past
his prime. But except for Mr. Redmond and Mr.
Devlin the Convention contained few parliament-
arians of note.

The Ulster Unionist Council had decided, wisely
enough, to present its case through persons of
local standing rather than through the Orange
M.Ps., only one of whom, Mr. H. T. Barrie,
appeared at the Convention. The abler sort of
Northern Protestant does not enter Parliament.
That he has little talent or inclination for politics
is shown, significantly, by the fact that the trusted
leader of the " Ulster " cause is a Dubliner, Sir
Edward Carson. Lord Londonderry, Colonel
Wallace, a well-known Orangeman, Mr. Knight,
and Sir George Clarke, composed with Mr. Barrie,
M.P., the important delegation from the Ulster
Unionist Council; and it was upon their
action that all eyes were turned. This Council
had conducted the fight against Home Rule
during the years previous to the war, and
these men had organised the Covenant and had
supported the arming and drilling of the Ulster

THE CONVENTION 87

Volunteers. Would they now abandon that
position in deference to the alleged Imperial
necessity of an Irish settlement ? In the south of
Ireland little was known, personally, of the five
men. But it was reported that in Sir A. McDowell,
a solicitor with a large Northern practice and one
of the Government nominees, " Ulster " had found
an advocate of unusual power. Sir A. McDowell,
as it happened, was prevented by illness from
attending many meetings of the Convention, and
the burden of presenting the case of the Northern
Unionists fell chiefly on Lord Londonderry, a
descendant of Castlereagh, the promoter of the
Union, and upon Mr. Pollock, the able spokesman
of Northern capitalism, a delegate from the Belfast
Chamber of Commerce.

There were present, besides the above-named,
others who had been associated with the Carsonite
movement of 1912-14, and were still in thorough
sympathy with the statement of the Covenant.
Several Chairmen of County Councils and
Corporations in Ulster, including the Duke of
Abercorn from Tyrone, were also representative
Unionists of the northern type. Dr. Crozier of
Armagh, the Primate, had joined in the No-
Surrender Campaign before the war, and another
stern Covenanter was Dr. Irwin, the Moderator
of the General Assembly of Presbyterians. The
Ulster Unionists composed a comparatively small
minority of the whole Convention; but they had
the Government's assurance that they entered it
without prejudice to their previous declaration of
non possumus. The Southern Unionists acted
separately, and the Labour delegates, with one ex-
ception, were not of the Covenanting disposition.

Of the seven Labour delegates two served on the
Grand Committee of the Convention. These were
Mr. Robert Waugh and Alderman McCarron.
Mr. Waugh, the representative of the Belfast and

88 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

District Building Trades Federation, was a dele-
gate of wide experience in labour affairs, having
earlier been Organising Secretary of the Amal-
gamated and General Union of Carpenters and
Joiners. He was appointed one of the Irish repre-
sentatives to the Labour Party Conference at
Nottingham in January, 1918, and some years be-
fore had represented Ireland at a similar Con-
ference in Glasgow. Alderman James McCarron
was leader of the Labour representatives in Derry
Corporation, and Chairman of the Public Health
Committee. He had long been the Irish delegate
of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors, and was
a well-known speaker at Trade Union Congresses.
A man of advanced views on questions of social
reform, he was a strong supporter of Mr. Red-
mond, but a determined opponent of the partition
scheme. Of the other five Labour delegates, Mr.
H. T. Whitley, a member of the Belfast Branch
of the Typographical Union, and one of the lead-
ing trade unionists in the city, represented in the
Convention the Belfast and District Trades' Coun-
cil, and Mr. C. McKay, also of Belfast, the Ship-
building and Engineering Trades' Federation. Mr.
J. Murphy, of Dublin, representing the Irish
Branch of the National Union of Railwaymen,
was one of the most active officials of that Union,
which in recent months had very greatly increased
its membership and influence all over Ireland,
especially in Ulster. Mr. John Hanna, represent-
ing the Belfast shipyard workers, was, perhaps,
the only Labour delegate of whom it could fairly
be said that he was a politician first and a labour
man afterwards. A foreman in Harland and
Wolff's yards, Mr. Hanna was President of the
Queen's Island Unionist Club, and presided at the
mass meeting of Ulster trade unionists held in the
Ulster Hall on April 29th, 1914, to protest against
the passing of the Home Rule Bill. Somewhat in

THE CONVENTION 89

the same category, on the opposite side, one might
place Mr. Thomas Lundon, M.P. (Land and
Labour Association) a member of the Nationalist
Parliamentary Party, who was to be regarded as
more or less representative of the interests of
labour in the rural districts.

Chairmen of County and Urban Councils,
Mayors and Lord Mayors were a large block of the
assembly. These, except as voters, did not, per-
haps, count for much ; and owing to recent changes
in the opinion of the south, their representative
right might have been called in question. Most
were at the outset of the proceedings strong
" party " men. But from the historically National-
ist point of view how suitable it was that
(as actually happened) a Byrne should come from
Wicklow, a Reilly from Cavan, a Power from
Waterford, a MacMurrough Kavanagh from Car-
low ! The names had tribal and regionalist asso-
ciations running down the centuries. If the Union-
ists of Tyrone produced a British Duke for their
representative, the Nationalists of Carlow pro-
vided the Convention with a descendant of the
ancient kings of Leinster, a landlord and a Pro-
testant, who was also a Home Ruler. Dublin Cor-
poration sent to the Convention a man of eloquence
in Councillor O'Neill, Lord Mayor of the city, the
only member at Regent House who had suffered
arrest in connection with the Rebellion. Coun-
cillor O'Neill had been arrested — albeit in error—
during the martial regime of Sir John Maxwell.
" There was a man," he told his fellow townsmen
on the occasion of his election to the Mayoral
Chair, " who was despised and rejected by men.

. . . The soldiers spat upon him

He stands before you now."

The representatives of the Southern Unionist
Organisation were well chosen men of tolerant
disposition, but among them shone no bright parti-

90 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

cular star, although they had called upon an ex-
Cabinet Minister in the person of Lord Midleton,
who played a very important part in the delibera-
tions. More or less of Southern Unionist com-
plexion were such able and distinguished Irish-
men as Lord Dunraven, Lord Mayo and Lord
Oranmore and Brown (the last two representatives
of the Irish Peers), the Provost of Trinity, Dr.
Mahaffy, and Dr. Bernard, the Protestant Arch-
bishop of Dublin. Lord Dunraven, politician,
traveller, author, sportsman, reforming land-
owner, was one of the several old but still active
figures of the Convention. After presiding with
success at the Irish Land Conference of 1902, he
had endeavoured to promote a settlement of the
political question along the lines of Devolution,
and from the Tory Imperialist standpoint. Lord
Oranmore, a Conservative and former Unionist,
had, previous to the assembling of the Conven-
tion, expressed the opinion that if Home Rule
were granted it should be in its widest form next
to separation, namely, Repeal of the Union. His
speeches on Irish affairs in the House of Lords
had always been characterised by a remarkable
independence and originality. Rev. Dr. Mahaffy,
wit, courtier, scholar, appeared at the Convention
as the representative of the Elizabethan institu-
tion of Trinity College. He it was who had said
that in Ireland the " inevitable never happens, the
impossible always occurs." Very hostile to the
Young Ireland of the Gaelic League and a bitter
commentator on the Rebellion— one who could see
nothing in the events of '16 but an envious assault
of the " have-nots " upon the " haves" (he believed
that Pearse aimed at seizing the Provostship of
Trinity College) — Dr. Mahaffy was frequently ridi-
culed by Nationalists as supreme type of the
Anglo-Irish shoneen. But with his clever tongue
he gives back as good as he got; nor can a man so

THE CONVENTION 91

brilliant, a man familiar with the cosmopolitan
societies of Europe, be really suspected of sharing
the political or religious views of the narrowest
sort of Irish Protestant. Indeed it is suspected
that the Provost combined with his " superiority "
to Irish ideals a very hearty contempt for the
modern British effort to govern his country.

A very notable feature of the Convention was
the amount of ability which resided in the dele-
gations from the two Churches. Two of the four
Roman Catholic Bishops, Dr. Kelly and Dr.
O'Donnell, were well-known Redmondites, where-
as Dr. Harty and Dr. MacRory represented fairly
accurately the feeling of the Independent
Nationalists. Dr Kelly, a close personal friend
of Mr. Redmond, belonged to that division of the
clerical party which had openly denounced the Re-
bellion of Easter Week, and which desired to recon-
cile the Home Rule claim with Imperial interests.
A man of views, a student of Irish statistics and
finance, he had been for many years in close con-
tact with public affairs, having sat on the Royal
Commission on Irish Finance (1910). The Arch-
bishop of Cashel, Dr. Harty, another of the May-
nooth delegates represented a similar tendency of
opinion in the Church. A different type was the
Bishop of Raphoe — an O'Donnell from Tyrconnell
— an older man, the possessor of many popular
qualities, more of a democrat and an enthusiast,
a very keen politician. Dr. O'Donnell, although
a leading figure of Mr. Redmond's United Irish
League, had won the affection "* of " Irish "
Irelanders by his energetic efforts in the North-
West for the preservation of the Irish language.
He was himself the one native speaker at the Con-
vention. Being also a learned theologian he did
good service to Nationalists when during the
debates Orangemen raised the question of their
religious objections to Home Rule. By common

92 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

consent the Bishop of Raphoe proved himself at
the Convention to be among the two or three
ablest men on the Nationalist side. In the repre-
sentation from the Church of Ireland the genial
and conciliatory Primate, Dr. Crozier, a Coven-
anter, and Dr. Bernard, Archbishop of Dublin,
scholarly, suave, critical-minded, with English
sympathies, stood out prominently.

Lastly come the members nominated by the
Government. To several of these — including Lord
Dunraven, Mr. George Russell, and Sir Horace
Plunkett — allusion has already been made. Among
the others there were Sir Crawford MacCullagh,
a prominent member of the Belfast City Council;
Sir Bertram Windle, President of the University
College, Cork, a scientist of repute; Sir William
Whitla, a Belfast physician, and Sir William
Goulding of Dublin, a southern captain of industry.
In the list there stood out two notabilities, Mr.
W. M. Murphy and Lord MacDonnell, men past
the age of seventy who had already exercised an im-
portant influence on Irish affairs. This was the
Mr. Murphy, tramway owner and railway builder,
who had upheld the Dublin employers against
the assault of James Larkin during the famous
strike in the winter of 1913-14. The son of a
contractor in West Cork, Mr. Murphy came from
the same part of Ireland as the Sullivans, T. D.
and A. M ., and the celebrated brothers, T. M. and
Maurice Healy, and he joined this group in
Parnell's Parliamentary Party of the " eighties."
All turned bitterly anti-Parnellite during the
" Split," but objecting to the policy of Mr. Dillon
formed a third party of their own which continu-
ally harassed the recognised leaders, Mr. Dillon,
Mr. T. P. O'Connor, and subsequently, Mr. John
Redmond, who, it was alleged, continually sub-
ordinated Irish to Liberal interests. In time Mr
Murphy left Parliament, but he retained, in spite

THE CONVENTION 93

of the diversity of his business interests, sufficient
leisure to keep an eye on the " Party." He owned
in recent years the Independent, a half-penny
newspaper with a wider circulation than any of the
other Dublin journals.

During 1915 the Independent combined support
of recruiting and the war with vigorous attacks
on the Administration and Mr. Redmond. It
laid stress on the dangers of the increased
taxation of Ireland in connection with the
financial clauses of the Home Rule Act, and,
after the appointment of Sir Mathew Nathan as
Under-Secretary, hinted that deep schemes were
afoot to render Irish self-government unworkable
and worthless. These imputations of sinister
British intentions undoubtedly worked upon Irish
nerves during the winter of 1915-16, and Mr.
Birrell in his evidence before the Commission on
the Rebellion hinted that the influence of the
Independent was one of the chief difficulties which
the Administration had had to encounter. It is
needless to say that Mr. Murphy disapproved of
the Rising. But he recovered from the shock of
that outburst more quickly than did the Redmond -
ite politicians ; and soon again he was hard at work
undermining the position of the latter and up-
setting their plans. His newspaper it was which,
by playing on the susceptibilities of the Northern
Bishops, did most to upset Mr. Lloyd George's
plan of " settlement " in the summer of 1916. Sub-
sequently— though he may not have been without
suspicions — Mr. Murphy acquiesced in the next
move of the Government, namely, the Convention
proposal, and he accepted a place among the
nominated members at Regent House, although
Mr. T. M. Healy and Mr. William O'Brien, the
politicians whose ideas most nearly corresponded
with his, had refused to participate in the " farce."
An admirer, who wrote of Mr. Murphy at the

94 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

time of the Dublin strike, found him " a tall, spare
figure, slightly stooped at the shoulders, with a
mass of silvery hair framing a benevolent face in
which two kindly but piercing grey eyes are firmly
set." He has been called the Irish Lord North-
cliffe, but the description is not really apt except
in the sense that both Lord Northcliffe and Mr.
Murphy derive their political influence from the
ownership and direction of newspapers. But the
Irishman, unlike Lord Northcliffe, has been a man
of a few fixed ideas ; and if within recent years he
gave the public much of what it wanted, this was
due to coincidence rather than to design. Indeed,
Mr. Murphy's closest political associate has been
Mr. T. M. Healy, a man whose boast it has been to
be usually in a minority of one.

Lord McDonnell, formerly Sir A. P. McDonnell,
is a man of about the same age as Mr. W. M.
Murphy; both had a slight advantage in years
over the two other notable septuagenarians of the
Convention, Lord Dunraven and the Rev. Dr.
Mahaffy. Successful in a very different walk of
life he had, like Mr Murphy, started life in a
Nationalist environment, being the brother of Dr.
Mark MacDonnell, once an Irish M.P. Mr. T. P.
O'Connor had been his school-fellow in Gal way
fifty years ago. Then came a long career in India,
ending with the Governorship of Bengal. His
appointment as Under-Secretary for Ireland in
1902 created extraordinary interest. It was at the
time when a Conservative Government of Great
Britain was making an effort to deal with Irish
nationalism on conciliatory lines, particularly in
regard to the land question; and the appointment
of a Catholic with Nationalist associations to the
most important post in Dublin Castle seemed to
betoken revolutionary changes. Lord MacDonnell
may not then have been the strong Home Ruler he
afterwards became; but certainly he had little in

THE CONVENTION 95

common with that section of the Irish Unionists
which regarded every Conservative Government as
the servant of its desires. Mr. William O'Brien, in
his Olive Branch in Irish History, gives a pen
portrait of the Indian Administrator as he
appeared at that time. " He . . . somehow
suggested a resemblance to an Indian curry such
as they serve in all the pride of its four courses at
the Goljaas Hotel in Columbo to wayfarers from
the mail-boats — a dish of startling richness and
variety, but of a distinctly peppery flavour. The
only part of the stooped and meagre figure to attract
the attention was the head — the head with, per-
haps, the provoking note of interrogation of the
eyeglass. It was in every sense of the term a tete
carree, such as it would seem nothing less penetrat-
ing than a bullet could move from its base; the
head of a Bismarck, but of a Bismarck whose
heart was softer than his head."

When the Land Conference had achieved, or
largely achieved, its purpose, a movement was
started among the reforming Irish landowners
with the object of introducing certain changes in
the Irish Government in the sense of self-govern-
ment. This was what was called Devolution.
To this movement the Conservative Cabinet
adopted, at first, a benevolent attitude; but,
presently, the extremer Unionists in Ireland
actively revolted against the Wyndham-MacDon-
nell regime. When the Irish Parliamentary
Party, too, refused to continue the Land Con-
ference truce, the end was near at hand. The
position of Under- Secretary in itself meant nothing
to Lord MacDonnell, except in so far as it would
enable him to be the initiator of experiments in re-
form. Things fell back upon the old party lines,
and Lord MacDonnell, therefore, left Ireland and
took a seat upon the Indian Council. He remained,
however, a close student of Irish affairs, and he

96 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

dealt authoritatively with the Home Rule Bill of
1912 both in his speeches and writings. He
had clearly become a convert to Home Rule in its
fullest sense of fiscal autonomy, and Nationalists
were satisfied at his recall to Ireland to act upon
the Convention.

The stated purpose for which the Convention
had been summoned was the making of an Irish
Constitution. There were, however, not many
members of it who either had a knowledge of
constitutional history or constitutional forms or
were men of practical experience in administration.
Lord MacDonnell combined both qualifications. So
did Sir Francis Hopwood, the English Secretary
(who became Lord Southborough in 1917) ; he had
held many important British appointments, among
others that of Under-Secretary of State for the
Colonies, when he promoted the South African
settlement. Two Anglo-Irish Peers, the Earl of
Desart, who had been a member of the British
Court of Arbitration at the Hague, and the Earl
of Granard, Postmaster-General in a former
Liberal Government, were men with experience in
affairs. Lord Dunraven, the Bishop of Ross and
Sir Horace Plunkett had a close acquaintance with
the technical side of the Home Rule question.

Among the declared Nationalists at the Conven-
tion, Mr. George Russell, Mr. Edward E. Lysaght
and Captain Stephen Gwynn contributed the
largest share of constructive proposals. Mr.
Lysaght, the youngest member of the Convention,
and one of the most versatile — a large farmer in
County Clare and an author — represented what
might be described as the extreme left of the
Nationalist movement. Of English education, he
had become an ardent Gaelic Leaguer, and knew
more about the feelings and aspirations of the
young and serious-minded Irish democracy than
any other member of the Convention, with the pos-

THE CONVENTION 97

sible exception of Mr. George Russell. In accept-
ing the Government's invitation, however, Mr.
Lysaght made it clear that he did not in any sense
pretend to represent either the Gaelic League or
Sinn Fein movements. Mr. Stephen Gwynn,
another Oxford man, the son of a Fellow of Trinity
College and the grandson of the rebel Smith
O'Brien, combined in himself many of the con-
flicting tendencies of Irish sentiment. He had
been brought up as an Irish Unionist; hi^
early career was that of a successful journalist
and literary critic in London. Subsequently
the Irish literary movement attracted his atten-
tion, and the ideas of the Gaelic League found
in him one of their most cultivated adherents.
He had even leanings towards Sinn Fein, though
deprecating the anti-English side of Mr. Arthur
Griffith's programme. In 1906 he joined Mr.
Redmond's party as member for Galway after an
exciting contest. He wrote many books on
Irish topics, To-day and To-Morrow in Ireland,
The Fair Hills of Ireland, and the Famous Cities
of Ireland, and an Irish Novel, John Maxwell's
Marriage. When the war broke out, he appeared
as one of the most determined supporters of Mr.
Redmond's point of view, and, though already past
fifty, he volunteered for the British Army and
served in France.

The Convention, as finally constituted, con-
sisted of the following ninety-five members (in
alphabetical order) : — Government Nominees (15)
— Councillor Patrick Dempsey (Belfast), the Earl
of Desart, the Earl of Dunraven, Sir William
Goulding, the Earl of Granard, E. E. Lysaght,
Sir Crawford McCullagh, Lord MacDonnell, Sir
A. McDowell, Dr. Mahaffy, William M. Murphy,
Sir Horace Plunkett, George Russell, Sir William
Whitla, Sir Bertram Windle. Other delegates (80).
— The Duke of Abercorn, Tyrone Co. Council ; R. N.

Q

98 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Anderson, Mayor of Derry; E. H. Andrews, Dublin
Chamber of Commerce ; H. B. Armstrong, Armagh
Co. Council; H. T. Barrie, M.P., Ulster Party;
M. K. Barry, Cork Co. Council; Dr. Bernard,
Archbishop of Dublin; Sir Henry Blake, Southern
Unionist; J. Bolger, Wexford Co. Council; W.
Brodrick (Jun.), Youghal U.D.C.; J. Butler, Kil-
kenny Co. Council; T. C. Butterfield, Lord Mayor
of Cork; J Byrne, Queen's County Co. Council;
J. J. Clancy, M.P., Irish Party; Sir G. S. Clark,
Ulster Party; Colonel J. J. Clarke, Kerry Co.
Council; J. J. Coen, Westmeath Co. Council; D.
Condren, Wicklow Co. Council; Colonel R. G. S.
Crawford, M.P., Down Co. Council; Dr. Crozier,
Primate of All Ireland; J. Devlin, M.P., Irish
Party ; J. Dooly, King's County Co. Council ; Cap-
tain W. A. Doran, Louth Co. Council; T. Duggan,
Tipperary (North Riding) Co. Council; J. Dun-
leavy, Donegal Co. Council; T. Fallen, Leitrim Co.
Council; John FitzGibbon, M.P., Roscommon Co.
Council; J. Flanagan, Ballina U.D.C.; H. Gara-
han, Longford Co. Council; M. Governey, Carlow
U.D.C. ; W. Gubbins, Limerick Co. Council; Cap-
tain Stephen Gwynn, M.P., Irish Party; T. Halli-
gan, Meath Co. Council; J. Hanna, Labour (Ship-
yards); T. J. Harbison, Irish Party; Dr. Harty,
Archbishop of Cashel; Dr. John Irwin, Moderator;
J. Johnston, Lord Mayor of Belfast; Andrew
Jameson, Southern Unionist; W. Kavanagh, Car-
low Co. Council; Dr. Kelly, Bishop of Ross; J. K.
Kett, Clare Co. Council; M. E. Knight, Ulster
Party ; the Marquis of Londonderry, Ulster Party ;
T. Lundon, M.P., Labour (Land and Labour
Association) ; J. S. F. McCance, Antrim Co. Coun-
cil; Alderman J. McCarron, Labour (Derry);
M. McDonagh, Galway U.D.C. ; J. McDonnell,
Galway Co. Council; J. McGarry, Mayo Co.
Council; H. G. McGeagh, Lurgan U.D.C.; J.
McHugh, Fermanagh Co. Council; C. McKay,

THE CONVENTION 99

Labour (Shipbuilding and Engineering Trades'
Federation); J. McMeekan, Bangor U.D.C.; A. E.
McMullen, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping,
Cork; Dr. McRory, Bishop of Down; the Earl of
Mayo, Irish Peer; Viscount Midleton, Southern
Unionist; M. J. Minch, Kildare Co. Council; J.
Murphy, Labour (National Union of Railwaymen) ;
Dr.O'Donnell, Bishop of Raphoe; J. O'Dowd, M.P.,
Sligo Co. Council; C. P. O'Neill, Pembroke U.D.C.;
L. O'Neill, Lord Mayor of Dublin; P. J. O'Neill,
Dublin Co. Council; Lord Oranmore and Browne,
Irish Peer; Dr. O'Sullivan, Mayor of Waterford;
P. Peters, Mayor of Clonmel; H. M. Pollock, Bel-
fast Chamber of Commerce ; J. B. Powell, Southern
Unionist ; T. Power, Waterford Co. Council ;
Stephen Quinn, Mayor of Limerick; John Red-
mond, M.P., Irish Party; D. Reilly, Cavan Co.
Council; M. Slattery, Tipperary (S. Riding) Co.
Council; C. Stewart, Southern Unionist; T. Toal,
Monaghan Co. Council; Colonel R. H. Wallace
(Ulster Party); R. Waugh, Labour (Belfast and
District ' Building Trades' Federation) ; H. T.
Whiteley, Labour (Belfast and District Trades'
Council).*

Immediately before the assembly of the Conven-
tion an addition was made to the Defence of the
Realm Regulations declaring it to be unlawful for
anyone to violate the secrecy of its proceedings.
The prohibition covered both printed publication
and public speaking, and forbade any report or
statement which described or purported to describe
its proceedings, or referred to them, except reports
or statements officially authorised by the Chair-

* The distinguished Secretariat appointed included Mr. Erskine Childers,
author of a famous novel The Riddle of the Sands. Mr. Childers was
a well-known student of Irish politics, and had written the authoritative
book The Frameivork of Home Rule. Among his colleagues were Captain
Herbert Shaw, sometime Secretary of the Irish Unionist A'liance ; Mr.
Cruise O'Brien, a member of the Plunkett House Staff ; Mr. Callan, a
resident magistrate and authority on land purchase ; Mr. Sh&n Bullock,
the Ulster novelist, and Mr. Verpon an English public official.

man. It was generally recognised by the friends
of the Convention that this prohibition was neces-
sary if its work was not to be hampered, perhaps
fatally, by public debate on its proceedings, though
on the other hand the secrecy involved a certain
atrophy of political thought in Ireland which gave
larger scope to the Sinn Fein propaganda. The
situation was in some respects anomalous. The
members of the Convention were not themselves
bound to secrecy. A relatively large number of
people in Ireland were kept informed of its pro-
gress from day to day, and a still larger number
.gathered a general idea of the course of events
within the Convention. In these circumstances it
was inevitable that rumours sometimes misleading,
or even altogether erroneous, should get abroad.
The Irish Press in general, however, loyally
observed the regulations during the earlier stages
of the Convention, though later it was more
honoured in the breach than in the observance, at
least in spirit if not in actual fact, in such a
manner as to involve a legal offence.

It is not the intention of this book to invade the
secrecy of the processes by which the Convention
reached its conclusion. The inner history of the
Convention will doubtless be written in suitable
time by more competent hands. All that will be
attempted here is a record of its proceedings so far
as these were officially made public, and in so far
as they were revealed at the time by other published
indications. The Convention, as was mentioned
at the close of our first chapter, held its first meet-
ing in Dublin on July 25th. Mr. Duke presided at
this session, and after his opening address and the
appointment of Sir Francis Hopwood as Secretary,
a committee was appointed to advise the Conven-
tion on the selection of a suitable Chairman. It
unanimously recommended the appointment of Sir
Horace Plunkett, and this recommendation was

THE CONVENTION 101

unanimously adopted. Sir Horace Plunkett then
formally took the Chair, and the first day's pro-
ceedings terminated with votes of thanks to the
Provost and Fellows of Trinity College, and to the
Chief Secretary. Large crowds assembled in
College Green to witness the first gathering of the
Convention. A small group made a hostile demon-
stration against Mr. Redmond on his departure.
Afterwards little public interest in the meetings
was displayed. On the following day, July 26th,
considerable discussion took place as to the
arrangements for the transaction of business. A
Preliminary Procedure Committee was appointed
to submit proposals to the Convention. It was
agreed that the Convention should adjourn until
August 8th to enable the Chairman, in conjunction
with the Secretariat, to prepare and circulate to
members the material necessary to enable the Con-
vention to proceed with its task. The Preliminary
Procedure Committee then held its first meeting,
and Sir Francis Hopwood was asked to submit to
it information with regard to the procedure
adopted by the South African Convention. The
Committee met again on July 31st, under the
Chairmanship of Dr. Crozier, and drafted Stand-
ing Orders to regulate the proceedings of the Con-
vention, modelled on the general lines of those of
the General Synod of the Church of Ireland. After
final revision these Standing Orders were cir-
culated to the members of the Convention.

At the next meeting of the Convention, on
August 8th, after their adoption, the Chairman,
having described the steps taken by the1 Secre-
tariat to establish an information bureau, referred
to the various schemes for the government of Ire-
land already in existence, and suggested a pro-
cedure by which they might at once be sifted,
thoroughly examined, and subsequently brought
before the Convention for discussion. Finally it

102 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

was proposed by the Chairman, seconded by the
Bishop of Raphoe, and unanimously resolved
" that a Standing Committee of not more than
twenty members (five to form a quorum) be
appointed to consult with the Chairman as to the
procedure to be adopted by the Convention, and to
exercise such powers as may from time to time be
delegated to it by the Convention." On the motion
of the Archbishop of Armagh, seconded by the
Archbishop of Cashel, the same committee which
had previously advised on the choice of a Chairman
was appointed to advise on the choice of this Stand-
ing or Grand Committee — the second name was
subsequently adopted. At the third meeting of the
Convention, on August 9th, the appointment was
recommended and ratified of the following member-
ship of the Grand Committee, upon which the main
work of the Convention should subsequently
devolve: — B. N. Anderson (Mayor of Derry);
H. T. Barrie, M.P. ; T. C. Butterfield (Lord Mayor
of Cork); the Archbishop of Cashel,' J. Devlin,
M.P.; the Archbishop of Dublin; Captain Stephen
Gwynn, M.P.; T. J. Harbison, J. Johnston (Lord
Mayor of Belfast); E. E. Lysaght, Alderman J.
McCarron, A. McDowell, Lord MacDonnell, Vis-
count Midleton, W. M. Murphy, L. O'Neill (Lord
Mayor of Dublin); P. J. O'Neill (Chairman,
Dublin Co. Council); H. M. Pollock, G. F. Stewart,
A. R. Waugh.* This Grand Committee was em-
powered from time to time to report .what further
committejBs it was necessary to appoint.

The Convention then decided, in order to enter
upon its principal task through a preliminary ex-
amination of " such proposals for the government
of Ireland as have clear merit and some measure

* Alterations in the membership were made later on. Lord London-
derry, Dr. Irwin, Dr. Kelly, Dr. O'Donnell, Mr. Redmond, Mr. Clancy,
Mr. Russell, Mr. Powell, took the place of Messrs. Anderson, Butterfield,
Harbison, Johnston, ! . O'Neill, P J. O'Neill, Stewart, and Dr. Harty.
Dr. Crozier was co-opted later.

THE CONVENTION 103

of support in Irish public opinion," that the
Secretariat should present such schemes to the
Grand Committee in a form suitable for discus-
sion. These were then to be circulated among the
members together with all documents, historical,
statistical, and constitutional, needed to assist
them in the debate in full Convention. As this
procedure involved ^nuch detailed work it was
necessary to adjourn the Convention until August
21st. Before the adjournment it was decided to
accept an invitation from the Lord Mayor of Bel-
fast that the Convention should visit Belfast, and
it was agreed that the first series of meetings in
September should be held in that city. A similar
invitation from Cork was also cordially accepted.
The Grand Committee then proceeded forthwith
to make arrangements for the preparation and ex-
amination of draft schemes which might be made
applicable to the future government of Ireland,
and decided upon the discussion of " schemes of
the Dominion type" at the next meeting of the
Convention. At this meeting, on August 21st,
and those on August 22nd and 23rd, the Conven-
tion entered upon and continued " the considera-
tion of certain draft schemes based upon the
Dominion principle of self-government."

These meetings were felt to mark a fresh and
important phase of the deliberations. Nothing
further occurred, however, to stimulate public
interest. It had now become the regular procedure
for the Convention to meet on Tuesday, Wednes-
day and Thursday of every week. It met accord-
ingly on August 28th, 29th, and 30th in Dublin,
and on September 4th, 5th and 6th in the City Hall,
Belfast, aid every meeting was followed by the
publication of the same formula. The members of
the Convention were hospitably received in Bel-
fast, where, in the course of a public speech, Sir
Horace Plunkett said that already it was

104 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

abundantly clear that every member had come to
the Convention with the earnest desire of develop-
ing not Irish differences, but Irish agreements, and
he thought that already some of them felt very
hopeful of their task. The only jarring note
during their visit to Belfast was struck by the
Northern Whig, which descanted on the futility of
discussing schemes of self-government which were
destined to be committed to the waste-paper basket.
Some significance was attached to this demonstra-
tion, in view of the fact that the Northern Whig
was understood to be closely in touch with a certain
section of the Ulster Unionist Council. The Con-
vention then returned to Dublin, and at its next
two meetings, on September llth and 12th, issued
the same formula.

At the meeting on September 13th, however,
the formula was varied. It was announced
that " further schemes, in addition to those
previously under discussion, were introduced and
considered" — an announcement which gave rise
to the impression that no basis of settlement
could be reached " upon the Dominion principle of
self-government." The sittings of September 18th,
19th and 20th produced no more than the formula
that "the discussion on proposals for the future
government of Ireland was continued." The first
sitting in Cork, at the Crawford Technical
Institute, on September 25th, was marked by a
notable speech at a public luncheon by *he Chair-
man, who sounded a note, in his own phrase, of
" justifiable optimism," and announced that an
important stage of the deliberations had been
passed and the Convention was moving on to the
next. At this sitting a motion was adopted that
on the conclusion of the debate at the present
sitting of the Convention — on September 26th and
27th — " the various schemes which have been sub-
mitted to, and discussed in, the Contention, be

THE CONVENTION 105

referred to the Grand Committee, in order, if pro-
fitable, to prepare a scheme for submission to the
Convention, which would meet the views and
difficulties expressed by the different speakers
during the debate." On September 27th, there-
fore, the Convention stood adjourned until the
Grand Committee should be in a position to report.

During a period of nearly three months the
Grand Committee met from time to time, issuing
no reports beyond the fact of its meetings, and the
appointment of some sub-committees, of which
the most important was that established to con-
sider the completion of Land Purchase. It was
not until December 18th that the full Convention
was summoned to receive a statement of the work
done by the Grand Committee. The Convention
continued the debate on the statement during the
two following days, and then adjourned over
Christmas until January 2nd. It was by now
apparent that it had reached a crisis in its affairs.

During the Christmas adjournment Sir Horace
Plunkett made a brief reference to the Convention
in his speech on December 21st at the annual meet-
ing of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society.
" We are making progress," he said. " We have
agreed on many things. There are some things on
which we have not agreed. I cannot tell you yet
that we will be able to present a unanimous re-
port; but I can tell you that, at the end of our
deliberations, we shall leave the Irish question
better than we found it, because we shall have*
agreed on many things, and those who have to
complete the task which we may have left un-
finished will find that they have a much simpler
work to do than we had." After mentioning that
the work done by the sub-committee on Land Pur-
chase was very likely to produce a solution that
the country would approve, Sir Horace Plunkett
added : — "It is perfectly true that we have been

106 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

often on the rocks, and probably shall be on the
rocks again; but there are always tugs lying by
ready to pull us off. We will get off somehow, and
I myself am very hopeful of the ultimate result."

The meetings of the Convention in January,
after tne Christmas adjournment, however, pro-
vided no immediate justification of the Chair-
man's optimism. The meeting on January 2nd
was preceded by meetings of the Irish Peers and of
the Irish Unionist Alliance. It was now known
that Viscount Midleton, on behalf of the Southern
Unionists, had proposed the adoption of a com-
promise which fell far short of Dominion self-
government. While securing large concessions to
the Unionist minority, it contemplated the reserva-
tion of control over Customs, as well as complete
naval and military control, to the Imperial Parlia-
ment, in which a reduced Irish membership was
to be retained. During the first group of meetings
after the Christmas recess — January 2nd, 3rd and
4th — the Irish Independent — Mr. W. M. Murphy's
newspaper — published a strongly worded protest
against any settlement which did not give the Irish
Parliament complete control over Customs and
Excise. " We assert," it said, " that any scheme
of Home Rule which does not concede full fiscal
powers will not for one moment be entertained by
the country. It will be rejected and scouted with
derision." The meetings of the Convention on
January 8th, 9th and 10th, it was common know-
ledge, had resulted in absolute deadlock, and those
on the 15th, 16th and 17th provided no solution of
it. The position, it was understood, was that the
Nationalists were not prepared to reduce the claim
to Dominion powers and agree to the Midleton
compromise while the Ulster Unionists had not
denned tlxeir attitude, and while there was no
assurance that in the event of their finally refus-
ing to agree to that compromise, the Government

THE CONVENTION 107

would enforce it if it were embodied in a majority
report.*

This public impression of the situation which
had developed was confirmed when, immediately
before the next meeting of the Convention on
January 22nd, it was announced that Mr. Lysaght,
one of the nominated members, had addressed a
letter to the Prime Minister resigning his position.
Mr Lysaght, as has been mentioned, represented
the extreme left wing of the Nationalists on the
Convention. In a letter to the Press explaining
his resignation he wrote that the Irish people as a
whole could be expected to agree to no settlement!
" which does not provide for an Irish Parliament
with complete powers over all Irish affairs, and
free from outside interference of any kind. Such
a Parliament must be democratically elected, and
minority safeguards must not prevent it from ex-
pressing the will of the Irish people as a whole.
The provisions of the Constitution should in-
clude : — (1) Fiscal autonomy — i.e., complete con-
trol of all taxation, including Customs and Excise.
(2) Control of trade policy, with powers similar
to those enjoyed by the Dominions of Canada,
South Africa, Australia and New Zealand in re-
spect of making commercial treaties. (3) Power
to raise and control forces for home defence, and
powers similar to those enjoyed by the above
Dominions as regards naval forces. (4) No
representation at Westminster." Mr. Lysaght
went on to say that he believed it so desirable to
avoid the coercion of any body of Irishmen that he
had been, and remained, ready to agree to con-
cessions on the following lines in order to induce
Irish Unionists to co-operate in self-govern-

* Mr. Redmond and some of his followers adhered to the Midleton
compromise, but were opposed not only by the Independent Nationalists,
but also by Mr. Devlin and the Northern Bishops. The advocates of the
Dominion scheme had hoped to receive the support of the Belfast Labour
delegates, but these refused to go beyond the Midleton compromise.

108 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

ment : — (1) Special arrangements for a limited
period, say ten years, by which minority interests
would be represented out of proportion to their
numbers. (2) By Constitutional safeguards to en-
sure religious equality. (3) The reservation, for a
period, of the control of naval and military forces
to t^e Imperial Parliament, provided that the
Irish Parliament had power to raise and control
Volunteer forces for service in Ireland only, and
that conscription could not be imposed on Ireland
without the consent of the Irish Parliament. (4) The
recognition of the principle of an Imperial con-
tribution by the assumption of the responsibility
for the full cost of home defence, and the comple-
tion of Land Purchase by the Irish Parliament.
(The general principle which Mr. Lysaght defined
in this connection was that of " no doles from Eng-
land and no tribute from Ireland.") (5) A Free
Trade Treaty between Ireland and Great Britain,
attached to the Constitution, and binding both
countries for a term of years, always provided that
Irish control of trade in all other matters was not
impaired.

" The object of the Convention," Mr. Lysaght
proceeded, "was to find some, such means to
induce Irish Unionists, and especially Ulster
Unionists, to agree voluntarily to a Constitution
which would be acceptable to the majority of the
Irish people. Without the prospect of such agree-
ment and without an immediate assurance from
the Government, that a majority report, however
constituted, will be acted on without delay, con-
tinued discussions in the Convention seem to me to
be useless. If Mr. Lloyd George's speech of January
5th, in which he outlined British war-aims,
means anything, it certainly commits the British
Government to the principle of self-determination,
and the right of Ireland to determine her form of
government can no longer be disputed. There is, I

THE CONVENTION 109

believe, grave danger of Ireland's case being
grossly misrepresented in the eyes of the world,
who may be led to believe that the setting up of an
unrepresentative Convention of Irishmen (ham-
pered by the pledge which Ulster Unionists have
from the Government) is a fair and proper appli-
cation of the principle of self-determination to
Ireland. Every country to which the principle of
self-determination is to be applied has within its
borders a minority opposed to its national freedom.
Is Ireland alone to be dominated by that minority,
which, it must be remembered, has been offered in
Ireland concessions and safeguards unprecedented
in any democratic country in the world ? There is •
even greater danger, in my judgment, of its con-
tinued existence in protracted silence, being
utilised to postpone the question of Ireland's
future status, which is now a question of interna-
tional importance. The time has surely come for
the Government to prove to the Irish people that
the fullest self-government is not only possible, but
certain, for nationalities within the bounds of the
British Empire; otherwise they need not be sur-
prised if an increasing number of Irishmen refuse
to accept anything short of complete separation."
Mr. Lysaght's resignation from the Irish Con-
vention was immediately followed by that of Sir
Edward Carson from the War Cabinet. His letter
of resignation to the Prime Minister explained his
reasons for this step. After recalling that he had
used his influence to induce his friends in Ulster
to take part in the Convention, but had himself
been debarred from taking part in its proceedings
by his dual position as a member of the Govern-
ment and as leader of the Ulster Party, Sir Edward
Carson said that " it is apparent that, whatever the
result of the Convention may be, its proceedings
may lead to a situation demanding a decision by the
Government on grave matters of policy in Ireland."

110 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

He felt certain that it would be of advantage to
the War Cabinet to discuss this policy without his
presence, " having regard to the very prominent
part which I have taken in the past in relation to
the Home Rule controversy and the pledges by
which I am bound to my friends in Ulster." He
added that he desired to be entirely unfetterd him-
self in forming a judgment as to the new situation
which might arise, " taking account both of the
supreme duty which rests on all of us of assisting in
the prosecution of the war, and of my personal
obligations as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party/'

Mr. Lloyd George, in accepting his resignation
with regret, expressed his assurance that Sir
Edward Carson was resigning "in no partisan
spirit, for ever since the war began you have placed
victory for your country above all sectional pre-
judice or advantage." Public speculation in Ire-
land as to the use which Sir Edward Carson would
make of his liberty of action was not immediately
gratified. In his series of speeches during his
visit to Ulster after his resignation he baffled
curiosity by laying carefully equal stress on the
importance of an Irish settlement and on the
security of the Government's pledge that there
should be no coercion of Unionist Ulster. He was
clearly adopting a waiting attitude until the
Government had defined its policy.

Sir Edward Carson's resignation was at once
interpreted as meaning that the Government had
decided upon some sort of intervention in the
affairs of the Convention. This expectation was
quickly realised. The Convention had resumed its
sittings on January 22nd, the date when Sir
Edward Carson's resignation was announced. On
the morrow The Times published a remarkable dis-
patch from its Washington correspondent. The
correspondent asserted that disquieting reports
reaching America of the prospects of the Irish

THE CONVENTION 111

Convention had created a profound uneasiness,
which was causing great anxiety in official circles.
"America," he said, "regards the question as one
in which the whole civilised world is most deeply
interested. Although there is no desire on the part
either of President Wilson or the American people
to interfere in the slightest degree with the manner
of solution, the principles at stake a^e so vital that
the most disastrous consequences would inevitably
follow the collapse of the Irish Convention and the
failure of the British Government to apply to Ire-
land principles which both Mr. Lloyd George and
President Wilson have declared essential to the
future happiness of mankind. Among the mass
of the American people, it is true, there has been a
widespread feeling that the Irish Convention was
hand-picked, but the general belief is that what-
ever the majority decides will be ratified by the
Irish people. Should these hopes be dashed, no
power on earth can prevent an immediate outburst
of feeling here, which will not only very greatly
hamper President Wilson, but will have a direct
effect upon America's participation in the war.
The splendid result of Mr. Balfour's visit to the
United States would be wiped out overnight, and
distrust of Great Britain would take the place of
the confidence now happily existing. There are at
present several resolutions bearing upon the Irish
question dormant in Congress, and political condi-
tions in the United States make it certain that
action will be taken by Congress should the Con-
vention collapse and the British Government fail
to meet the resulting situation. . . . Even in
official circles a strong feeling exists that, in the
event of a collapse of the Irish Convention, the
British Government must be prepared to accept the
decisions of the majority, and to enforce them upon
the minority. This is based on the belief that the
majority of the Irish people have been obliged

112 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

in the past to live under a system of government
not desired by the majority, and acceptable only
to the minority of the inhabitants, and that now the
least the British Government can do is to give
Ireland, as a whole, the kind of government desired
by the majority, even though it may be repugnant
to the minority, as they realise that absolute
political unanimity is impossible. Americans can
no more conceive of Ulster being allowed to
separate herself from the rest of Ireland than
they could conceive of allowing South Carolina to
secede from the Union. To admit it is to admit the
right of Ireland to secede as a whole from the
British Empire."

The validity of this interpretation of the
American attitude was fiercely disputed by Ulster
Unionists. President Wilson's undoubted anxiety
for an Irish settlement, however, must be pre-
sumed to have been not the least of the influences
which decided the Government to intervene in the
Convention deadlock. On January 24th, the day
after the publication of The Times's Washington
dispatch, Sir Horace Plunkett read to the Con-
vention a letter from the Prime Minister stating
that " before a decision was come to by the Con-
vention on certain issues under discussion," he and
his colleagues in the Cabinet would be happy to
confer with leading members representing different
sections of the Convention, should they desire to
follow such a course. It was therefore decided to
adjourn the Convention, and certain members
were selected to meet the Prime Minister and his
colleagues. The Chairman was authorised to
arrange the conference for the earliest possible
date, and immediately thereafter to summon the
Convention. Owing to the Prime Minister's
engagements he did not meet the Convention re-
presentatives until the second week in February,
when he began to confer with the delegates of the

THE CONVENTION 113

various parties separately. Sir Edward Carson,
who had returned to London, was at the same time
in touch with Mr. Lloyd George.

In the period between the adjournment of the
Convention and the meetings in London three sug-
gestive things occurred. In the first place, Mr.
Devlin interpreted the Parliamentary Party's
victory in South Armagh in these terms : — "I take
the verdict of South Armagh to represent the feel-
ings of Nationalist Ulster in relation to the pre-
sent political situation in Ireland. If that verdict
means anything, it means that there must be con-
ceded to this country a measure of the widest form
of self-government. South Armagh demands such
a measure of liberty for Ireland as is enjoyed by
Canada, Australia and South Africa. If the
Government is not prepared to hearken to the voice
of the rational-minded people of Ireland as re-
flected in the decisive result of this election, then
it must be prepared to see this country handed
over to the forces of extremism and disruption. I
go so far as to say that the message of the electors
of South Armagh embodies a dual lesson. It con-
veys a message of good-will to the Convention, on
the one hand, and a warning, on the other hand,
that the question of Irish self-government must be
settled at once on the broadest and most generous
lines." Following this speech of Mr. Devlin's the
Nationalist Press, official as well as independent,
urged the demand for Dominion self-government.
In the next place, Mr. Qeorge Russell (" 3L "),
known to be one of the foremost advocates of that
solution, who had been selected as one of the dele-
gates to the London Conference, followed Mr.
Lysaght's example and resigned from the Conven-
tion on the eve of the delegates' departure. Finally,
there was to be observed a certain tentative can-
vassing in a section of the London Press of the
possibility of reviving the completely discredited
scheme of partition.

H

114 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

During the suspension of the Convention's
sittings, while the delegation from it was absent
in London, the situation in Ireland was not want-
ing in elements of interest and even of excitement.
On February 14th, in a letter to the Freeman's
Journal, Mr. Dillon made a tentative overture to
Sinn Fein, hinting at a possibility of common
action in the event of an abortive issue to the Con-
vention. In the course of his letter he asserted his
belief that an Irish Republic would not be practical
politics within the life-time of himself or Mr. de
Valera. At the same time he declared that " I am
and always have been of opinion that, if the Irish
question is not satisfactorily settled before the
conclusion of the war, an effort ought to be made,
and must be made, to get a hearing for the Irish
question at the Peace Conference." Apart from the
demand for an independent Republic, which he
said was becoming more and more a purely
academic question, Mr. Dillon suggested that the
only difference between the Nationalist Party and
Sinn Fein was that the former " consider it far
preferable, if possible, that a settlement by agree-
ment with the British people should be made now
or before the conclusion of the war, rather than
that we should be forced to appeal to the Peace
Conference." Without developing the hint of a
possible scheme of co-operation, Mr. Dillon went
on to propose a truce. He asked was it necessary
for the purposes of the Sinn Fein movement that
each by-election should be made a battlefield, " to
the manifest weakening of every movement having
for its object the winning of Irish freedom." He
proposed that Sinn Fein should carry on without
fighting by-elections, and that when the General
Election came, if the Irish question was still un-
settled, and it was still of the same mind, it should
then challenge once for all the verdict of the new
electors and let Ireland decide who was to speak in

THE CONVENTION 115

her name. In the anticipated event of this proposal
being rejected by Sinn Fein, he suggested at least
an agreement whereby neither party should bring
into a contested constituency more than a limited
number of outsiders, confined to speakers and elec-
tion agents, so as to leave the people of the con-
stituency free from outside pressure to record their
verdict, and "mitigate the scandals which have
marked recent elections." Finally, Mr. Dillon
addressed this further question to Mr. de Valera :
" Does he, or does he not, approve of the Mansion
House meeting held last week in Dublin? Does
he agree with the speaker at that meeting who de-
clared that, in his judgment, the liberty won by
the Bolsheviks in Russia is the only complete
liberty ever enjoyed by any people in history, and
that it is the kind of liberty that the Irish people
are determined to have and are prepared to fight
for?"

To these questions Mr. de Valera returned no
immediate reply. The last of the questions
addressed to him by Mr. Dillon referred to a
crowded meeting in the Dublin Mansion House
which was addressed by some Russian Bolsheviks,
who were given an enthusiastic reception by the
Irish Labour Party and the labour wing of Sinn
Fein. The policy of the Bolsheviks had at this
time brought them into extreme disfavour with
the bourgeois parties of Ireland as of every other
country. This meeting was rigidly boycotted by
orthodox members of the Sinn Fein party. It was
chiefly remarkable as illustrating the hold which
the extreme doctrines of the "class-war" had
established over the imagination of the working
classes of the Irish towns. The theory of James
Connolly and the Bolshevik theory had, of course,
much in common. The bourgeois Press, Nation-
alist as well as Unionist, however, lost no oppor-
tunity of seeking to implicate Sinn Fein in

116 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

" Bolshevism " —a term which it applied to the
development in the month of February of mani-
festations of "anarchy," though these were con-
fined to rural districts, while " Bolshevism," in any
serious meaning of the word, was wholly applic-
able to the towns.

The unrest which rapidly developed in this
month centred in Clare, a county always
peculiarly subject to agrarian disturbance, and
spread thence to the adjacent counties. Ex-
tensive and frequent raiding for arms was
followed by the organisation of cattle-drives, and
the seizure of land for tillage on a large scale.
These drives and seizures were carried out under
the auspices of the local Sinn Fein clubs " in the
name of the Irish Republic," and in defiance of
the police, who were compelled to adopt the role of
impotent spectators in the majority of cases. In
some, however, collisions occurred between the
people and the police. The successful challenge of
the political and agrarian movement to authority
began inevitably to encourage ordinary crime in
the form of the satisfaction of private vendettas,
and, in one or two cases, of serious highway
robberies. The Standing Committee of Sinn Fein
addressed a circular to the local executives in
which it said that, while most of the cattle-drives
were no doubt justifiable, some of them appeared
to be unjust and undertaken without due regard to
the circumstances, and appealed for discretion in
these and other matters lest the cause of the Irish
Republic should be brought into disrepute.

A correspondent of the New York World, after
spending ten days in the West of Ireland, thus
described the situation : " The meaning of the news
is not that the rural districts of the West are seeth-
ing with violent crime. Comparatively little of
what is happening could fairly be brought within
that term. What has happened is that the popula-

THE CONVENTION 117

tion of County Clare and of wide areas of the
adjacent counties have simply ceased to recognise
the law. There is no longer even a pretence of
general respect for authority. All Government
regulations are openly flouted. The police are
mocked at and the magistrates ridiculed with im-
punity. ... In all this there seems to be little
bitterness or hatred, but much contempt — the con-
tempt of an acute, witty and vain people for what
they choose to regard as the dull blundering of a
set of stupid outsiders. ... In this scornful
fashion Western Ireland is drifting to the rapids
of anarchy. While the Government thus finds it-
self in a state of dissolution, the background of all
Irish minds that are able to view events clearly
is snadowed by the spectre of an ultimate ' settle-
ment ' under Martial Law in the West."

Manifestations of this movement were not con-
fined to the West. In County Dublin, for example,
an aerodrome was raided at night by a masked
band of cyclist, who carried away plans and instru-
ments. A number of young men were arrested in
Dublin on charges of conspiring to blow up rail-
way bridges. On February 22nd the Dublin Press
announced that " Bolshevism has invaded Dublin."
On the previous afternoon a drove of pigs on their
way through the streets to the port for export had
been stopped, seized and slaughtered to the number
of thirty-four. The Sinn Fein Food Committee,
which by this time had extended its organisation
into almost every parish in Ireland, announced
that it took full responsibility for this action, and
that no more Irish swine must cross the Channel
until the Irish bacon factories had enough supplies
to meet the needs of the Irish people. This affair
of the pigs — " thirty-four good friends of Eng-
land butchered in the streets of Dublin," as the
Morning Post put it with mordant humour —
apparently moved the Chief Secretary to action.

118 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Mr. Duke hurriedly cancelled his engagements in
London and crossed to Dublin on February 23rd.
It was at once evident that the Executive had
decided upon a new policy. Its first step was to
attempt to defeat the " hunger-strike.". In recent
weeks persons convicted for political offences had
resorted in ever-increasing numbers to this device
—an example which ordinary prisoners tended to
follow — and the Executive, doubtless with a vivid
memory of the storm which followed the death of
Ashe, had permitted the device to become an almost
infallible means of jail delivery. Mr. Duke, in a
letter to the Lord Mayor of Cork, now announced
that "under the circumstances now existing,
physical disability, due to wilful and systematic
refusal of food, ought not to be regarded as ground
for discharge." At the same time the aid of
Catholic doctrine on the subject of self -extinction
was invoked in support of the civil law. In a
public letter dealing with cattle-driving, the Chief
Secretary wrote that he was " not surprised that
at this period, when, as I believe, there is sound
reason to anticipate fruitful results from the
labours of the Irish Convention, there should be re-
newed and systematic endeavours to disturb and
alarm the people of Ireland. The object of such
transactions is too obvious for any disguise."

Mr. Dillon, however, in his speeches saw in
the recent attitude of the Executive once more the
working of the " hidden hand." As the last of
a series of sinister symptoms he instanced the
appointment as Chief of the Imperial General
Staff of Sir Henry Wilson, " one of the chief
military advisers of Sir Edward Carson in getting
up the Ulster rebellion." Mr. Dillon suggested that
the country was being deliberately allowed, or even
invited, to drift into anarchy in order to justify
a policy of coming forward and saying, "the
country is not fit for Home Rule, and the first thing

THE CONVENTION 119

to do is to restore order." On February 27th a
Communique was issued by the General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief in Ireland announcing that
"the outbreak of lawlessness which has occurred
in County Clare rendered it necessary on Sunday
(February 24th) to send additional troops into the
county to assist the police." The county was de-
clared a special military area under the Defence
of the Realm Regulations, and powers were there-
by conferred on a military commandant to be
"enforced so long as is necessary for the restora-
tion of order." The County of Clare was thence-
forward administered by Brigadier-General Bur-
nett under a severe regime of Martial Law.

These were the circumstances in which the Con-
vention reassembled in Dublin on February 26th.*
The visit of its delegation to London appeared to
have produced no very solid results. It was un-
fortunate in its occasion, for Mr. Lloyd George
had been immersed in the Versailles Council and
in the " crisis " which followed over the dismissal
of Sir William Robertson, and had little oppor-
tunity to give the tangled affairs of the Convention
the study which they required. The delegates
brought 'back to Dublin little beyond an impression
of the capital importance which the Cabinet
attached to an Irish settlement. At the first of the
resumed meetings of the Convention the Chairman,
who had stayed in London after the rest of the
delegates, presented to the Convention a report on
the results of the delegation to the Cabinet. The
report indicated the Government's intention, in the
event of the Convention's failure to agree, to re-
sume responsibility for affecting a settlement; the
Government's ideas corresponding closely with
those of Lord Midleton. The Government,
however, had not committed itself to any

* Sir Henry Blake, one of the Southern Unionist delegates, had died
during the adjournment,

120 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

abrogation of the standing pledge to Unionist
Ulster against coercion. An attempt was made,
but defeated, to adjourn the sittings of the Conven-
tion as a protest against the state of Ireland. On
February 27th the official communique contained
only the statement that discussion on the report on
the delegation to London was continued. On the
following day it was announced that, on receiving
a report from the Grand Committee, the Conven-
tion had appointed a sub-committee to consider
the question of housing in urban areas, and that
the Convention was adjourned until the following
week to enable the sub-committee to hold its first
meeting. The appointment of such a committee at
this late stage of the Convention's business was re-
garded with some suspicion by a large part of the
Irish public. A saying attributed to Sir F. E.
Smith in an American interview was recalled in
this connection — that the best thing for Ireland
was that the Convention should " keep on talking."

CHAPTER IV.

THE REPORT AND AFTER.

THE Convention had scarcely resumed its sittings
on March 6th when they were interrupted by the
death on the same day of Mr. John Redmond, who
for some little time had been prevented by ill-
health from attending. At its meeting on the
following day the Convention passed a resolution
placing on record " our deep sense of sorrow at
the unexpected death of Mr. John Redmond, our
faithful and devoted colleague." Mr. Redmond,
the resolution declared, " was valued by all as a
great Irishman, a brilliant Parliamentarian, an
honourable opponent, a kindly friend, a genial and
warm-hearted comrade. Throughout the proceed-
ings of the Convention his wise counsel was an in-
valuable aid for our guidance. He looked upon the
work of the Convention and its outcome as fraught
with the most vital interests for the Irish people
and the whole Empire." Then out of respect for
the memory of the parliamentary leader the Con-
vention adjourned until after the funeral, which
took place at Wexford on the following Saturday.
Shortly afterwards occurred the death of Sir A.
McDowell, the ablest of the Ulstermen, whom, un-
fortunately, illness had prevented from attending
many of the sittings at Trinity College. The in-
fluence of Mr. Redmond had at one moment nearly
secured agreement between the bulk of the
Nationalists and the Southern Unionist and non-
party delegates. If that influence was overborne
while he remained leader of the Nationalist Party
and a member of the Convention, it seemed unlikely
that such a compromise of conflicting interests
should be again afforded now that he was removed
by death, and the leadership of the Parliamentary

122 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Party had passed to Mr. Dillon, who had declined
membership in the Convention.

Moreover, a more unaccommodating temper had
began to disclose itself on the other side. On
March 4th a body of twenty-two Southern
Unionists had issued a " Call to Unionists," in
which they chose this moment for reaffirming
their " conviction that in the maintenance of
the Legislative Union between Great Britain
and Ireland, and in the firm, just, and im-
partial administration of the law, lies the only
hope for the future of our country and the security
of His Majesty's Dominions." The authors of this
document proceeded to set up a Southern Unionist
Committee and to enrol supporters. They dis-
puted the validity of the claim of Lord Midleton
and the other representatives of the Irish Unionist
Alliance to speak in the name of Southern
Unionists in their attitude in the Convention.
The Committee's own policy for the solution of the
Irish question was, in effect, conscription, tempered
by the completion of land purchase. It refused to
contemplate any departure from the Union beyond
a devolution to Ireland of such local affairs as
might equally be devolved upon other parts of
the United Kingdom in a federal system.

The support which the Committee attracted was
not so great that the formation of this Southern
Unionist " cave " need be regarded as seriously
compromising the Midleton policy if that policy
had still promised to secure any approach to " sub-
stantial agreement " in the Convention. But in
the existing circumstances it tended to weaken the
position of the Southern Unionist delegates; still
more, it tended inevitably, as it was perhaps chiefly
intended, to confirm the Ulster Unionist delegates
in their uncompromising attitude — if that were
needed. An inconclusive result of the Convention
was now certain. It reassembled on March 12th,

THE REPORT AND AFTER 123

and this week sat for four instead of three days,
announcing that discussion on the Chairman's
statement on the results of the delegation to the
Cabinet, and on the statement received from the
Grand Committee, was being continued during
these sittings. This formula was understood to
cover the preparation of the Convention's Report,
which was expected to be largely of a historical
character : its conclusions, as a newspaper
gossiper said, " were expected to be a guide rather
than a mandate to the Government." Pending its
appearance public attention was directed to the
declaration of policy by Mr. Dillon, and to the
two by-elections which were in progress in Water-
ford and East Tyrone in consequence of Captain
Redmond's resignation of the latter seat to con-
test his father's old constituency against Sinn Fein.
Mr. Dillon went to Enniskillen, where he played
what his enemies called "the old tune." He
taunted the Sinn Feiners with being divided in
their counsels and vague in their aspirations, but
did not disclose his own policy. He said that the
Party could not decide upon its line of action until
the Convention had issued its report. The Con-
vention— here Mr. Dillon found himself in agree-
ment with Sinn Fein — should not be regarded as
a genuine instrument of self-determination; and
if it failed to lead to Home Rule, Mr. Dillon pro-
mised to denounce England for being false to her
profession in favour of small nations. Neverthe-
less the experiment of the Convention had been
worth while making; the Party was justified in
approving it ; and, whatever might eventuate, Mr.
Dillon (it was evident) would not associate him-
self with the Republican demand, or with threats
of physical force, or with the policy of abstention
from Westminster.

* This, of course, \TM before the Government's declaration of its
ntention to extend conscription to Ireland.

124 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

When this speech was being made it was already
evident that the contest in Waterford would end
in favour of the Irish Party's candidate. On
Saturday, March 23rd, the figures were announced.
They were: Captain Redmond, 1,242; Dr. V.
White, 764.* Comment was largely silenced
owing to the critical character which the
war in France had suddenly assumed. The
Sinn Feiners attributed their defeat, first, to
the Unionist vote and, secondly, to the " family "
feeling in favour of the Irish Party candidate.
" Captain Redmond's election," wrote The Inde-
pendent, " caused no surprise. ... It does not
prove that the Nationalists are winning all along
the line. Even two swallows do not make a sum-
mer. These results merely prove that the Party at
present has succeeded in retaining some of its
seats, though in the event of a general election
the Party would lose considerably more than
half its seats, and the result of recent contests
in no way modifies this view." An English news-
paper pointed out that Captain Redmond had
conducted his campaign in khaki, and that
the Union Jack was his emblem; while Sinn
Fein headquarters in Dublin announced the
result as "Another British Victory." After
all allowances had been made Waterford must
have induced a serious reflection among the Sinn
Feiners. It was all very well for them to jeer at
a Unionist and Redmondite collaboration under
the Union JacK. The very fact that Unionists and
Redmondites had collaborated under the Union
Jack constituted an important criticism of what
was the chief claim of Sinn Fein — that for the
international status of the Irish question.

On the same Saturday an important Note
was issued from the Convention. The public was

* The East Tyrone seat wis also held by the Nationalists by a sub-
stantial majority.

THE REPORT AND AFTER 125

informed that " decisions had been arrived at on
all material points/' and that the Chairman had
been instructed to draw up a draft report which
would be presented to the Convention after the
Easter holidays. Subsequently Lord Midleton,
the leader of the Southern Unionists at the Con-
vention, conferred in Dublin with the Executive of
the Irish Unionist Alliance (the political organi-
sation of the Southern Unionists); no report of
tne proceedings was issued to the Press, but it was
stated unofficially that the Alliance had been in-
formed of the course of events in Trinity College
up to date, and that there had been expressions
both of approval and disapproval. The comment
of the Press became more optimistic, though it was
noted that nothing had been said in the Note as to
the unanimity of the " decisions " arrived at. It
was also current that the Report of the Convention
would be largely recapitulatory and that the onus
of real decisions would be left to the Government.
Public opinion had, however, been still further
diverted from the Convention by a revival
of what was called the " Conscription menace."
In view of events in France the War Cabinet had
decided on the necessity of an increase in British
man-power. The Tory organs, the Morning Post
and Globe, seized the opportunity to raise anew the
question of the total exemption of Ireland from
the Military Service Acts. The Morning Post and
the Globe had always been urgent for Irish Con-
scription. But now for the first time the Harms-
worth Press, both Times and Daily Mail, associ-
ated themselves, albeit cautiously, with the same
demand. It was argued that the British public,
called upon for further sacrifices, would no longer
bear with the state of affairs which prevailed in
Ireland. On April 1 the Freeman's Journal hinted
that a big struggle was going on in the Cabinet,
and represented that both from the military and

126 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

the political point of view differences of opinion
on the question of Irish conscription existed. Mr.
Duke, according to the rumour, intended to resign
in the event of the adoption of the Irish proposals
of the War Office. It was also believed that for
one reason or another the Irish Unionists as a
whole shared the cautious view of Mr. Duke.
Certainly the attitude of the Irish Parliamentary
Party was not in doubt, and Mr. Devlin renewed
his pledges of opposition in the course of an
electioneering speech in Tyrone.

The suggestion came forward inevitably that
conscription should be introduced in Ireland
as a result of a " deal " between the Home Rulers
and the Government. Thus, if the Convention
should come to a decision in favour of Home Rule
the Uovernment would undertake legislation as
soon as the principle of Irish conscription had
been asserted. Mr. Garvin in the Observer pro-
posed that application of the measure should be
left to " statesmanship " in the immediate future.
The difficulties of mixing up the matter of political
settlement — if there was a sincere desire for
political settlement — with a proposal of conscrip-
tion were obvious. Mr. Lloyd George in pledging
the Government to legislate in accordance with the
recommendations of the Convention had made no
condition save that of substantial agreement
among Irishmen themselves. No sort of suggestion
of a deal with Great Britain on the basis of con-
scription had been raised. From the point of view
of the Freeman's Journal or the Party, however,
the aim of the agitators for conscription was not
so much that of securing soldiers from Ireland as
that of ruining the prospects of settlement. The
Liberal Press, the Daily Chronicle, the Daily News
and the Manchester Guardian, put forward coun-
sels of moderation. " The suggestion," said the
Daily Chronicle, " that it would be a wise and

THE REPORT AND AFTER 127

»

bold thing for the Government to extend conscrip-
tion to Ireland shows a lamentable ignorance of
tne facts. Such a policy would aggravate the
Irish problem and bring no appreciable help to
the army."

On Saturday, April 6, the Press unanimously
announced that the Cabinet had come to a decision
of bringing Ireland within the scope of the new
Man Power Bill. According to the best informed
journals the principle of Irish conscription was
to be asserted. At tne same time the Report of the
Convention came into the Government's hands; it
was laid upon the Table of the House of Commons
on April 9th. The Press of that morning stated
that the Government were of opinion that the Re-
port sufficiently satisfied the condition of sub-
stantial agreement to justify it in presenting
immediately to Parliament a " Bill for a Final
Settlement of the Irish Question." The supporters
of the Government denied that either plan was
conditional upon the other; a coincidence had
occurred, a fortunate coincidence, and nothing
more. In Ireland, however, even among Unionists,
the value of the coincidence was disputed ; the Irish
Times declared that Ireland's " obligation to her-
self and humanity " should have no sort of con-
nection with her form of government, and the same
newspaper suggested that in his " earnest desire
for a settlement " —for a coincidence of events —
the Premier had read into the report more than it
contained. The Dublin Corporation called a meet-
ing and warned the Government against " the dis-
astrous effect " of the " insane proposal " of con-
scription. One of the Redmondite members of the
Council stated that Nationalist Ireland would not
accept the proposal even if it were the outcome of
the most satisfactory political settlement; and he
moved an addendum to the resolution asking the
Lord Mayor to invite Messrs. Dillon, De Valera,

128 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Devlin, A. Griffith, and representatives of the
Trades Union Congress to meet him in conference
for a united opposition to conscription, and to
consider the establishment of an All-Ireland
Covenant. As regards the actual nature of the
Convention Report it was now known for certain
that it amounted merely to a record of proceedings
in chronological order, of proposals made, decision?
taken, of voting, and of a statement of the views
of the various bodies into which the Convention
had divided.

On April 9th, when the Premier introduced his
Man Power proposals to the House of Commons
the prophets who had foretold that conscription
would be contingent on Home Rule, or vice versa,
proved to have been in error. He said that the re-
markable Convention which had just been held in
Ireland furnished the Government with another
opportunity (here Mr. Byrne interjected, " Of
breaking its word ") of approaching the vexed
question of Irish autonomy with more hope of
success. " But," he added, " there must be no mis-
apprehension. The questions (of conscription and
Home Rule) do not stand together. Each must be
taken on its merits." The Premier justified com-
pulsion in Ireland by quoting from speeches of
Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon in support of the
war. Had not Mr. Redmond said in 1916 that he
opposed conscription on the grounds of expediency
not of principle? Had not Mr. Dillon said that
that he would not hesitate to support conscription,
to-morrow if he thought it necessary to maintain
liberty? Mr. Dillon took up the challenge in his
replies. If Irish liberties were at stake (he said)
he would still not hesitate to support Conscription.
The inexpediency of the measure even from the
Allied standpoint still held good ; for " you take
a decision which will plunge Ireland into blood-
shed and open up a new war front." He might

THE REPORT AND AFTER 129

have quoted from the significant statement of the
Irish Roman Catholic Bishops which had been
published on that very day in the Dublin Press : —
" What between mismanagement and mischief
making this country has already been deplorably
upset, and it would be a fatal mistake, surpassing
the worst blunders of the past, to furnish a telling
plea now for desperate courses by the attempt to
enforce Conscription." The Irish Parliamentary
leader also attacked the Premier's proposal from
the ground of principle, and he asked what justice
there could be in the Government's taking its
decision without the consultation of one single
Irish representative.

All turned theoretically on the question of
status, and the Premier scored by pointing out (as
Sinn Feiners had often done) that the Parlia-
mentary Party by accepting the Home Rule Act
of 1914 had acquiesced in the Imperial right to
compel Irishmen to military service. On the other
hand, in 1917, by the establishment of the Irish
Convention — if the Convention were not a farce —
the Government had admitted an Irish right of
self-determination. Mr. Lloyd George's refer-
ences to the Convention in his speech of April 9th,
were, to put it mildly, unfortunate. It transpired
that he had not yet had time to read the Report.
But, apparently, he had gathered vaguely that
there had not been complete unanimity at the Con-
vention. " I understand that it reported by a
majority. I fear the majority is not such as to
justify the Government in saying that it represents
substantial agreement. . . ." Therefore the
Government would take the responsibility of sub-
mitting to Parliament such proposals for the
establishment of self-government in Ireland as
they thought " just." By these words, in effect,
the Premier threw over the whole case for the Con-
vention, that body having been set up in 1917 for

1

130 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

the alleged reason that the Government could not
say in what " justice " to Ireland consisted, and
had determined to leave the matter to Irishmen
themselves. Mr. Devlin disclosed the fact (of
which the Premier professed ignorance) that a sub-
committee of the Convention had reported on the
application of conscription to Ireland, and de-
clared it to be, assuming the establishment
of an Irish Parliament, " impossible " without the
consent and co-operation of that Parliament.

While the Man Power Bill was being hurried
through the House of Commons amid protests from
Ireland — protests that the Dublin Correspondent
of The Times described as the most violent within
the memory of man — the Blue Book containing the
Report of the Proceedings of the Irish Convention
was issued to the public. It contained Sir H.
Plunkett's Report of the Proceedings, a Report of
the Ulster Unionist delegates, a Note by the Pro-
vost and the Archbishop of Armagh, a Report by
twenty-two Nationalist members of the Conven-
tion, a Note by the majority of the Labour repre-
sentatives, a Note by the Earl of Dunraven, and a
Note by the Southern Unionists.* It was found
that all the Southern Unionists, a majority of
Nationalists, and five out of the seven Labour re-
presentatives were agreed that the scheme of Irish,
self-government set out in paragraph 42 of the
Report of the Proceedings should be immediately
passed into law. Paragraph 42 provided for an
Irish Parliament (King, Senate and Commons),
and at the same time, for the maintenace of the
supreme power and authority of the Parliament of
the United Kingdom. The minority of eighteen

* This sub-committee consisted of two Irish Peers, a Southern Unionist
Delegates, and two Soldser Nationalists. The report was unanimous, and
was adopted by the Convention by a majority

t Paragraph 42 of the Report c f the Proceedings will be found in the
Appendix to this Volume, together with the Ulster Report, the Note of
the Nationalist Majority and Minority Nationalist Report.

THE REUORT AND AFTER 131

which voted against this provision was composed
wholly of Northern Unionists. Certain matters,
such as Peace and War, the Coinage, Army and
Navy, Harbours for naval and military purposes,
were definitely excluded from the powers of the
Irish Parliament. The Irish Police and Postal
services were to be under unified control during the
war, subject to Imperial exigencies, but the ad-
ministration of these services would after the
cessation of hostilities become automatically sub-
ject to the Irish Parliament. There were to be
certain restrictions on the power of the Irish
Parliament on matters within its competence,
as in the Home Rule Act of 1914. All-important,
however, were the sections in paragraph 42
relating to Finance and the Concessions to
Unionists. The Nationalists of both sections
provec to have been equally generous to the
Irish Unionist and Protestant minority in their
offer :>f safeguards. They were ready to
accept the principle that 40 per cent, of the mem-
bership of the Irish Commons should be guaranteed
to Unionists. They consented that for a period
there should be summoned to the Commons 20 mem-
bers noninated by the Lord Lieutenant, with a
view tc the due representation of interests not
otherwise adequately represented in the provinces
of Leiiuter, Munster and Connaught, and that 20
additioial members should be elected by Ulster
constituencies, to represent commercial, industrial;
and agricultural interests (in the latter suggestion
an ida had evidently been borrowed from Mr.
Georgg Russell's celebrated pamphlet Thoughts
for a Convention}. The extra-representation of
Ulste would not cease except on an adverse de-
cision by a three-fourth's majority of both Houses
sittinf together. This last sub-section was carried
by 2( votes to 20, the delegates of the Ulster
Uniorist Council abstaining.

In regard to Finance, on the sub-section post-
poning the Control of Customs and Excise for
lurther consideration until after the war, and pro-
viding that the question of such control should be
considered and decided by the United Kingdom
Parliament within seven years after the conclusion
of peace, the voting was very close — 38 to 34- The
Ulster, delegates voted in the minority together
with a large number of leading Nationalists,
notably, the Archbishop of Cashel, the Bishop of
Down and Connor, Mr. Joseph Devlin and Mr.
W. M. Murphy. The delegates of the Irish Party
were themselves divided, Mr. Devlin being on one
side and Captain Stephen Gwynn on the other. On
this issue there had been, according to the Chair-
man's draft report, three clearly defined bodies of
opinion in the Convention; the Ulster Unionists
advocating the maintenance of fiscal unity within
the United Kingdom ; a section of Nationalists in-
sisting on complete fiscal autonomy for Ireland;
and the Southern Unionists, with the adherence of
a majority of Nationalists and the majority of the
labour members, agreeing to a compromise which
left to Ireland the proceeds of all sources of revenue
and the imposition of all taxes other than Customs.

On February 25, 1918, the Premier, who lad been
informed of events, communicated to Sii Horace
Plunkett a letter which contained, amoig other
suggestions, certain proposals regarding Customs
and Excise.* Mr. Lloyd George opposed the de-
mand for fiscal autonomy; for the tramfer of
Customs and Excise would be " impossible in the
midst of a great war," and might also be "incom-
patible with the federal reorganisation >f the
United Kingdom." After that the Con^ntion
took up a resolution of Lord MacDonnell which
embodied, with variation in detail, some of the
suggestions contained in the Premier's lette. But

* See Appendix.

THE REPORT AN DAFTER 133

whereas the Premier had proposed that a Royal
Commission should sit after the war and " re-
examine " the financial relations of Ireland and
England, Lord MacDonnell's motion made it clear
that a decision as regards the " imposition of
Customs and Excise " should be arrived at by the
Imperial Parliament within seven years after the
cessation of hostilities. For the purposes of the
decision a number of Irish representatives pro-
portioned to the population of Ireland should be
called to the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
The Nationalists who consented to the compromise
explained in a Note that, in their belief, the pro-
posed Parliament would be an effective instrument
in obtaining further powers by general consent;
that the proposal to pay into an Irish Exchequer
the full proceeds of Irish taxation, direct and in-
direct, subject only to an agreed contribution to
Imperial expenditure, would give the Irish Govern-
ment means for internal development; and that
the claim of an Irish Parliament to be the sole tax-
ing authority for Ireland must still hold. The
Note was signed by 25 Nationalists and 3 Liberals
(Lords Granard and MacDonnell and Sir Bertram
Windle). The 22 Nationalists who drew up a
Minority Report* dwelt largely upon the subject.
This Report, which had the support of three clerics
(Dr. O'Donnell, Dr. Harty and Dr. MacRory), of
Mr. Devlin, M.P., of Mr. Lundon, M.P., of Mr.
Harbison, M.P., and Mr. W. M. Murphy proposed
the recognition of Irish rights over Customs and
Excise, but agreed to a suspension of such rights
until after the war, to a guarantee for a reasonable
period of Free Trade between Ireland and England
" in articles which were the produce or manu-
facture of either country," and to a fixed statutory
contribution to Imperial Expenses."

In dealing with the question of Irish representa-
tion at Westminster the Nationalists of the

134 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

minority stated that they would have preferred
that all representation at Westminster should ceare
for the time being. The report of the proceedings
does not indicate that the Nationalist members of
the Convention showed at any time a very strong
feeling on this point. In a scheme of Colonial
Home Rule drawn up by the Bishop of Raphoe
during the autumn, for submission to a sub-com-
mittee of the Grand Committee, it had been pro-
posed that " representation in the Parliament of
the United Kingdom should cease until there was
a Federal Parliament." The Unionists, however,
both of the North and South, intimated that re-
presentation at Westminster was for them a sine
qua non. On the Nationalist's side it was stated
that, while they did not favour the continuance of
representation in the Imperial Parliament, they
did not look upon its cessation as a sine qua non.
Doubts were expressed as to whether Irish repre-
sentatives at Westminster should be directly
elected or delegated by the Irish Parliament. In
the final voting (paragraph 42) it was decided that
forty-two Irish members should be elected to the
Imperial Parliament on the panel system.

We may here give the " letter of transmission "
of the 8th of April, 1918, in which Sir Horace
Plunkett, addressing the British Prime Minister,
summed up results. : — "I have the honour to
transmit herewith the Report of the Proceedings
of the Irish Convention. For the immediate
object of the Government the Report tells all
that needs to be told : it shows that in the
Convention, whilst it was not found possible
to overcome the objections of the Ulster Unionists,
a majority of Nationalists, all the Southern
Unionists, and five out of the seven Labour repre-
sentatives were agreed that the scheme of Irish
self-government set out in paragraph 42 of the
Report should be immediately passed into law. A

135

minority of Nationalists propose a scheme which
differs in only one important particular from that
of the majority. The Convention has, therefore,
laid a foundation of Irish agreement unpre-
cedented in history. I recognise that action in
Parliament upon the result of our deliberations
must largely depend upon public opinion. Without
a knowledge of the circumstances which, at the
termination of our proceedings, compelled us to
adopt an unusual method of presenting the results
of our deliberations, the public might be misled as
to what has actually been achieved. It is, there-
fore, necessary to explain our procedure.

" We had every reason to believe that the Govern-
ment contemplated immediate legislation upon the
results of our labours. The work of an Irish
settlement, suspended at the outbreak of the war,
is now felt to admit of no further postponement.
In the Dominions and in the United States, as well
as in other allied countries, the unsettled Irish
Question is a disturbing factor, both in regard to
war effort and peace aims. Nevertheless, urgent
as our task was, we could not complete it unni
every possibility of agreement had been explored.
The moment this point was reached — and you will
not be surprised that it took us eight months to
reach it — we decided to issue our Report with the
least possible delay. To do this we had to avoid
further controversy and protracted debate. I was,
therefore, on March 22nd, instructed to draft a
Report which should be a mere narrative of the
Convention's proceedings, with a statement, for
the information of the Government, of the con-
clusions adopted, whether unanimously or by
majorities. It was hoped that this Report might
be unanimously signed, and it was understood that
any groups or individuals would be free to append
to it such statements as they deemed necessary to
give expression to their views. The Draft Report

136 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

was circulated on March 30th, and discussed and
amended on April 4th and 5th. The accuracy of
the narrative was not challenged, though there was
considerable difference of opinion as to the relative
prominence which should be given to some parts
of the proceedings. As time pressed it was decided
not to have any discussion upon a Majority Report,
nor upon any Minority Reports or other statements
which might be submitted. The Draft Report was
adopted by a majority, and the Chairman and
Secretary were ordered to sign it, and forward it
to the Government. A limit of twenty-four hours
was, by agreement, put upon the reception of any
other reports or statements, and in the afternoon
of April 5th the Convention adjourned sine die.

" The public is thus provided with no Majority
Report, in the sense of a reasoned statement in
favour of the conclusions upon which the majority
are agreed, but is left to gather from the narrative
of proceedings what the contents of such a report
would have been. On the other hand, both the
Ulster Unionists and a minority of the Nationalists
have presented Minority Reports covering the
whole field of the Convention's enquiry. The re-
sult of this procedure is to minimise the agreement
reached, and to emphasise the disagreement. In
these circumstances, I conceive it to be my duty
as Chairman to submit such explanatory observa-
tions as are required to enable the reader of the
Report and the accompanying documents to gain
a clear idea of the real effect and significance of the
Convention's achievement. I may assume a know-
ledge of the broad facts of the Irish Question. It
will be agreed that, of recent years, the greatest
obstacle to its settlement has been the Ulster
difficulty. There seemed to be two possible issues
to our deliberations. If a scheme of Irish self-
government could be framed to which the Ulster
Unionists would give their adherence, then the

137

Convention might produce a unanimous Report.
Failing such a consummation, we might secure
agreement, either complete or substantial, between
the Nationalist, the Southern Unionist and the
labour representatives. Many entertained the hope
that the effect of such a striking and wholly new
development would be to induce Ulster to recon-
sider its position.

" Perhaps unanimity was too much to expect. Be
this as it may, neither time nor effort was spared
in striving for that goal, and there were moments
when its attainment seemed possible. There was,
however, a portion of Ulster where a majority
claimed that, if Ireland had the right to separate
herself from the rest of the United Kingdom, they
had the same right to separation from the rest of
Ireland. But the time had gone by when any other
section of the Irish people would accept the parti-
tion of their country even as a temporary expedient.
Hence, the Ulster Unionist members in the Con-
vention remained there only in the hope that some
form of Home Rule would be proposed which might
modify the determination of those they represented
to have neither part nor lot in an Irish Parliament.
The Nationalists strove to win them by concessions ;
but they found themselves unable to accept any of
the schemes discussed and the only scheme of Irish
government they presented to the Convention was
confined to the exclusion of their entire Province.
Long before the hope of complete unanimity had
passed, the majority of the Convention were con-
sidering the possibilities of agreement between
the Nationalists and the Southern Unionists
Lord Midleton was the first to make a concrete
proposal to this end. The Report shows that
in November he outlined to the Grand Committee,
and in December brought before the Convention,
what looked like a workable compromise. It
accepted self-government for Iceland. In return

138 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

for special minority representation in the Irish
Parliament, already conceded by the Nationalists,
it offered to that Parliament complete power
over internal legislation and administration and,
in matters of finance, over direct taxation
and Excise. But, although they agreed that
the Customs revenue should be paid into the Irish
Exchequer, the Southern Unionists insisted upon
the permanent reservation to the Imperial Parlia-
ment of the power to fix the rates of Customs duties.
By far the greater part of our time and attention
was occupied by this one question, whether the im-
position of Custom duties should or should not be
under the control of the Irish Parliament. The
difficulties of the Irish Convention may be summed
up in two words — Ulster and Customs.

" The Ulster difficulty the whole world knows;
but how the Customs question came to be one of
vital principle, upon the decision of which de-
pended the amount of agreement that could be
reached in the Convention, needs to be told. The
tendency of recent political thought among con-
stitutional Nationalists has been towards a form
of government resembling as closely as possible
that of the Dominions, and, since the geographical
position of Ireland imposes obvious restrictions in
respect of naval and military affairs, the claim for
Dominion Home Rule was concentrated upon a
demand for unrestricted fiscal powers. Without
separate Customs and Excise Ireland would,
according to this view, fail to attain a national
status like that enjoyed by the Dominions. Upon
this issue the Nationalists made a strong case, and
were able to prove that a considerable number o*
leading commercial men had come to favour fiscal
autonomy as part of an Irish settlement. In the
present state of public opinion in Ireland, it was
feared that without Customs no scheme the Con-
vention recommended would receive sufficient

139

measure of support to secure legislation. To
obviate any serious disturbance of the trade
of the United Kingdom, the Nationalists were
prepared to agree to a free trade arrangement
between the two countries. But this did not
overcome the difficulties of the Southern Unionists,
who on this point agreed with the Ulster
Unionists. They were apprehensive that a separate
system of Customs control, however guarded,
might impair the authority of the United
Kingdom over its external trade policy. Neither
could they consent to any settlement which was, in
their judgment, incompatible with Ireland's full
participation in a scheme of United Kingdom
federation, should that come to pass.

" It was clear that by means of mutual con-
cessions agreement between the Nationalists and
the Southern Unionists could be reached on all other
points. On this important point, however, a sec-
tion of the Nationalists, who have embodied their
views in a separate Report, held that no com-
promise was possible. On the other hand, a
majority of the Nationalists and the whole body
of Southern Unionists felt that nothing effective
could result from their work in the Convention
unless some understanding was reached upon
Customs which would render an agreement on a
complete scheme attainable. Neither side was
willing to surrender the principle ; but both sides
were willing, in order that a Parliament should be
at once established, to postpone a legislative
decision upon the ultimate control of Customs and
Excise. At the same time each party has put on
record, in separate notes subjoined to the Report,
its claim respecting the final settlement of this
question. A decision having been reached upon
the cardinal issue, the majority of the Convention
carried a series of resolutions which, together, form
a complete scheme of self-government. This

140 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

scheme provides for the establishment of a
Parliament for the whole of Ireland with an
Executive responsible to it, and with full powers
over all internal legislation, administration and
direct taxation. Pending a decision of the fiscal
question, it is provided that the imposition of
duties of Customs and Excise shall remain with
the Imperial Parliament, but that the whole of the
proceeds of these taxes shall be paid into the Irish
Exchequer. A joint Exchequer Board is to be set
up to determine the Irish true revenue, and Ire-
land is to be represented upon the Board of
Customs and Excise of the United Kingdom The
principle of representation in the Imperial Parlia-
ment was insisted upon from the first by the
Southern Unionists, and the Nationalists conceded
it. It was felt, however, that there were strong
reasons for providing that the Irish representa-
tives at Westminster should be elected by the Irish
Parliament rather than directly by the con-
stituencies, and this was the arrangement adopted.
It was accepted in principle that there should be
an Irish contribution to the cost of Imperial ser-
vices, but, owing to lack of data, it was not found
possible in the Convention to fix any definite sum.

" It was agreed that the Irish Parliament should
consist of two Houses — a Senate of 64 members
and a House of Commons of 200. The principle
underlying the composition of the Senate is the
representation of interests. This is affected by
giving representation to commerce, industry and
labour, the County Councils, the Churches, learned
institutions and the Peerage. In constituting the
House of Commons the Nationalists offered to
guarantee forty per cent, of its membership to the
Unionists. It was agreed that, in the South,
adequate representation for Unionists could only
be secured by nomination; but, as the Ulster re-
presentatives had informed the Convention that

THE REPORT AND AFTER 141

those for whom they spoke could not accept the
principle of nomination, provision was made in the
scheme for an extra representation of .Ulster by
direct election. The majority of the Labour re-
presentatives associated themselves with the
Nationalists and Southern Unionists in building
up the Constitution, with the provisions of which
they found themselves in general agreement. They
frankly objected, however, to the principle of
nomination and to what they regarded as the in-
adequate representation of Labour in the Upper
House. Throughout our proceedings they helped
in every way towards the attainment of agreement.
Nor did they press their own special claims in such
a manner as to make more difficult the work already
difficult enough, of agreeing upon a constitution.

' I trust I have said enough to enable the reader
of this Report and the accompanying documents
to form an accurate judgment upon the nature and
difficulties of the task before the Convention and
upon its actual achievement. While, technically,
it was our function to draft a Constitution for our
country, it would be more correct to say that we
had to find a way out of the most complex and
anomalous political situation to be found in
history — I might almost say in fiction. We are
living under a system of Government which sur-
vives only because the Act abolishing it cannot,
consistently with Ministerial pledges, be put into
operation without further legislation no less
difficult and controversial than that which it has to
amend. While the responsibility for a solution to
our problem rests primarily with the "Government,
the Convention found itself in full accord with
your insistence that the most hopeful path to a
settlement was to be found in Irish agreement. In
seeking this — in attempting to find a compromise
which Ireland might accept and Parliament pass
into law — it has been recognised that the full p/o-

142 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

granule of no party could be adopted. The Con-
vention was also bound to give due weight to your
opinion that to press for a settlement at West-
minster, during the war, of the question which,
as I have shown, had been a formidable obstacle
to agreement would be to imperil the prospect of
the early establishment of self-government in
Ireland. Notwithstanding the difficulties with
which we were surrounded, a larger measure of
agreement has been reached upon the principle and
details of Irish self-government than has ever yet
been attained. Is it too much to hope that the
scheme embodying this agreement will forthwith
be brought to fruition by those to whose call
the Irish Convention has now responded ? ':

Before we proceed to record the Government's
action upon the Report, however, it will be desir-
able, since space has been found in the Appendix
only for paragraph 42 of the Draft Report of the
proceedings, to give here a resume of the earlier
pages. Some of the events recorded by Sir Horace
Plunkett have already been noted in the other parts
of this book. In paragraph 10 of the Narrative
we learn that the Bishop of Raphoe was in October
delegated to present the Heads of a Scheme for
the consideration of a sub-committee (Mr. Barrie,
Mr. Devlin, Lord Londonderry, Sir A. McDowell,
Lord Midleton, Mr. W. M. Murphy, the Bishop of
Raphoe, Mr. Redmond and Mr. Russell). The
Bishop's scheme turned out, in effect, to be a pro-
posal of " Dominion " Home Rule, although the
Ulster Unionists in their Minority Report sub-
sequently credited the Bishop with having pro-
posed co-equal Parliaments for Ireland and Eng-
land. The Bishop gave the Irish Parliament
power to maintain a Defence Force, power in re-
spect of commercial treaties, complete authority
over Finance, Police and Post Office. But he ex-
cluded the Army and Navy from Irish interference,

THE REPORT AND AFTER 143

he agreed to an Irish contribution to the Imperial
Exchequer, and he suggested restriction on the
powers of the Irish Parliament in respect of re-
ligious legislation. The sub-committee in consider-
ing the Scheme arrived at certain provisional con-
clusions on most of the Heads (though not on the
more important ones), but these provisional under-
standings were all contingent on full agreement
on the general scheme being reached. Lord South-
borough subsequently submitted new proposals on
the question of finance, but these proposals failed
to gain the unanimous assent of the Sub-Com-
mittee. The Chairman then intervened and sub-
mitted certain questions to the Nationalists and
Ulster representatives. He received replies which
showed that there could be no basis of agreement,
the Ulstermen declaring their opinion that for Ire-
land and for Great Britain a common system of
Finance, with one Exchequer, was a fundamental
essential.* The Grand Committee again took up
the task of discussion. Then on the 2nd of January
Lord Midleton, before the whole Convention, intro-
duced his compromise, which, in the first instance,
took the form of the following Resolution : —

' That, in the event of the establishment of an
Irish Parliament, there be reserved to the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom full authority for
Imperial services, including the levying of Custom
Duties, but subject to the above limitation, the
Irish Parliament shall control all purely Irish
services, including Judicature and Police, with
internal taxation and administration.

The differences between Nationalists on the
Midleton compromise led, as has been already
stated, to the Premier's intervention (letters of
February and 21st January*). During the sessions

* For the answers of the Nationalists and Ulstermen to Sir Horace
Plunkett's queries, see Appendix :

* For letter of 25th February, see Appendix.

of February 26th, 27th and 28th the Convention
considered the views of the Cabinet. On March
5th the resolution of Lord MacDonnell on the
Fiscal question was taken up, and on March 12th
was carried by a majority of 4,* whereupon the
Convention resumed the consideration of the state-
ment of provisional conclusions reached in the
Grand Committee. Mr. Barrie, M.P., presently
moved his amendment excluding all Ulster from
the power of the Irish Parliament. It was defeated
by 52 votes to 19. On the 22nd of March the Con-
vention adopted unanimously the final report of
the Sub- Committee on Land Purchase, which con-
tained detailed recommendations for a complete
settlement of the agrarian question, under a scheme
for recasting the framework of the government of
Ireland. It did the same with the Report of the
Committee appointed to consider the Question of
Housing in Urban Areas in Ireland. Finally, on
the 5th of April, 1918, the Chairman and Secretary
were, by 42 votes to 35, empowered to submit the
Report of Proceedings to His Majesty's Govern-
ment. There voted in the minority of 35 the 18
representatives of Ulster Unionism, one of the
Labour delegates from Belfast and, among the
Nationalists, the Archbishop of Cashel, the Lord
Mayor of Cork, Mr. T. Lundon, M.P., Mr. J.
Devlin, M.P., the Bishop of Raphoe, the Bishop of
Down and Connor, and Mr. W. M. Murphy.

We have dealt above at some length, in its pro-
per place in the historical sequence of events, with
the Convention's Report. The issue of the Report,
however, was made to an Irish public profoundly
uninterested in it. The mind of the whole people
was fixed on conscription, to the complete exclusion
of any other question. Nor was the gathering
storm of determined opposition to the proposal to

* See Appendix, paragraph 42. section 15 ; and division list.

THE REPORT AND AFTER 145

conscript Ireland in any way checked by a certain
change in the Government's attitude which was
disclosed during the hurried passage of the
Military Service Bill through the House of Com-
mons under the " guillotine." The Irish clause of
the Bill — Clause II. — gave the Government power
to extend the operation of the Act to Ireland by
Order in Council. In his speech on the first read-
ing of the Bill on April 9th the Prime Minister
announced the Government's intention to use this
power immediately upon the completion of the
necessary preliminary arrangements. So far as the
question of Home Rule — which he insisted was an
entirely separate question — was concerned, he
merely offered a sort of ex post facto justification of
the conscription in Ireland in the remark that
" when the young men of Ireland had been brought
in large numbers into the fighting line, it is im-
portant that they should feel that they are not
fighting for the purpose of establishing a prin-
ciple abroad which is denied to them at home."

From these declarations it appeared that the
enforcement of conscription in Ireland was an
almost immediate certainty, while the production,
and still more, the passage of " such proposals for
the establishment of self-government for Ireland
as in themselves are just and can be carried with-
out violent controversy " was an uncertain possi-
bility relegated to the vague future. During the
passage of the Bill, however, the Government's
attitude underwent an important change. The
Bill, of course, was opposed at every stage by the
Nationalist members to the utmost limits that the
operation of the " guillotine " permitted. They
were joined in this opposition, up to a point, by
Liberal and Labour members, as well as by some
Unionists. Mr. Asquith, as leader of the Opposi-
tion, expressed the gravest doubts of the wisdom of
the Government's policy ; but in face of Mr. Bonar

K

Law's declaration that the Government would
stand or fall by the Irish clause, the Liberal leader
refused to take the responsibility of defeating it.
It was known, however, that the Labour Ministers
were putting the strongest pressure on the War
Cabinet to modify its attitude.

In the speeches of Mr. Barnes and of the Prime
Minister on the third reading of the Bill on April
16th the result of this pressure became apparent.
It was now clear that, despite Mr. Lloyd George's
earlier emphatic assertions to the contrary, Home
Rule and conscription for Ireland were, in fact,
inter-dependent. These speeches showed that the
Government now proposed to bring in a Home Rule
Bill immediately, and to stand or fall by it as it
had decided to stand or fall by the Irish Clause of
the Military Service Bill. Mr. Barnes said that he
believed that the Home Rule Bill might be put on
the Statute Book before this clause was operative.
The Prime Minister explained his position with
some clearness, and made it plain in his speech that
what concerned him most was not the Irish attitude
towards the conscription of Ireland, but the
English attitude. " If there is to be trouble in Ire-
kind," he said, " in resisting a measure of this
kind " — and he added that he did not doubt for a
moment that there would be trouble — " before any
measure of a stern character is taken by this
country it is essential that the conscience of this
country should be perfectly clear. If there is a re-
fusal to legislate after that remarkable Conven-
tion, if the only answer that is given to the Con-
vention is conscription and nothing else, let there
be no mistake — if there is resistance in Ireland
under those conditions there will be an amount of
sympathy with the resistance in this country
which would paralyze any effort to enforce it.
• . . you can face the difficulties in Ireland
with a united country behind you, and you

THE REPORT AND AFTER 147

can only get unity when every section of
the community feels that full justice has been
done to Ireland in procuring for her that
measure of self-government which we are ostensibly
fighting for for other countries." The Prime
Minister went on to say that nothing would help
more to secure the full measure of America's assist-
ance, which was vital at this juncture, than the
' determination of the British Parliament to ten-
der to Ireland a measure of self-government which
would satisfy reasonable American opinion." In
these circumstances, he declared, the Government
had come to the conclusion that Irish self-govern-
ment after the Convention had reported was an
essential war measure. The conclusion which Sir
Edward Carson drew from these speeches was
that " it was now clear that no recruits in Ireland
were to be conscripted until a Home Rule Bill was
passed by the Government." " That," he added,
" was handing over Ulster as the price to be paid
for conscripting them."

After the passage of the Military Service Bill
on April 16th — the Irish clause being carried by
296 votes to 123 — the Nationalist Parliamentary
Party immediately left Westminster and returned
to Ireland. A passive resistance movement was
already afoot. On April 13th the Rev. Joseph W.
Brady, Adminstrator of the Cathedral Parish of
Armagh, published in the Nationalist Press a,^
letter in the following terms : — " Following the
eminent example set us a few years ago by Sir
Edward Carson, the priests and people of the
Cathedral Parish of Armagh will hold a series of
meetings on next Sunday for the purpose of found-
ing a Solemn League and Covenant against con-
scription. The methods employed, however, will not
be those sanctioned by Sir Edward Carson, viz. :—
arms, drilling, &c. The constitutional weapon of
passive resistance, employed so successfully by

148 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

thousands of conscientious objectors in England,
Scotland and Wales for years recently, will be quite
sufficient, and we have the highest theological
authority for its use." At the meeting on the follow-
ing Sunday a message was read from Cardinal
Logue, who wrote : — " I am heart and soul with the
meeting at Armagh. Forcible conscription is an
outrage on the clergy and people of Ireland. There
is nothing for it but passive resistance to it in every
shape and form." Cardinal Logue added that he
had convened a meeting of the Irish Bishops on
April 18th.

On the same day there assembled at the Dublin
Mansion House the conference to arrange for
united opposition to conscription, which had
earlier been proposed in a resolution by the Dublin
Corporation. The Government's proposal, it was
now clear, had achieved the miracle of Irish unity.
Invitations to the conference, over which the Lord
Mayor of Dublin presided, were accepted by Mr.
Dillon and Mr. Devlin, representing the National-
ist Parliamentary Party ; Mr. de Valera and Mr.
Arthur Griffith, representing Sinn Fein; Mr.
William O'Brien and Mr. T. M. Healy, represent-
ing the All-for-Ireland League; and Messrs.
William O'Brien (Dublin), Thomas Johnson (Bel-
fast), and W. J. Egan (Cork), representing the
Irish Trades' Union Congress. During this
period, though feeling ran high throughout the
country, and public meetings were held and resolu-
tions of protest passed by public bodies daily, there
was no disorder — except in Belfast, where a
great protest meeting was violently broken up by
a body of young Orange shipyard workers, who
were, of course, " protected " by their occupation
from conscription. The Mansion House conference
at once undertook the task of organising the move-
ment of opposition on lines of passive resistance in
close co-operation with the Roman Catholic Hier-

THE REPORT AND AFTER 149

archy. At its first meeting, the entrance of mem-
bers into which was witnessed by an enormous and
enthusiastic crowd, the Conference appointed a
deputation, consisting of Messrs, de Valera,
Dillon, Healy and O'Brien (Trades Union Con-
gress) to wait upon the Hierarchy in session at
Maynooth.

After the return of this deputation, and its re-
port on the result of the interview with the Hier-
archy, the Conference adopted and issued the
following declaration :— ' Taking our stand on
Ireland's separate and distinct nationhood, and
affirming the principle of liberty, that the Govern-
ments of nations derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed, we deny the right of
the British Government or any external authority
to impose compulsory military service in Ireland
against the clearly expressed will of the Irish
people. The passing of the Conscription Bill by
the British House of Commons must be regarded
as a declaration of war on the Irish nation. The
alternative to accepting it as such is to surrender
our liberties and to acknowledge ourselves slaves.
It is in direct violation of the rights of small
nationalities to self-determination, which even the
Prime Minister of England — now preparing to
employ naked militarism and force his Act upon
Ireland — himself officially announced as an
essential condition for peace at the Peace Con-
gress. The attempt to enforce it will be an un-
warrantable aggression, which we call upon all
Irishmen to resist by the most effective means at
their disposal." After drafting this declaration
the Conference proceeded to discuss the methods
to be employed for giving effect to it. It was
announced that detailed instructions as to the most
effective plans to be pursued would be communi-
cated in due course, and that all the decisions so
far reached Had been unanimous.

150 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Simultaneously with the issue of this declara-
tion of the Mansion House Conference the Roman
Catholic Hierarchy published an important state-
ment in the following terms : — " An attempt is
being made to force conscription on Ireland
against the will of the Irish nation and in defiance
of the protests of its leaders. In view especially
of the historic relations between the two countries
from the very beginning up to this moment, we con-
sider that conscription forced in this way upon
Ireland is an oppressive and inhuman law, which
the Irish people have a right to resist by every
means that are consonant with the law of God. We
wish to remind our people that there is a higher
Power which controls the affairs of men. They
have in their hands the means of conciliating that
Power by strict adherence to the Divine law, by
more earnest attention to their religious duties,
and by fervent and persevering prayer. In order
to secure the aid of the Holy Mother of God, who
shielded our people in the days of their greatest
trials, we have already sanctioned a National
Novena in Honour of our Lady of Lourdes, com-
mencing on the 3rd May, to secure general and
domestic peace. We also exhort the heads of
families to have the Rosary recited every evening
with the intention of protecting the spiritual and
temporal welfare of our beloved country, and bring-
ing us safe through this crisis of unparalleled
gravity."

The Hierarchy directed the clergy to celebrate
a public Mass of intercession on the following Sun-
day " to avert the scourge of conscription with
which Ireland is now threatened." They further
directed that an announcement be made at every
public Mass of a public meeting to be held on that
day at an hour and place to be specified in the
announcement for the purpose of administering
the following pledge against compulsory conscrip-

THE REPORT AND AFTER 151

tion in Ireland : — " Denying the right of the
British Government to enforce compulsory service
in this country, we pledge ourselves solemnly to
one another to resist conscription by the most
effective means at our disposal." The clergy were
also directed by the Bishops to announce that a
collection would be held at an early suitable date
outside the church gates for the purpose of supply-
ing means to resist the imposition of compulsory
military service.

On the following Sunday — April 21st — the
pledge to resist conscription was solemnly ad-
ministered at public meetings after Mass in every
parish throughout Ireland. Centres were then
opened for the registering of names. A few days
later a Protestant protest against conscription was
also circulated through the country. This protest
was organised unofficially. The Protestant Arch-
bishops contented themselves with issuing an
appeal for recruits, significantly refusing to ex-
press an opinion on the application of conscription
to Ireland. In the meantime three important
events had occurred. In the first place the Mansion
House Conference, at its second meeting on April
17th, decided that a detailed statement of Ireland's
case with respect to the attempt of the English
Government to impose conscription upon the Irish
people be prepared for presentation to the world,
and the Lord Mayor of Dublin was deputed to
arrange to proceed to Washington and present in
person a statement to the President of the United
States. At the meeting it was also decided that
the money collected in each parish for the Irish
National Defence Fund should remain in the hands
of the priests or other persons locally selected to
act as treasurers ; that Archbishop Walsh and the
Lord Mayor of Dublin, and a third to be named
subsequently by them should act as Trustees, and
that representative Local Committees of Defence

152 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

selected by and from those who signed the National
Pledge against conscription should be formed
immediately in every parish. The Conference
further advised the public to refuse to assist in any
proceedings to facilitate the enforcement of the
Act, and added the comment that " the question
of the local conservation of food supplies was under
consideration in view of possible developments."

In the next place, on April 21st, the Nationalist
Parliamentary Party held a meeting in Dublin at
which it passed a series of resolutions which, after
denouncing the Government's proposal, pledged
the party to use all its influence and power to
defeat any attempt to enforce conscription, and to
carry out the decisions of the Mansion House Con-
ference, and set on record the party's opinion that
" in the present crisis, the highest and most im-
mediate duty of the members of this party is to
remain in Ireland and actively co-operate with
their constituents in opposing the enforcement of
compulsorily military service in Ireland." Finally,
on the same day an All-Ireland Conference, con-
sisting of some fifteen hundred delegates, was held
in Dublin under the auspices of the Irish Trades
Union Congress " to consider and advise on the
best course to adopt to safeguard the position of
Labour in view of the introduction of conscrip-
tion." Mr. William O'Brien presided at this Con-
ference, and in the course of his speech declared
that " they were opposed to conscription as Irish
labour men because it was sought to be forced on
them by a foreign people, and they would be equally
opposed to it if it were tried to be forced by an
Irish Parliament."

The Conference unanimously adopted the follow-
ing resolution: — "That this convention of the
Irish Labour movement representing all sections
and provinces of Ireland pledge ourselves and
those whom we represent that we will not

THE REPORT AND AFTER 153

have conscription; that we shall resist it in
every way that to us seems feasible; that we
claim the right of liberty to decide as units
for ourselves and as a nation for itself; that we
place before our brothers in the Labour movement
all the world over our claims for independent
status as a nation in the international movement,
and the right of self-determination as a nation as
to what action or actions our people should take
on questions of political or economic issues. That
in view of the great claims on the resources of the
National Executive of the Irish Trades Union
Congress and Labour Party we hereby call upon
the bodies represented here to forward subscrip-
tions for the purpose of enabling them to carry out
their campaign against conscription, and pledge
ourselves to make it a success. That this Conven-
tion calls upon the workers of Ireland to abstain
from work on Tuesday next, April 23rd (1st) as a
demonstration of fealty to the cause of Labour and
Ireland ; (2nd) as a sign of their resolve to resist
the application of the Conscription Act ; and (3rd)
for the purpose of enabling every man and woman
to sign the pledge of resistance against conscrip-
tion. Believing that our success in resisting the
imposition of conscription will be a signal to the
workers of all countries, we call upon all lovers of
liberty everywhere to give assistance in this im-
pending struggle."

In accordance with this resolution, April 23rd
— the anniversary of the eve of the Rebellion two
years before — witnessed a general strike through-
out the whole of Ireland with the exception of
North-East Ulster and the Great v Northern Rail-
way line between Belfast and Dublin. This one-
day strike — the first general strike in any country
in Western Europe — was completely successful in
paralysing the whole of the normal life of Ireland.
It was marked by no " incident," but its very re-

154 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

straint was an additional demonstration of the
strength, solidarity, and determination of organ-
ised Labour in Ireland. After this demonstration
the work of perfecting the resistance movement
was carried on throughout the country under the
general direction of the Mansion House Confer-
ence, which met from time to time. The East
Cavan seat, held by the Parliamentary Party, fell
vacant, and efforts were made to avoid a contest,
on the ground that a contested election would im-
pair the national unity* Sinn Fein, however, re-
fused to agree to a compromise, and put forward
as its candidate Mr. Arthur Griffith.

On May 5th Mr. Dillon and Mr. de Valera
appeared on a common platform at a monster anti-
conscription meeting at Ballaghadereen, the
chief town of Mr. Dillon's constituency, and at this
meeting Mr. de Valera justified the Sinn Fein
attitude in East Cavan in these terms :— ' We
have the right unity, the unity of co-operation.
The unity of amalgamation would be no unity, and
that we cannot have." A few days earlier, in a
speech in East Cavan, Mr. Dillon had defended
the Parliamentary Party against the Sinn Fein
policy/ of abstention. He said that there were
three great lines of defence standing between the
Irish people and the brutal military application
of the Conscription Act. " First, and by no means
least, the Parliamentary situation created by the
fight of the Irish Party in the House of Commons
—a fight which had already borne fruit in the
following results : first, all the Radical Press in
England, without exception, has declared against
the Government's policy, and even the Northcliffe
Press is wavering. Secondly, that had it not been
from extreme pressure of the Government Whips,
and the threat of the Government to resign, the
House of Commons would undoubtedly have de-

* The Party had earlier decided not to enter the Tullamroe division of
King's County against Sinn Fein,

THE REPORT AND AFTER 155

feated the proposal. Thirdly, that we have
secured by that debate the opposition of organised
Labour to the conscription proposal, and without
the support* of organised Labour the present
Government cannot continue in existence. The
second line of defence is the national union which
was achieved by the Mansion House Conference,
and which, in my judgment, it would be criminal
to break up. The third line is the whole-hearted
support of our Prelates, given with a courage and
a generosity which will earn the undying grati-
tude of the Irish people, which has exposed them
already to a whirlwind of abuse and vituperation,
and has made the resistance of the Irish people
absolutely impregnable/'

It quickly became apparent that the organisa-
tion of resistance to conscription in Ireland was
to be used by the opponents of Home Rule to kill
the Government's promised Bill, which was in the
hands of a drafting committee presided over by
Mr- Walter Long. The Times, while urging the
Government to persevere with both parts of its
Irish policy, opened a " No Popery " campaign.
Sir Edward Carson, after notifying the Secretary
of the Ulster Unionist Council that " it will be
necessary to reorganise all the machinery through-
out the province which has been in abeyance since
the war broke out," in a series of letters to the
Press vehemently denounced the proposal to
establish Home Rule. " It is evident," he said
in one of these letters, " that the situation is so
changed (by the Irish opposition to conscription)
that the vast body of Irish Southern Unionists no
longer support the action of Lord Midleton and
the Southern Unionist delegates at the Conven-
tion." A general meeting of the Irish Unionist
Alliance had, in fact, been invited to express its
emphatic disapproval of those delegates' action,
but finally broke up after a heated discussion

156 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

without reaching any decision. At the close of a
letter published on May 8th Sir Edward Carson
appealed to Unionist members of the Government
and to the Unionist Party " to compel a recon-
sideration of this matter before we have a
fratricidal conflict at a time when our whole
energies should be devoted to the prosecution of
the war." With this strong pressure being put
on the Unionist members of the Government the
drafting of the Home Rule Bill made the slowest
progress. " Federalism " re-appeared as the solu-
tion, and it was evident that the labours of the
Irish Convention were in process of being com-
mitted to the waste-paper basket. On May 6th
it was announced that Viscount French had been
appointed Lord Lieutenant in succession to Lord
Wimborne. This appointment revived in the
Nationalist Press memories of '98 and Cornwallis,
and was interpreted as the prelude to military
governorship for the enforcement of conscription.
Coupled with this appointment, however, was
that as Chief Secretary of Mr. Edward Shortt,
the Radical member for Newcastle-on-Tyne, who
had voted against the Irish Clause of the Military
Service Act. A few days later the resignation
was announced of Sir Bryan Mahon, Commander-
in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland.

On the same day on which the appointment of
Lord French and Mr. Shortt was announced Sir
Horace Plunkett addressed a final appeal to the
Government in a letter to the Press. The late
Chairman of the Convention wrote :— " At the
gravest crisis with which the British Empire has
ever been faced the Government have staked their
existence upon a two-fold Irish policy, conscrip-
tion and Home Rule- They cannot achieve both.
At the cost of much present bloodshed and last-
ing hate they might achieve the first, thereby
making the second impossible. In my opinion, for

THE EEPORT. AND AFTER 157

what it is worth, they would fail in the attempt,
and have to go leaving both undone. Their suc-
cessors wuld then have to find a way out of the
worst Irish situation in my memory, which goes
back to the Fenian days of fifty years ago, and
has had burned into it every agrarian and political
agitation since.

" I would not write this did I not believe that
even now, ajt the eleventh hour, it is not beyond
the resouices of statesmanship to achieve the
double purpose the vast majority of both peoples
have in view. I believe the Government could not
only satisfy the reasonable aspirations of the
Irish people at home, but also get them to follow
voluntarily the immemorial instincts of a chival-
rous race and the example of their kinsmen and
sympathisers throughout the United States and
the British Dominions. There is one, and only
one, alternative to the disastrous policy upon
which the Cabinet has embarked, and that is to
set up at once responsible government in Ireland.
The report of the Convention has shown that they
could do this with the support of a large body of
Irish Nationalist and Unionist opinion. They
should pass through Parliament without delay
the necessary legislation as a war measure.

" The present chaos, with its growing bitter-
ness, its utter demoralisation of our public life,
and its discredit to British statesmanship, need
not be continued while we are waiting for a
Parliament. The moment the Bill is passed an
Irish Executive, broadly represented and com-
posed of responsible men who would not shirk the
burden of their brief authority, should be
appointed and given the task of setting up the
Parliament as quickly as possible, of promoting
voluntary recruiting, and generally carrying on.
The Irish people, given their own instrument of
government, would quickly show the world what

158 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

is their real attitude to this war. It may then
dawn upon Englishmen that we have in Ireland
no pro-Germans except those they have made, not
of malice prepense but through incapacity to
understand us/'

We began this book with Sir Horace Plunkett's
definition of the Irish situation as it existed after
the Rebellion of 1916. We close it with his de-
finition of that situation as it existed two years
later. We ended our " History of the Rebellion "
with a question mark. We are fated to end this
book, it seems, in the same manner. If it be
objected that a record of Irish politics should be
brought to a close at such a point, it may be re-
plied that, from the historian's point of view, the
introduction of the Government's proposal of
Irish conscription, coinciding with the presenta-
tion of the Irish Convention's Report, ends finally
and very definitely a chapter in the history of
Ireland.

APPENDICES

CLAUSE 42.— FROM REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE IRISH CONVENTION.

42. We have now set out in order the proceedings of the
Convention throughout the eight months of its deliberations.
The answer to our Reference, is to be found in the following
statement. This statement embodies the conclusions arrived
at by majoritieSj full particulars of which will be found in
Appendices X. to XIII.

STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS.*

1. THE IRISH PARLIAMENT.

(1) The Irish Parliament to consist of the King, an Irish

Senate, and an Irish House of Commons.

(2) Notwithstanding the establishment of the Irish

Parliament or anything contained in the Govern-
ment of Ireland Act, the supreme power and
authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom
shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all
persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every
part thereof.
Section carried by 51 votes to 18.

2. POWERS OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. The Irish Parlia-
ment to have the general power to make laws for the peace,
order, and good government of Ireland, subject to the ex-
clusions and restrictions specified in 3 and 4 below.

Section carried by 51 votes to 19.

3. EXCLUSIONS FROM POWER OF IRISH PARLIAMENT. The
Irish Parliament to have no power to make laws on the
following matters : —

(1) Crown and succession. (See 1914 Act, sect. 2 (1) ).

* The Statement shows the votes for and against each section and
sub-section (where a division was taken).

160 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

(2) Making of peace and war (including conduct as
' neutrals). (Act, sect. 2 (2) ).

(3) The Army and Navy.

(4) Treaties and foreign relations (including extradition).

(Act, sect. 2 (4) ).

(5) Dignities and titles of honour. (Act, sect. 2 (5) ).

(6) Any necessary control of harbours for naval and

military purposes, and certain powers as regards
lighthouses, buoys, beacons, cables, wireless ter-
minals, to be settled with reference to the require-
ments of the Military and Naval forces of His
Majesty in various contingencies. (Act, sect. 2 (9) ).

Sub-section carried by 41 votes to 13.

(7) Coinage ; legal tender ; or any change in the standard

of weights and measures. (Act, sect. 2 (10) ).

(8) Copyright or patent rights.

Section carried by 49 votes to 16.

TEMPORARY AND PARTIAL RESERVATION. The Imperial
and Irish Governments shall jointly arrange, subject to
Imperial exigencies, for the unified control of the Irish Police
and Postal services during the war, provided that as soon as
possible after the cessation of hostilities the administration of
these two services shall become automatically subject to the
Irish Parliament.

Carried by 37 votes to 21.

4. RESTRICTION ON POWER OF IRISH PARLIAMENT ON
MATTERS WITHIN ITS COMPETENCE.

(1) Prohibition of laws interfering with religious equality.

(Act, sect. 3).

N.B. — A sub-section should be framed to annul
any existing legal penalty, disadvantage or disability
on account of religious belief. Certain restrictions
still remain under the Act of 1829.

(2) Special provision protecting the position of Free-

masons. (Act, sect. 43 (1) and (2) ).

(3) Safeguard for Trinity College, and Queen's University

similar to sect. 42 of Act.

(4) Money bills to be founded only* on Viceregal message.

(Act, sect. 10 (2) ).

(5) Privileges, qualifications, etc., of members of Irish

Parliament to be limited as in Act. (Act, sect. 12).

(6) Rights of existing Irish Officers to be safeguarded.

(Act, sects. 32-7).

Section carried by 46 votes to 15.

APPENDICES 161

5. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. Section 9 (4) of the Act
of 1914 to apply to the House of Commons with the sub-
stitution of " ten years " for " three years." The constitution
of the Senate to be subject to alteration after ten years, pro-
vided the Bill is agreed to by two-thirds of the total number
of members of both Houses sitting together.

Section carried by 46 votes to 15.

6. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY. The executive power hi Ireland
to continue vested in the King, but exercisable through the
Lord Lieutenant on the advice of an Irish Executive Com-
mittee in the manner set out in Act. (Sect. 4). "

Section carried by 45 votes to 15.

7. DISSOLUTION or IRISH PARLIAMENT. The Irish Parlia-
ment to be summoned, prorogued, and dissolved as set out in
Act. (Sect. 6).

Section carried by 45 votes to 15.

8. ASSENT TO BILLS. Royal Assent to be given or withheld
as set out in Act (sect. 7) with the substitution of " reservation "
for " postponement."

Section carried by 45 votes to 15.

9. CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE.

(1) Lord Chancellor ... ... ... ... 1

(2) Four Archbishops or Bishops of the Roman

Catholic Churchj ... ... ... ... 4

(3) Two Archbishops or Bishops of the Church of

Ireland ... ... ... ... ... 2

(4) A Representative of the General ^Assembly ... 1

(5) The Lord Mayors of Dublin, Belfast, and Cork ... 3

(6) Peers resident hi Ireland, elected by Peers

resident in Ireland ... ... ... 15

(7) Nominated by Lord Lieutenant : —

Irish Privy Councillors of at least two years'

standing ... ... ... ... 4

Representatives of learned institutions] ... 3

Other persons ... ... ... ... 4

(8) Representatives of Commerce and Industry ... 15

(9) Representatives of Labour, one for each Province 4
(10) Representatives of County Councils two for each

Province ... ... ... 8

64

On the^disappearance of£any nominated element in the
House of Commons an addition shall be made to the numbers
of the Senate.

Section carried by 48 votes to 19.

162 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

10. CONSTITUTION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

(1) The ordinary elected members of the House of

Commons shall number 160.

(2) The University of Dublin, the University of Belfast,

and the National University shall each return two
members. The graduates of each University shall
form the constituency.

(3) Special representation shall be given to urban and

industrial areas by grouping the smaller towns and
applying to them a lower electoral quota than that
applicable to the rest of the country.

(4) The principle of Proportional Representation, with

the single transferable vote, shall be observed
wherever a constituency returns three or more
members. (Act, sect. 9 (2) ).

Sub-section carried by 47 votes to 22.

(5) The Convention accept the principle that forty per

cent, of the membership of the House of Commons
shall be guaranteed to Unionists. In pursuance of
this, they suggest that, for a period, there shall be
summoned to the Irish House of Commons 20
members nominated by the Lord Lieutenant, with
a view to the due representation of interests not
otherwise adequately represented in the provinces
of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught, and that 20
additional members shall be elected by Ulster
constituencies, to represent commercial, industrial
and agricultural interests.

(6) The Lord Lieutenant's power of nomination shall be

exercised subject to any instructions that may be
given by His Majesty the King.

(7) The nominated members shall disappear in whole or

in part after 15 years, and not earlier, notwith-
standing anything contained in Clause 5.

(8) The extra representation in Ulster not to cease except

on an adverse decision by a three-fourths majority
of both Houses sitting together.

Sub-section carried by 27 votes to 20.

(9) The House of Commons shall continue for 5 years

unless previously dissolved.

(10) Nominated members shall vacate their seats on a
dissolution but shall be eligible for renomination.
Any vacancy among the nominated members shall
be filled by nomination.

Section carried by 45 votes to 20.

APPENDICES 163

11. MONEY BILLS.

(1) Money bills to originate only in the House of

Commons, and not to be amended by the Senate.
(Act, sect. 10).

(2) The Senate is, however, to have power to bring about

a joint sitting over money bills in the same session
of Parliament.

(3) The Senate to have power to suggest amendments,

which the House of Commons may accept or reject
as it pleases.
Section carried by 45 votes to 22.

12. DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN HOUSES. Disagreements
between the two Houses to be solved by joint sittings as set
out in Act (sect. 11), with the proviso that if the Senate fail
to pass a money bill such joint sitting shall be held in the same
session of Parliament.

Section carried by 45 votes to 22.

13. REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER.

(1) Representation in Parliament of the United Kigndom

to continue. Irish representatives to have the right
of deliberating and voting on all matters.

(2) Forty-two Irish representatives shall be elected to

the Commons House of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom in the following manner : —

A Panel shall be formed in each of the four
Provinces of Ireland, consisting of the members for
that Province in the Irish House of Commons, and
one other Panel shall be formed consisting of
members nominated to the Irish House of Commons.
The number of representatives to be elected to the
Commons House of the Imperial Parliament shall
be on the principle of Proportional Representation.
Sub-section carried by 42 votes to 24.

(3) The Irish representation in the House of Lords shall

continue as at present unless and until that Chamber
be remodelled, when the matter shall be recon-
sidered by the Imperial and Irish Parliaments.

Section carried by 44 votes to 22.

14. FINANCE.

(1) An Irish Exchequer and Consolidated Fund to be
established and an Irish Controller and Auditor-
General to be appointed as set out in Act (sect.
14 (1) and sect. 21).

164 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

(2) If necessary, it should be declared that all taxes at

present leviable in Ireland should continue to be
levied and collected until the Irish Parliament
otherwise decides.

(3) The necessary adjustments of revenue as between

Great Britain and Ireland during the transition
period [should be made.
Section carried by 51 votes to 18.

15. FINANCIAL POWERS OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT.

(1) The control of Customs and Excise by an Irish

Parliament is to be postponed for further con-
sideration until after the war, provided that the
question of such control shall be considered and
decided by the Parliament of the United Kingdom
within seven years after the conclusion of peace.
For the purpose of deciding in the Parliament of the
United Kingdom the question of the future control
of Irish Customs and Excise, a number of Irish
representatives proportioned to the population of
Ireland shall be called to the Parliament of the
United Kingdom.
Sub-section carried by 38 votes to 34.

(2) On the creation of an Irish Parliament, and until the

question of the ultimate control of the Irish Customs
and Excise services shall have been decided, the
Board of Customs and Excise of the United Kingdom
shall include a person or persons nominated by the
Irish Treasury.
Sub-section carried by 39 votes to 33.

(3) A Joint Exchequer Board, consisting of two members

nominated by the Imperial Treasury, and two
members nominated by the Irish Treasury, with a
Chairman appointed by the King, shall be set up
to secure the determination of the true income of
Ireland.
Sub-section carried by 39 votes to 33.

(4) Until the question of the ultimate control of the Irish

Customs and Excise services shall have been
decided, the revenue due to Ireland from Customs
and Excise, as determined by the Joint Exchequer
Board, shall be paid into the Irish Exchequer.
Sub-section carried by 38 votes to 30.

(5) All branches of taxation, other than Customs and

Excise, shall be under the control of the Irish
Parliament.

Sub-section carried by 38 votes to 30.

APPENDICES 165

16. IMPERIAL CONTRIBUTION. The principle of such
contribution is approved.

Section carried unanimously.

17. LAND PURCHASE. The Convention accept the recom-
mendations of the Sub-Committee on Land Purchase.

Section carried unanimously.

18. JUDICIAL POWER. The following provisions of the
Government of Ireland Act to be adopted : —

(a) Safeguarding position of existing Irish Judges.

(Sect. 32).
(6) Leaving appointment of future Judges to the Irish

Government and their removal to the Crown on

address from both Houses of Parliament. (Sect. 27).
(e) Transferring appeals from the House of Lords to the

Judicial Committee, strengthened by Irish Judges.

(Sect. 28).

(d) Extending right of appeal to this Court. (Sect. 28 (4)

and sect. 30 (1-2) ).

(e) Provision as to reference of questions of validity to

Judicial Committee. (See sect. 29).
The Lord Chancellor is not to be a political officer.

Section carried by 43 votes to 17.

19. LORD LIEUTENANT. The Lord Lieutenant is not to be
a political officer. He shall hold office for 6 years, and nether
he nor the Lords Justices shall be subject to any religious
disqualification. (See Act of 1914, sect. 31). His salary
shall be sufficient to throw the post open to men of moderate
means.

Section carried by 43 votes to 17.

20. CIVIL SERVICE.

(1) There shall be a Civil Service Commission consisting

of representatives of Irish Universities which shall
formulate a scheme of competitive examinations for
admission to the public service, including statutory
administrative bodies, and no person shall be ad-
mitted to such service unless he holds the certificate
of the Oivil Service Commission.

(2) A scheme of appointments in the public service, with

recommendations as to scales of salary for the same
-shall be prepared by a Commission consisting of an
independent Chairman of outstanding position in
Irish public life, and two colleagues, one of whom
shall represent Unionist interests, /

166 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

(3) No appointments to positions shall be made before the

scheme of this Commission has been approved.
Section carried by 42 votes to IS.

21. DEFERRING TAKING OVER CERTAIN IRISH SERVICES.
Arrangements to be made to permit the Irish Government, if
they so desire, to defer taking over the services relating to
Old Age Pensions, National Insurance, Labour Exchanges
Post Office Trustee Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies,
Section carried by 43 votes to 18.

43. In conclusion, we have pleasure in recording our high
appreciation of the unremitting service rendered to us by our
Secretary, Lord Southborough, at every stage of our pro-
tracted labours. He has placed at our disposal the wise
counsel and ripe experience of a distinguished public servant,
and to him and all the members of our efficient Secretariat we
tender our cordial thanks.

44. The Chairman and Secretary have the honour, by
direction of the Convention, to submit the foregoing Report
of its Proceedings to His Majesty's Government.

Paragraph 44 carried by 42 votes to 35.
The whole Report carried by 44 votes to 29.

SOUTHBOROUGH, HORACE PLUNKETT,

Secretary. Chairman.

5th April, 1918.

REPORT OF ULSTER UNIONIST DELEGATES TO
IRISH CONVENTION.

1. We, the Ulster Unionist Members of the Convention, find
ourselves unable to concur in the Chairman's Drait Report.
We protest against its implication that a measure of agreement
regarding Irish Self-Government was attained, which in fact
was not the case as is evidenced by the record of the Divisions.
The provisional conclusions on minor matters which were
arrived at in Committee were strictly contingent on agreement
on the vital issues. These were fundamental — and upon
them no agreement was at any time visible. On many of the
important questions the Nationalists were sharply divided.
All discussions were " without prejudice " and subject to
complete agreement being reached on the whole Scheme.
Absolute freedom of action as regards decision in Convention
on all points was reserved and this was clearly indicated
throughout the proceedings.

2. In confirmation of this statement the following extract
from Lord MacDonnell's Memorandum issued to the Conven-
tion on 8th March, 1918, may be quoted : —

" It is true that this report does not bind the Grand
Committee, still less the Convention, even on the points
on which no difference of opinion is recorded, because
all the provisional understandings which were arrived at
were contingent on a full agreement on the general scheme
being reached ; and it cannot be said this agreement has
been reached."

3. In order that an accurate estimate may be formed of the
origin and purpose of the Irish Convention, it is necessary to
recall the political situation as it existed in the early summer
of 1917.

4. The Home Rule Act of 1914, to which Ulster was inexor-
ably opposed, had been placed on the Statute Book, in dis-
regard of the truce entered into at the beginning of the war,
at which time an Amending Bill excluding Ulster from the
Act had passed through its initial Parliamentary stages with
general consent and was postponed in consequence of the
European situation.

5. Yielding to the demands of the Nationalists, the Prime

168 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Minister, in a letter addressed to Mr. John Redmond, on

16th May, 1917, offered :—

(a) A " bill for the immediate application of the Home
Rule Act to Ireland, but excluding therefrom the
six Counties of North-East Ulster " ; or, alter-
natively,

(6) A Convention of Irishmen "for the purpose of
drafting a Constitution for their country . . .
which should secure a just balance of all the
opposing interests."

6. Mr. Redmond refused the first proposal, but acquiesced
in the suggestion of a Convention, in which Ulster Unionists
were invited to join. On 21st May, 1917, in announcing the
Government's intention to summon the Convention, the
Prime Minister said : " No one — I want to make this quite
clear — by the mere fact of going to the Convention can be
assumed to be pledged to the acceptance or the rejection of
any particular proposal or method for the Government of
Ireland.

7. Ulster Unionists felt some natural hesitancy in sending
delegates to the Convention, but relying absolutely on this
pledge, and on further pledges given by the Prime Minister
and Mr. Asquith, that Ulster would not be forced to come
under a Dublin Parliament, they ultimately consented. In
taking this course the Ulster Unionists were animated by the
desire to do what was best for the Empire, for Great Britain,
and for Ireland. They were satisfied with the Constitution
under which they had lived and prospered, and they desired
to continue under the Union which they still believe to be
the form of Government best suited to the needs of Ireland
and best calculated to maintain the stability of the Empire.
They were ready, however, to consider any plan that might
be put forward, provided it would increase the happiness and
comfort of the people and at the same time maintain the
supremacy oi the Imperial Parliament.

8. Ulster Unionists, who have thrown themselves whole-
heartedly into the war, deplore the faqt that in this great
world crisis, when their entire energies ought to be devoted
to providing men and munitions, they should be even tem-
porarily diverted from vital national issues on which the very
existence of the Empire depends in order to again take up a
subject the consideration of which had been rightly postponed
on the outbreak of hostilities.

9. In view of Ulster's well-known doubts and fears and of
the undeniable fact that the declared object of the Convention
was to " secure a just balance of all opposing interests " it

APPENDICES 169

was not unnatural to assume that the Nationalists were
prepared to offer a modus vivendi, and formulate proposals of
local Parliamentary government for Ireland which would at
least : —

(1) Provide for the absolute supremacy of the Imperial

Parliament ;

(2) Maintain the existing fiscal unity ;

(3) Guarantee protection for the undoubted rights of the

Unionist minority ;

(4) Ensure the safety of Irish industrial enterprises, the

vast proportion of which are situated in the North-
Eastern Counties of Ulster, and from which the
bulk of the Irish Revenue is derived.

10. We" expected that the real work of the Convention
would have been directed to a sincere and patriotic endeavour
to find common ground somewhere between the 1914 Act on
the one hand, and the views of Ulster on the other. From
the first week in which the Convention sat we urged this
course, and repeatedly expressed our disappointment that
almost every Nationalist speech outlined a form of "Home
Rule far in advance of any previous claim.

11. The Scheme which was finally brought forward by the
Bishop of Raphoe on behalf of the Nationalists included the
following demands : —

First — A Sovereign Independent Parliament for Ireland
co-equal in power and authority with the Imperial
Parliament.

Second — Complete Fiscal Autonomy for Ireland, in-
cluding : —

(a) Power of imposing tariffs and control of Excis e,

involving, as it would, the risk of hostile
tarifts against Great Britain and the disturb-
ance of free intercourse between the two
countries ;

(b) Right of making Commercial Treaties with

foreign countries ;

(c) Full powers of direct taxation.

Third- — Right to raise and maintain a Military (territorial)
Force in Ireland.

Fourth — Repudiation of any liability for the National
Debt on the plea of over-taxation of Ireland in the
past. Subject to the consent of the Irish Parliament,
the principle of a small annual contribution towards
Imperial expenditure was admitted.

Fifth — Denial of the right oi the Imperial Parliament to
impose Military Service in Ireland unless with the
consent of the proposed Irish Parliament.

170 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

12. When the Clause claiming Fiscal Autonomy for Ireland
was reached, it soon became evident that no real approach
towards agreement was possible. At that stage the Chairman
endeavoured to get over the deadlock by putting a series of
questions to the Nationalists and to the Ulster Unionists, and
the replies sent in speaK for themselves. The real object of
these proposals was clearly apparent in the official reply to
the Chairman's queries of 6th November, signed by the
following Nationalist Leaders : — John Redmond, the Lord
Bishop of Raphoe, Joseph Devlin, George Russell.

13. In this document the Nationalists again emphatically
insisted upon their demand for Ireland's fiscal independence,
and crystalised their argument in the following terms : — " We
regard Ireland as a National, an economic entity. Self-
government does not exist where those nominally entrusted
with aftairs of Government have not control of fiscal and
economic policy."

14. It is, therefore, clear that Fiscal Autonomy including
the control of Customs and Excise and National taxation is
valued by the Nationalists not only on the ground of supposed
economic advantage but as an essential symbol of National
independence. In opposition to this Ulster takes a firm stand
on the basis of the people's common prosperity, and maintains
that the Fiscal unity of the United Kingdom must be preserved
intact, carrying with it as it does the sovereignty of the
Imperial Parliament and due representation therein.

15. The important question of how far Ireland should
contribute to Imperial taxation raised much controversy. In
the earlier stages of the discussior s some prominent Nationalists
stated quite frankly that they recognised no responsibility
for any portion of the pre-war National Debt, nor for the
present war expenditure, whilst we claimed that in justice
and in honour Ireland must continue to pay her full share of
both. The majority of the Nationalists declined to admit
such liability.

16. During the financial year just ended Ireland's Imperial
contribution will, it is estimated, amount to about thirteen
millions sterling, and possibly to twenty millions next year.

An important section of the Nationalists objected to any
Imperial contribution being paid, but the larger number
favoured a contribution ranging from two and a hah* to four
and a half millions sterling per annum. It was invariably a
condition that the contribution should be purely voluntary
and at the pleasure of the Irish Parliament. We listened to
these suggestions with keen disappointment, knowing of no
reason why Ireland, which is abundantly prosperous, shoaid

APPENDICES 171

not in the hour of the Empire's need contribute her full share
of men and money. We have always contended that there
should be equality of sacrifice hi every part of the United
Kingdom. \

17. As already pointed out, a further Clause in the Bishop
of Raphoe's Scheme with which we found it impossible to agree
claimed that compulsory Military Service could not be imposed
upon Ireland by Great Britain unless with the consent of the
Irish Parliament, and this demand was supported by a majority
vote of the Convention.

18. Again, it was claimed that, in contradistinction to the
provisions of all previous Home Rule Bills, the Royal Irish
Constabulary, a semi-Military Force, should immediately at
the conclusion of the war come under the control of the Irish
Parliament. The 1914 Act provided that this Force should
remain under Imperial control for a period of six years. In
the presen c state of Ireland such a proposal must be regarded
as " excessively dangerous." This is the opinion expressed
by the Inspector-General of the Force, whose statement
appears in the Appendices I.G. 27.

19. Failing any evidence of an approach to a narrowing of
our differences, and in view of the new demands made and
adhered to by the Nationalists, we were finally forced to declare
that in any such scheme of Self -Government for Ireland Ulster
could not participate. We cannot overlook the strong
probability that the controlling force in such a Parliament
would to-day be the Republican or Sinn Fein Party, whichio
openly and aggressively hostile to Great Britain and to the
Empire. During recent months in many parts of Ireland,
outside of Ulster, there has been a great renewal of lawlessness,
and crime bordering on anarchy, which unfortunately has not
been adequately dealt with by the Irish Executive.

20. A most remarkable situation arose in the Convention
when a vote was taken on the proposal to adjourn the pro-
ceedings until an assurance was received from the Government
that they would promptly take effective steps to restore law
and order and repress outrage throughout Ireland. Fifty
Nationalist Members voted against that proposal, and 33
Members, including the Ulster Unionists, voted for it.

21. A proposal was brought forward, under which, in an Irish
Parliament Unionists should have a temporary representation
largely in excess of what they are entitled to on the basis of
population. While appreciating the spirit of this offer it
was felt, after full consideration, that the undemocratic
character of this proposal rendered it wholly unacceptable,

172 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

22.|On theJLand Question a|Report containing valuable
suggestions was^submitted by the ^Committee to which the
subject hadjbeen referred. This Report was unanimously
adopted as there was a desire amongst all sections to have the
great regenerative scheme of Land Purchase completed
without further delay.

23. The Committee appointed to consider the urgent neces-
sity for providing additional Workmen's houses in Urban
Districts reported in favour ot comprehensive schemes being
at once undertaken by the Local Authorities, an Imperial
grant in aid to be provided by the Treasury. This Report
was also unanimously adopted.

24. We regret that instead of proposals being made to
remove our objections, the policy pursued by the ftationalists
in the Convention strengthened our opinion that Home Rule
would intensify existing divisions in Ireland and prove a
constant menace to the Empire. Had we thought that the
majority of the Convention intended to demand, not the
subordinate powers contained in previous Home Rule Bills,
but what is tantamount to full national independence, we
could not have agreed to enter the Convention.

25. While firmly believing that Home Rule would be
inimical to the highest interests of Ireland and the Empire,
Ulster Unionists, with the object of meeting the Nationalists,
presented an alternative scheme for the exclusion of Ulster
based on lines agreed to by the official Nationalist Party
in 1916.

26. The discussions have proved beyond doubt that the
aim of the Nationalists is to establish a Parliament in Ireland
which would be practically free from effective control by the
Imperial Parliament. It is only necessary to draw attention
to modern political movements to realise the unwisdom of
establishing within the United Kingdom two Parliaments
having co-equal powers. All other countries have fought
against this disintegrating policy.

27. The Australian States, weary of local commercial
disputes, combined in one fiscal unit in which they were
joined by Tasmania — an Island much akin to Ireland in the
matter of area.

28. The United States of America established, at the cost
of much blood and treasure, National unity when the Con-
federacy claimed, like the Irish Nationalsts, the right to set
up an Independent Government.

29. With these and other examples before us we cannot

APPENDICES

173

help feeling that the demands put forward, if conceded, would
create turmoil at home and weakness abroad.

30. One of the many objections to the Scheme presented in
the Report is that it would make the future application of
Federalism to the United Kingdom impossible.

31. For the reasons stated we could not accept the proposals
put forward by the Nationalists.

32. We desire to record our appreciation of the uniform
courtesy and good feeling which characterised the proceedings
of the Convention throughout.

HUGH T. BABBIE.

LONDONDEBBY.

ABEBCOBN.

CBAWFOBD McCuLLAGH.

R. G. SHABMAN-CBAWFOBD

(COL.).

R. N. ANDEBSON.
M. E. KNIGHT.
JOHN IBWIN.
JOHN HANNA.
H. B. ABMSTKONG.

J. JACKSON CLABK.

G. S. CLABK.

ROBEBT H. WALLACE (CoL.).

J. STOUPPE F. McCANCE.

H. GBATTAN MACGEAGH.

W. WHTTLA.

JAMES JOHNSTON,

Lord Mayor of Belfast.
H. M. POLLOCK.
JOHN McMEEKAN.

5th April, 1918.

NOTE BY THE PROVOST OF TRINITY COLLEGE
AND THE ARCHBISHOP OF ARMAGH.

We have not found it possible to Vote for the conclusion
reached by the majority of the members of this Convention.
It involves, in our opinion, either of two alternatives :-

(1) The coercion of Ulster, which is unthinkable.

(2) The partition of Ireland, which would be disastrous.

We have more than once put forward a Federal Scheme
based on the Swiss or Canadian precedent, which might ensure
a united Ireland with provincial autonomy for Ulster, or any
other Province that desired it.

This scheme would also be capable of being adapted to some
larger scheme of Imperial Federation for the whole British
Empire.

J. P. MAHAFFY,

Provost of Trinity College.

JOHN B. ARMAGH,

Primate.

REPORT BY THE UNDERSIGNED NATIONALISTS.

r 1. The object set before the Convention was to frame a
Constitution for Ireland within the Empire. This was the
first time the Government had assigned such a commission
to a body of Irishmen, and we approached the task with a
deep sense of the gravity of the circumstances in which the
idea of the Convention originated as well as of the responsibility
which rested upon us of giving the best answer in our power
to a reference of such supreme importance.

2. Though its function was to draft a Constitution, the
Convention was not a Constituent Assembly with a direct
mandate from the people to plan the form of Government
under which they desired to live. Still it might well claim
a coBsiderable measure of authority for its proceedings.
Except for some important political and labour abstentions it
has worthily reflected almost every phase and interest and class
in the varied life of Ireland. But there has been no sure
means of knowing how far it exhibited the mind and will of
Ireland at the present time, even as regards the parties officially
represented in it, nor any guarantee that its decisions, inde-
pendently of suggestions made by the Government, would
take effect in law. The Sinn Fein organisation stood altogether
aloof.

3. Nevertheless, whatever the difficulties might be, we
determined to make the most of the unique opportunity that
presented itself when Irishmen of opposing parties were for
the first time to come together in a large body to discuss in
friendship the future government of their country at a great
crisis in the world's history. To co-operate in devising a
scheme of National self-government which would satisfy the
reasonable aspirations of our fellow-countrymen, and provide
adequate safeguards for minorities, was altogether according
to our desires. We believed that if a measure giving us full
control over our own affairs was agreed to, and given effect
to by the Government, the vast majority of Irish Nationalists
would accept it and bend their minds to making it a success,
and that the good will to the Constitution which had followed
self-government in the Dominions would speedily spring up
here.

4. Such hopes as were entertained of success in building
a worthy edifice from these foundations were strengthened by
the preliminary debates of the Convention, which were upon

176 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

a high level, and showed a real desire for mutual enlighten-
ment and understanding. It looked as if the gravity of the
times, the principles of freedom for which the Allied Nations
claimed to stand, the widespread desire for a settlement
throughout the Dominions and among our American kindred,
and the disastrous consequences of further conflict and dis-
union, might bring about a spontaneous resolve among all the
assembled delegates to establish our country as a free and
contented nation within the Empire.

5. These expectations have been only in part realised. The
Southern Unionist delegates, abandoning a long tradition of
opposition to Home Rule, came forward frankly and fairly
to assist in planning a scheme of self-government. We readily
acknowledge the patriotism of their action, and we can only
regret deeply that on one point, the control of Customs, which
we regarded as vital, they could not see eye to eye with us,
and thus effect a complete mutual agreement on a Constitution,

6. The Labour delegates also took a very useful part in the
deliberations. As a body they were strongly in favour of a
measure of self-government for Ireland.

7. On the other hand, the Ulster Unionists, who were in
close touch with their supporters in the North, to our great
regret did not see their way to give much co-operation in
constructive work along the lines which the Convention was
following. The objections which they formulated to our
proposals would, if given effect to, reduce the Irish Parliament
to a low level at the outset. What their view might be in
an Irish Parliament is a different matter. Every one of the
Dominions contained a minority of citizens accustomed to
identify themselves with Imperial interests who predicted a
calamity for their country and the whole Empire if self-govern-
ment were fully conceded. We are confident that the experi-
ence of the Convention will tend to remove any such feeling
in Ulster ; and, in order to make it easy for our esteemed
fellow-countrymen to join on fair terms in one Parliament
for the whole country, we went so far as to concede them a
large measure of additional elected representation in the Irish
House of Commons. They would be a powerful and effective
element in an Irish Parliament.

8. We realised clearly from the outset that to obtain an
agreement upon Home Rule for a United Ireland, and thus
fulfil the purpose of the Convention, compromise was neces-
sary. But we also realised that to carry compromise to the
point of agreeing to a scheme which, in our judgment, Ireland
would not accept from us would be very unwise, apart from
our own decided opinions on the right solution of the Irish
problem. The truth is, that it is in the control by Irishmen

APPENDICES 177

of the machinery of Irish Government ratber than in a reduc-
tion of the powers of the Irish Parliament that the best field
is to be found for a reasonable compromise. This brings us
to the recommendations of our Report.

9. The terms of reference given to the Convention contained
the single limitation that the Constitution must be within the
Empire.

10. Within the Empire and peculiar to it, there is a form
of Constitution, enjoyed by all the self-governing Dominions,
which has brought peace, contentment and prosperity to those
nations, together with an attachment to the Empire which
has grown steadily firmer, even after rebellion and open war.
This form of Constitution rests on three main principles —
(1) the Imperial Parliament retains full control over all
Imperial affairs, foreign relations, the making of peace and
war, the Army and Navy. (2) The Dominion Parliament is
technically a subordinate one, whose Bills must receive the
Royal Assent to become valid, and whose Acts may legally be
over-ridden by the Imperial Parliament. (3) Subject to these
limitations, the Dominion has unfettered power of national
self-government, including full control of all taxation.

11. Ireland is a Nation, and it is upon a like foundation
that we believe the Irish Constitution should now be built.
There is room for compromise on details, and even on secondary
questions of principle, and there is abundant room for com-
promise of the wisest kind in the form of* safeguards for the
minorities inside Ireland, without limiting the powers of
Ireland as a whole. But we think it essential to abide by the
principle that Irish affairs, including all branches of taxation
should be under the Irish Parliament.

12. It has often been said in our debates, and outside them,
that it would be unsafe for Great Britain to permit an island
so near her to have political power resembling in any degree
that of the Dominions. As regards national defence, we have
allowed a difference to exist ; and in the matter of trade there
is room for a special arrangement. But, as to the rest, we
can only reply that reconciliation between the two countries
is made exceedingly difficult unless it can be shown that the
British people sincerely believe in liberty for its own sake,
and are willing, to apply to Ireland the principle that the
supposed military interests of great states shall not over-ride
the rights of small nationalities living alongside them. The
noble principle of liberty, which has had such a unifying effect
in the Dominions during the war now devastating Europe
surely cannot lose its virtue when applied to an island near to
Great Britain, where mutual interests and intimate commercial
relations ought to promise an even closer friendship.

M

178 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

13. While we think, therefore, that any settlement founded
on distrust of Ireland will fail in its effect, and that the nearer
the Irish Constitution approaches to that of the Dominions
the better will be its prospects, we have striven with earnest
sincerity to meet the opposition of Unionist minorities in
Ireland, and allay their fears with safeguards which do not
infringe any vital principle. We take in turn the points where
difference has arisen, and the proposals which we make for
compromise.

CUSTOMS AND EXCISE.

14. The principal point of difterence arose on finance. We
asked for full powers of taxation. The Ulster representatives
wished to reserve all powers of taxation to the Imperial
Parliament, and only modified this demand to the extent of
allowing to the Irish Parliament some undefined taxing power
of its own. The Southern Unionists were prepared to concede
direct taxation and Excise to the Irish Parliament, and ad-
mitted the reasonableness of Ireland's claim to separate
Customs treatment by proposing an arrangement which, in
effect, would place a moral obligation upon the Imperial
Parliament of imposing lower Customs duties in Ireland than
in Great Britain upon articles of general consumption. They
could not see their way to go further and allow the Irish
Parliament control over Customs. Ultimately they acquiesced
in a proposition from the Government that leaves the control
of Customs and Excise to the decision of the Imperial Parlia-
ment after the war. In an Irish Parliament we have no doubt
that many of them would claim the fiscal autonomy which
more than one of them advocated in the earlier stages of the
Convention.

15. The taxing power so deeply affects the welfare and
prosperity of the people, the dignity of Parliament, and the
wise and economical administration of the Government, that
no part of it could be placed under external control without
perpetuating friction with Great Britain and discontent in
Ireland. The control of indirect taxation, which determines
the course of trade and in normal times produced seventy
per cent, of Irish tax-revenue, is of especial importance.
Irish Government cannot be financed without drawing largely
on these sources of revenue, nor can an equitable balance
between direct and indirect taxation be obtained if two
authorities instead of one are controlling them. Moreover,
the indirect taxes affect articles of general consumption among
the mass of the population, including necessaries of life.

16. Economically, Ireland is, and always has been, different
from Great Britain. It is a much poorer country, and a

APPENDICES 179

country with few manufacturing industries. It has suffered
severely from over-taxation under the Union, and urgently
needs a separate fiscal system under Irish control. There is
not an instance in the world of an island differing so radically
from a powerful neighbouring country being united with it
under a common fiscal system.

17. No exception can be made in the case ef Customs,
which, under the present free trade system, comprise the duties
on such important articles as sugar, tea, coffee and tobacco.
Moreover fiscal systems everywhere are in the melting pot, and
there is a likelihood of radical change in the British system.
No change could possibly affect Ireland and Great Britain in
the same way, and we consider it necessary that Ireland should
have the right of guarding her own trade interests and con-
trolling her own trade policy. It may be said with truth that
the power of each state within the Empire to control the whole
of its own taxation, and especially its Customs, is the very
corner-stone of Imperial unity.

18. Federaton is not in view. Even if it were, and Ireland
were still intent on retaining control of her Customs, her sea
boundary and her distinct national character and economic
interests would give her a claim in that respect which no
member of a federation anywhere else can advance.

19. It has been said that to give the Irish Government the
power of negotiating commercial arrangements with foreign
countries will complicate foreign relations and place her in an
unwarrantably privileged position. We answer that no such
complications arise in the case of the Dominions, and that
what we ask for implies, in our own case as in theirs, no'
diminution of Imperial authority. Any such trade arrange-
ment has to be negotiated through the agency of the Colonial
Office, as representing the Imperial Government, in which
the treaty-making power alone resides.

20. Another objection was the inconvenience to trade if a
Customs barrier were set up and ships were searched for
dutiable articles. But the system was in force here until
the middle of the last century. It still prevails in trade, not
only with America, France, and foreign countries generally,
but with the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, and even the
Channel Islands. It is, moreover, the only effective means of
ascertaining what the true income of Ireland amounts to.
The revenue at present attributed to Ireland in respect of tea
and other dutiable commodities is official guesswork, founded
mainly on the numbers of the population.

21. But the strongest objection made to the control of
Customs, an objection urged principally by the Ulster

180 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Unionists, was that it might interrupt free trade between
Ireland and Great Britain. They stated that the raw
materials of Ulster industry were drawn mainly from Great
Britain, which was also the market for much of their finished
produce, and that close commercial intercourse was therefore
essential. But this is true also of Irish agriculture, for whose
products, which are perishable, and are exported in normal
times to a greater value than the products of all the Ulster
industries combined, Great Britain is at the present time the
best and practically the only market. It would be folly to
offend our best customer.

22. As both countries are so deeply interested in free access
to one another's markets, we believe that mutual advantage
would be a surer guarantee of free and friendly intercourse
than any legal restrictions. But, in order to meet Unionist
fears, we are ready to agree to provisions in the Constitutional
Act maintaining free trade between the two countries in articles
of home produce, subject to safeguards against dumping, for
a reasonable term of years, and thereafter by mutual agree-
ment . This would ensure that if any change became absolutely
necessary, owing either to an altered tariff policy in Great
Britain, or to any other reason, it could not be made without
prolonged deliberation in the Irish Parliament.

23. We desire to recall the fact that in proposing full
powers of taxation for Ireland we are not making a new or
Unsupported claim. The three most eminent financial
authorities upon the Financial Relations Commission of 1895 —
Lord Farrer, Lord Welby, and Mr. Bertram Currie — reported
in a powerful reasoned argument, while disclaiming all political
prepossessions, that this was the only sound method of solving
the question. The Primrose Committee of financial experts,
no longer ago than 1911, unanimously and with equal emphasis
reported to the same effect, recommending the Irish control
of Customs with arrangements for free trade between the two
countries. None of the arguments used by these high
authorities, after exhaustive investigation, have lost their
weight, and some have gained strength.

24. The Act of 1914, which gives Ireland some restricted
powers in regard to Customs, contains in Section 26 a distinct
guarantee that when Irish revenue had met Irish expenditure
for three successive years, the financial arrangements would
be revised for the express purpose of increasing the powers
of the Irish Parliament over taxation, as well as for settling
an Imperial contribution. The condition is now fulfilled. A
large balance of revenue over expenditure has been growing
for three years, and it can no longer be said that an estimated

APPENDICES 181

deficit justifies any curtailment of Irish control over Irish
finance.

25. We fully agree that there should be some regular
machinery for ensuring close co-operation between Great
Britain and Ireland in commercial and postal matters ; and
we, therefore, propose the establishment of a Joint Advisory
Commission with power to make agreements and recom-
mendations on these important matters.

THE IMPERIAL CONTRIBUTION.

26. A most important financial question is the nature and
amount of the contribution to be made by Ireland to Imperial
services. The obligation of Ireland to contribute according
to her means we accept without question. As to the method,
our view is that this is another case where the greatest wisdom
would lie in following the Dominion precedent — that is, in
making the matter one of voluntary negotiation between the
Irish and Imperial Governments, the contribution taking the
form of payment for services of an Imperial nature, as by the
maintenance of forces for local defence or the provision of
ships. Ireland, on her side, would renounce all claim to sub-
sidies or payments of any kind from the British Exchequer.
This would make a clean financial settlement. Great Britain
would not be exacting what many might regard as tribute.
Ireland would wipe out bitter memories of over-taxation and
neglect, and face the future not only as a self-reliant country
but as a more willing because a more free contributor to the
common defence. It must be recognised that if this plan is
not adopted and a statutory contribution is to be enforced
by law, there is no logical course but to re-open intricate
questions of taxable capacity, which will inevitably bring into
prominence the over-taxation of Ireland in the past, and will
be held to jtistify claims for compensation.

27. In view of strong Unionist feeling, however, we do not
press our views upon the point, and are willing to agree to
statutory payment, to be fixed provisionally at the o tset and
afterwards by agreement between the Imperia j and Irish
Governments. We only stipulate that the annual expenses of
Land Purchase, which must be regarded as an Imperial obliga-
tion, though an Irish service, as well as the cost of any defence
forces that may be raised and maintained in the future by the
Irish Government, shall be set off against the sum so fixed.
The same applies, in a large measure, to the Housing scheme.
The balance could best be paid in kind by the provision of
ships or other war material manufactured in Ireland.

182 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

LOCAL FORCES.

28. Any settlement which prohibited Ireland, as a matter
of principle, from providing military forces for her own local
defence in the constitutional manner customary in the
Dominions would, in our opinion, be unacceptable. The con-
fidence shown by entrusting her with such a power would, we
are convinced, be repaid a thousandfold. But here, again,
we have felt it our duty to give way to cautious views, and we
propose that the power should remain in abeyance for five
years, and should then depend on the consent of the Imperial
Conference, upon which Ireland should be duly represented.

29. As regards the question of conscription, we are ready to
take it for granted that no attempt would be made to apply
it to Ireland without the consent of the Irish Parliament.
Any attempt to impose conscription upon a nation without
its sanction is utterly impolitic and unjust, and is bound to
end in disaster.

REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER.

30. We preferred that this representation should cease until
such, time as a Parliament is created in which all parts of the
Empire or the Realm could be properly and equitably repre-
sented. Until that time we believe that every purpose served
by representation could be better served by arrangements for
regular and systematic conference between the Irish and
British Governments in a permanent consultative council.
By sending members to the British Parliament at West-
minster, after we have obtained a Parliament of our own, we
risk incurring the odium of disturbing the balance of English
parties and influencing questions on which we are not con-
cerned, without any security that in matters where Ireland
is properly concerned her voice will carry its due weight, since
in order to avoid too much dislocation it is necessary to reduce
her membership far below the number to which her population
entitles her. But in view of the great importance attached
by Unionists to this representation, we were reluctant to
maintain our opposition, and we accordingly agreed to a
delegation of 42 Irish members being sent to Westminster by
the Irish Parliament. That is the form of representation at
Westminster that will least distract Irish attention from the
necessary concentration at home, and least divide the views
of our members in London from those of the Irish Parliament.

SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES.

31. All the points we have hitherto dealt with are concerned
with the future constitutional relations between Ireland and

APPENDICES 183

Great Britain, and the powers to be exercised by the Irish
Parliament. In regard to safeguards for minorities in Ireland
against any misuse of these powers that they might fear, we
have gone to extreme lengths in our anxiety to reach a settle-
ment.

32. That political parties will long continue on existing
lines seems most unlikely. But we have agreed that an Irish
House of Commons at the outset shall have a Unionist strength
of 40 per cent, and that the Upper House shall consist of
nominated and ex officio members, of peers elected by their
own order, and of other members elected by their own class.
The two Houses would sit and vote together on questions in
dispute between them, including Money Bills.

33. These arrangements are intended to give to commercial
and industrial interests, and to Unionist views generally, a
powerful Voice in the final decision of all legislative questions,
including financial measures.

34. We are aware that in agreeing to these arrangements we
put a severe strain on the Irish democracy, and hazard the
adverse opinion of the outside world. But we take the risk
on condition that full powers of self-government, especially
full economic and financial powers, are entrusted to the
Parliament so constituted. We believe the guarantee offered
against the wrongful and imprudent exercise of these powers
to be needless. But, provided that Irish questions are left to
the decision of the Irish Parliament, we trust our countrymen
of North, South, East and West to act loyally and patriotically
in the interests of Ireland.

35. The nomination of some Members to the Lower House
appears to be the only sure and practicable way of providing
adequate minority representation for the Southern Unionists.
In the case of the Ulster Unionists, who prefer election, we
should be willing to agree to securing larger representation
for them by arranging for smaller electoral quotas or for any
electoral expedient which would effect the desired result. As
regards the Ulster difficulty, we know of no other plan which
would not impair the efficiency of Parliament and keep in
being religious antagonisms which all good Irishmen desire
to see ended.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS.

36. We propose the establishment of fairly constituted
Civil Service Commissions to regulate competitive examinations
and advise on all patronage and appointments,

184 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE WAR.

37. So far from thinking that the war should further delay
the establishment of an Irish Executive and Parliament, we
regard a postponement of these measures as a disaster and
their prompt passage into law an advantage which no ad-
ministrative difficulties should be allowed to thwart. We
recognise, however, that the abnormal conditions brought
about by the war make it difficult to carry out some of the
changes required. We do not think these difficulties ought
to be magnified. The advantage gained by proofs of a
sincere desire to let the Irish people manage their own affairs
will far outweigh disturbance of official routine. But, if it is
clearly laid down that any reserved power will be operative
immediately after the war, a certain amount of postponement
is admissible. What we altogether object to is the postpone-
ment of vital questions until after the war. Now is the time
to decide them in principle. This makes it impossible for us
to agree to any suggestions made by the Government during
our deliberations to leave the future of Customs and Excise
in complete uncertainty.

38. No doubt it might be difficult to transfer the control of
these two services during the war, and we therefore consent
to their temporary maintenance under Imperial authority.
But a Joint Board should be immediately set up to determine
the true revenue of Ireland from these taxes, and to allocate
their proceeds, as so determined, to the Irish Exchequer.

39. We do not like to contemplate even a temporary
reservation of the Police or Post Office. But, to meet the views
of others, we have agreed that the Imperial and Irish Govern-
ments may jointly arrange for the unified control of either
service during the war.

LAND PURCHASE.

40. It is an important part of any scheme for the settlement
of the Irish question that Land Purchase should be completed
on terms equitable alike to landlord and tenant ; that the
administration should be Irish, and that the full cost of Land
Purchase, past and future, should be borne by the Irish
Government, on the understanding that it be reckoned as part
of Ireland's contribution to Imperial services. Happily, no
serious difference of opinion has arisen in the Convention on
the proposals framed by the able Committee which dealt with
Land Purchase, and we recommend that a measure embodying
the scheme outlined in its Report shall be annexed to the
Constitutional Act.

APPENDICES 185

SUMMARY.

41. To sum up, we propose a Constitution conferring powers
on Ireland which are strictly consistent with Imperial unity
and strictly conform to the limits set by the reference to the
Convention.

42. We propose an Irish Parliament with full powers of
legislation in all Irish affairs, subject to the religious safe'
guards contained in Section 3 of the Act of 1914 (the existing
disabilities to be removed in the Constitutional Act), and with
full powers of taxation, but with no power to make laws on
Imperial concerns ; the Crown, foreign relations, peace and
war, the Army and Navy and other allied matters duly
specified.

43. At the same time, we do our utmost to meet the doubts
and objections of Unionists by agreeing to the following
provisions : —

(1) Generous additional representation in the Irish

Parliament.

(2) A guarantee for a reasonable period of Free Trade

between Ireland and Great Britain in articles which
are the produce or manufacture of either country.

(3) A Joint Advisory Commission to secure co-operation

in commercial and postal matters.

(4) Continued representation in the Imperial Parliament

in such a way as to reflect the views of the different
parties in the Irish Parliament. *

(5) A fixed statutory contribution to Imperial expenses.

(6) Independent Civil Service Commissions.

(7) Suspension for a term of years of the power to raise

local defence forces.

(8) Suspension till the end of the war of the powers over

Customs and Excise, with an arrangement to be
made by joint agreement for the control of Police
and Post Office by the two Governments for a like
period.

We also agree to the scheme adopted by the Convention for
the speedy completion of Land Purchase, and express our
concurrence in the Housing scheme.

CONCLUSION.

44. Such a Constitution would, we believe, meet with the
approval of the great majority of the people of Ireland. It
would be accepted by our kindred in the United States and
Colonies. It is generous to the Irish Unionists, and good for
Great Britain as well as for Ireland. Had it been put into

186 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

operation at the beginning of the war, the World's history
might have been very different in these deciding years.
Better late than never.

3f J. M. HARTY, Archbishop of Cashel.

>i« PATRICK O'DONNELL, Bishop of Raphoe.

*fc JOSEPH MACRORY, Bishop of Down and Connor.

L. O'NEILL, Lord Mayor of Dublin.

T. C. BUTTERFIELD, Lord Mayor of Cork.

P. O'H. PETERS, Mayor of Clonmel.

JOSEPH DEVLIN, M.P., West Belfast.

THOMAS LUNDON, M.P., Limerick East.

T. J. HARBISON, M.P., East Tyrone.

W. M. MURPHY.

H. GARAHAN, Chairman, Longford County Council.

JOHN BOLGER, Chairman, Wexford County Council.

JOSEPH K. KETT, Chairman, Clare County Council.

JOHN McHuGH, Chairman, Fermanagh County Council.

THOMAS TOAL, Chairman, Monaghan County Council.

WILLIAM R. GTJBBINS, Chairman, Limerick County Council

THOMAS DUGGAN, Chairman, Tipperary (North Riding)
County Council.

JAMES MCGARRY, Chairman, Mayo County Council.

JAMES DUNLEVY, Chairman, Donegal County Council ^

P. J. O'NEILL, Chairman, County Dublin County Council.

JOHN BYRNE, Chairman, Queen's County County Council.

JOHN FLANAGAN, Chairman, Ballina Urban District
Council.

NOTE BY THE MAJORITY OF THE NATIONALISTS.

1. In order to reach an agreement between Unionists and
Nationalists, we do not at this moment desire to press our
objection to the fiscal proposals contained in the Prime
Minister's letter, as we hold it to be of paramount importance
that an Irish Parliament with an Executive responsible
thereto should be immediately established, and that, con-
currently with the legislation necessary to effect that object,
measures should be passed by the Imperial Parliament to pro-
vide for the entire completion of Land Purchase and the
solution of the Housing Problem.

2. In coming to this decision we are largely moved by the
belief that the Government we are helping to establish will be
an effective instrument in obtaining for Ireland by general
consent whatever further powers her material interests require ;
and that the proposal to pay into the Irish Exchequer the
full proceeds of Irish taxation, direct and indirect, subject
only to an agreed contribution to Imperial expenditure, will
give the Irish Government means for internal development,
and will prevent the ruinous increase of burdens which would
certainly result if Ireland remained liable to the full weight of
Imperial taxation, and jointly responsible forthe Imperial debt.

3. But since the decision upon Ireland's claim to full fiscal
autonomy is only postponed, we, the undersigned, desire to put
on record against the time when that decision has to be made,
our conviction that, according to all precedents in the British
Empire, an Irish Parliament is entitled, and ought to become
the sole taxing authority for Ireland, unless and until, in the
general interest it sees fit to part with some portion of its
financial independence. We hold, however, that in the
common interest of both countries there should be a Free
Trade agreement between Great Britain and Ireland.

4. We desire to add that we protest most strongly against
the suggestion that alternative sittings of the Irish Parliament
might be held in some other place than Dublin, and also
against the proposal that there should be set up anywhere in
Ireland other than in Dublin a complete branch of the Irish
administration. *

* Lord MacDonnell is unable to participate in this paragraph for the
following reasons : this matter was never raised or discussed in the Con-
vention, and without the fullest discussion he abstains from expressing an
opinion on it ; Lord MacDonnell is well aware that the proposal would give
rise to vehement opposition in Leinster, Munster and Connaught, and
probably amongst the Nationalist population of Ulster ; it would certainly
impose many hardships upon the great majority of the Irish people ; and
would unquestionably be productive of extreme administrative incon-
venience. But so strong is Lord MacDonnell's desire to meet all reasonable
wishes of the Unionists of Ulster that he feels unable to negative the proposal
without having before him the Ulster Unionist views upon the point.

188 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

5. We further hold that, by the Act constituting an Irish
Parliament, power should be taken to prevent dumping, and
we believe that this could most conveniently be done by pro-
hibiting the export from Great Britain to Ireland, and vice
versa, of any article which is being sold under the cost of its
production. It should be made a duty of the Joint Exchequer
Board to enquire into alleged cases of dumping, and action
should originate on a report from them.

M. K. BARRY, Chairman, Cork County Council.
WILLIAM BRODERICK, Vice-Chair man, Youghal Urban

District Council.

J. BUTLER, Chairman, Kilkenny County Council.
J. J. CLANCY, M.P., North Dublin.
JAMES J. COEN, Chairman, Westmeath County Council.
DANIEL CONDREN, Chairman, Wicklow County Council.
PATRICK DAMPSEY.

JOHN DOOLY, Chairman, King's County County Council.
W. A. DORAN, Chairman, Louth County Council.
THOMAS FALLON, Chairman, Leitrim County Council.
JOHN FITZGIBBON, M.P., Chairman, Roscommon County

Council.

M. GOVERNEY, Chairman, Carlow Urban District Council.
GRANARD.

STEPHEN GWYNN, M.P., Galway City.
THOMAS HALLIGAN, Chairman, Meath County Council.
WALTER KAVANAGH, Chairman, Carlow County Council.
MARTIN McDoNOGH, Chairman, Galway Urban District

Council.

MACDONNELL.*

JAMES MCDONNELL, Chairman, Galway County Council.
A. R. MACMULLEN, Chairman, Cork Chamber of Commerce.
M. J. MINCH, Chairman, Kildare County Counc.il.
JOHN O'DowD, M.P., Chairman, Sligo County Council.
CHARLES P. O'NEILL, Chairman, Pembroke Urban District

Council.

J. J. O'SuLUVAN, Mayor of Waterford (1917).
T. POWER, Chairman, Waterford 'County Council.
D. REILLY, Chairman, Cavan County Council.
M. SLATTERY, Chairman, Tipperary (South Riding) County

Council.
BERTRAM WINDLE.

NOTE BY THE MAJORITY OF THE LABOUR
REPRESENTATIVES.

1. We desire to make it clear that we have supported the
agreement which has been brought about in the Convention
between Unionists and Nationalists, because we believe that
self-government is in the best interests of the country, and
that a measure giving it effect should be passed promptly
into law.

2. We recognise that an agreement could not have been
brought about without certain temporary concessions made
in regard to the Constitution of the Irish Parliament which we,
as democrats and representatives of Labour, regard with
strong dislike. But we feel so deeply the necessity of setting
up a Parliament in Ireland, in which Labour amongst other
interests, may be able to find a place, that we have been
willing to subordinate our democratic beliefs to what we
conceive to be the highest interests of Ireland.

SENATE.

3. As to the constitution of the Senate we are still totally
opposed to the nominated element believing same should be
elected on a democratic vote if Labour is to be given a chance
to be represented in that body by its own choice. So strongly
do we feel on this point that we are prepared to recommend
our fellow workmen not to accept nomination to the chamber.

4. As a compromise we are prepared to agree with the
nominations as outlined in Head 9, sub-heads (1) to (5).

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

5. We are of opinion that the elected members of the Irish
House of Commons, like the members of the Imperial House of
Commons, and of the principal Legislatures in the British
Dominions, should receive a salary which we suggest should
be at the rate of £400 per annum.

FRANCHISE.

6. We are of opinion that the Representation of the People
Act, 1918, should continue to be the law governing the
franchise in Ireland.

JAMES MCCARRON. ROBERT WAUGH.

HENRY T. WHITLEY. JOHN MURPHY.

CHARLES McKAY.

NOTE BY SOUTHERN UNIONISTS.

We think it necessary to add to the Report of the Proceed-
ings of the Convention a brief statement of our position,
because the Resolution introduced by us on January 2nd,
1918, was, owing to circumstances, not brought to a decision.

1. We desire to record our unaltered conviction that the
Legislative Union provides the best system of government for
Ireland, but havirg entered the Convention on an appeal
from H. M. Government, based on high considerations of
Allied and Imperial interests which it was impossible to dis-
regard, we have endeavoured to assist the Convention in
devising a Constitution which would meet the aspirations for
self-government within the Empire long held by a great
majority of the Irish people.

2. We believe that an Irish Parliament can only be estab-
lished with safety to Imperial interests and security for the
minority in Ireland, by the participation of Irishmen of various
classes and creeds in the government which is rendered possible
by the safeguards agreed with practical unanimity by the
Convention and for which no provision was made under the
Act of 1914.

3. We regard the following points as vital to any satisfactory
settlement, and our action must be subject to these conditions :

(1) That Ireland occupy the same position as other parts
of the United Kingdom in any scheme for the
Federation of the Empire or the United Kingdom.

/2) That all Imperial questions and services, including
the levying of Customs Duties, be left in the hands
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

(3) That Ireland send representatives to Westminster.

(4) That the whole of Ireland participate in any Irish

Parliament.

(5) That the safeguards in the Report agreed to by the

Convention be established.

(6) That an adequate contribution be made by Ireland

to Imperial services.

Our lamented colleague, Sir Henry Blake, expressed by letter
in January last his concurrence with us on the above points

(Signed)

MIDLETON. ANDREW JAMESON.

EDWARD H. ANDREWS. MAYO.

DESART ORANMORE AND BROWNE.

JOHN DUBLIN. J. B. POWELL.

WILLIAM GOTJLDING. GEO. F. STEWART.

I desire to associate myself with the above, with the ex-
ception of paragraph 1.

(Signed) DUNRAVEN.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S LETTER OF 25TH FEBRUARY

1918.

10 DOWNING STREET,
LONDON, S.W.,

25th February, 1918.
DEAR SIR HORACE PLUNKETT,

I had the privilege of discussing, during the last three weeks,
the situation in the Irish Convention with the delegates whom
the Convention appointed to confer with the Government.
You will allow me to thank the Convention for sending over a
delegation so representative of all groups of opinion within the
Convention. The Government have thereby been enabled to
learn the views of different parties, and to appreciate better
than would otherwise have been possible the position that has
now been reached within the Convention. I regret that the
urgency of questions vital to the immediate conduct of the war
has protracted the meetings with various groups longer than
it was hoped would be necessary, but I am confident the
Convention will recognise the exceptional circumstances of the
time and will understand there has been no avoidable delay.

The conclusion to which the Government have come as a
result of their interviews with the representatives of the Con-
vention may be stated as follows : —

The Government are determined that, so far as is in their
power, the labours of the Convention shall not be in vain. On
receiving the report of the Convention, the Government will
give it immediate attention and will proceed with the least
possible delay to submit legislative proposals to Parliament.
They wish, however, to emphasise the urgent importance of
getting a settlement in and through the Convention. The
Convention has been brought together to endeavour to find
a settlement by consent. If the Convention fails to secure
this, the settlement of the question will be much more difficult,
but it will be a task incumbent on the Government. It is,
therefore, of the highest importance both for the present
situation and for future good relations in and with Ireland
that the settlement should come from an Irish assembly, and
from mutaul agreement among all parties. To secure this
there must be concessions on all sides. It has been so in
every Convention, from that of the U.S.A. to that of South
Africa.

There is, however, a further consideration which has an

192 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

important bearing on the possibilities of the present situation.
During the period of the war it is necessary to proceed as far
as possible by agreement. Questions on which there is an
acute difference of opinion in Ireland or in Great Britain must
be held over for determination after the war. At the same
time it is clear to the Government, in view of previous attempts
at settlement, and of the deliberations of the Convention itself,
that the only hope of agreement lies in a solution which, on
the one side, provides for the unity of Ireland under a single
Legislature with adequate safeguards for the interests of
Ulster and the Southern Unionists, and, on the other, preserves
the well-being of the Empire and the fundamental unity of the
United Kingdom.

It is evident that there is on the part of all parties in the
Convention a willingness to provide for and safeguard the
interests of the Empire and of the United Kingdom. A settle-
ment can now be reached which will reserve by common
consent to the Imperial Parliament its suzerainty, and its
control of Army, Navy, and Foreign Policy and other Imperial
services, while providing for Irish representation at West-
minster, and for a proper contribution from Ireland to Imperial
expenditure. All these matters are now capable of being
settled within the Convention on a basis satisfactory both to
the Imperial Government and to Ireland.

There remains, however, the difficult question of Customs
and Excise. The Government are aware of the serious
objections which can be raised against the transfer of these
services to an Irish Legislature. It would be ractically
impossible to make such a disturbance of the fiscal and financial
relations of Great Britain and Ireland in the midst of a great
war. It might also be incompatible with that federal re-
organisation of the United Kingdom in favour of which there
is a growing body of opinion. On the other hand, the Govern-
ment recognise the strong claim that can be made that an Irish
Legislature should have some control over indirect taxation as
the only form of taxation which torches the great majority
of the people, and which in the past has represented the greater
partlof Irish revenue.

The Government feel that this is a matter which cannot be
finally settled at the present time. They therefore suggest for
the consideration of the Convention that, during the period of
the war and for a period of two years thereafter, the control
of Customs and Excise should be reserved to the United
Kingdom Parliament ; that, as soon as possible after the Irish
Parliament has been established, a Joint Exchequer Board
should be set up to secure the determination of the true
revenue of Ireland — a provision which is essential to a system
of responsible Irish Government and to the making of a

APPENDICES 193

national balance sheet, and that, at the end of the war, a
Royal Commission should be established to re-examine impar-
tially and thoroughly the financial relations of Great Britain
and Ireland, to report on the contribution of Ireland to
Imperial expenditure, and to submit proposals as to the best
means of adjusting the economic and fiscal relations of the
two countries.

The Government consider that during the period of the war
the control of all taxation other than Customs and Excise
could be handed over to the Irish Parliament ; that, for the
period of the war and two years thereafter an agreed pro-
portion of the annual Imperial expenditure should be fixed as
the Irish contribution ; and that all Irish revenue from
Customs and Excise as determined by the Joint Exchequer
Board, after deduction of the agreed Irish contribution to
Imperial expenditure, should be paid into the Irish Exchequer.
For administrative reasons, during the period of the war it is
necessary that the Police should remain under Imperial control
and it seems to the Government to be desirable that for the
same period the Postal service should be a reserved service.

Turning to the other essential element of a settlement — the
securing of an agreement to establish a single Legislature for
an united Ireland — the Government believe that the Con-
vention has given much thought to the method of overcoming
objection on the part of Unionists, North and South, to this
proposal. They understand that one scheme provides for
additional representation by means of nomination or election.
They understand further that it has also been suggested that
a safeguard of Ulster interests might be secured by the pro-
vision of an Ulster Committee within the Irish Parliament,
with power to modify, and if necessary to exclude, the applica-
tion to Ulster of certain measures either of legislation or
administration which are not consonant with the interests of
Ulster. This appears to be a workable expedient, whereby
special consideration of Ulster conditions can be secured and
the objections to a single Legislature for Ireland overcome.
The Government would also point to the fact that it has
oeen proposed that the Irish Parliament, should meet in alter-
late sessions in Dublin and Belfast, and that the principal
>mces of an Irish Department of manufacturing industry and
ommerce should be located in Belfast. They believe that the
willingness to discuss these suggestions is clear evidence of the
esire to consider any expedient which may help to remove
tie causes of Irish disunion. The fact that, in order to meet
le qlaims of different parts of the community, the South
frican Convention decided that the Legislature was to be
stablished in Cape Town, the Administrative Departments to
? situated in Pretoria, and the Supreme Court was to sit in

194 THE CONVENTION AND SINN FEIN

Bloemfontein, is a, proof that proposals such as these may
markedly contribute to eventful agreement.

Finally, the Government have noted the very important
Report which has been prepared on the subject of Land
Purchase and on which an unanimous conclusion has been
reached by the Committee of the Convention set up to consider
this subject. If this Report commends itself to the Con-
vention, the Government would be prepared to introduce in
Parliament as part of the plan of settlement (and simulta-
neously with the Bill amending the Government of Ireland
Act, 1914) a measure for the purpose of enabling Parliament to
give effect to the recommendations of the Convention on the
subject of Land Purchase. The Government have also had
submitted to them by the Labour representatives in the
Convention the need of provision for dealing with the urgent
question of housing in Ireland, and on receiving recommenda-
tions from the Convention on the subject they would be pre-
pared to consider the inclusion in the scheme of settlement of a
substantial provision for immediately dealing with this vital
problem.

There thus seems to be within the reach of the Convention
the possibility of obtaining a settlement which will lay the
foundation of a new era in the government both of Ireland and
of Great Britain. It is a settlement which will give to Irishmen
the control of their own affairs, while preserving the funda'J
mental unity of the United Kingdom, and enabling Irishmen
to work for the good of the Empire as well as for the good of
Ireland. With all the earnestness in their power the Govern-
ment appeal to the members of the Convention to agree upon
a scheme which can be carried out at once and which will go
a long way towards realising the hopes of Irishmen all over
the world, without prejudice to the future consideration of
questions on which at present agreement cannot be attained in
Ireland and which are also intimately connected with con-
stitutional problems affecting every part of the United King-
dom, the consideration of which must be postponed till the
end of the present war. This is an opportunity for a settle-
ment by consent that may never recur, and which, if it is
allowed to pass, must inevitably entail consequences for
which no man can wish to make himself responsible.

Yours sincerely,

D. LLOYD GEOKGE.

THE DIVISION ON CUSTOMS AND EXCISE,
MARCH 12, 1918.

FOR (38).

E. H. Andrews.

W. Broderick.

J. J. Coen.

D. Condrer.

Earl of Desart.

J. Dooly.

Captain Doran.

Archbishop of Dublin.

T. Fallen.

J. Fitzgibbon.

Sir W. Goulding.

Earl of Granard.

Captain Gwynn.

T. Halligan.

A. Jameson.

W. Kavanagh.

J. McCarron.

M. McDonogh.

J. McDonnell.

Lord MacDonnell.

C. McKay.

A. R. MacMullen.

Earl of Mayo.

Viscount Midleton.

J. Murphy.

J. O'Dowd.

C. P. O'Neill.

Lord Oranmore and Browne.

Dr. O'Sullivan.

J. B. Powell.

T. Power.

Provost of Trinity College.

Sir S. B. Quin.

D. Reilly.
M. Slattery.
G. F. Stewart.
H. T. Whitley.
Sir B. Windle.

AGAINST (34).

Sir R. N. Anderson.

Archbishop of Armagh.

H. B. Armstrong.

H. T. Barrie.

Lord Mayor of Belfast.

J. Bolger.

Archbishop of Cashel.

Sir G. Clark.

Colonel J. J. Clark.

Lord Mayor of Cork.

Col. Sharman-Crawford.

J. Devlin.

Bishop of Down and Connor.

T. Duggan.

H. Garahan.

William Gubbins.

J. Hanna.

J. K. Kett.

M. E. Knight.

Marquis of Londonderry.

T. Lundon.

J. S. F. McCanee.

Sir C. McCullagh.

J. McGarry.

H. G. MacGeagh.

J. McHugh.

Moderator General Assembly

W. M. Murphy.

P. J. O'Neill.

P. O'H. Peters.

H. M. Pollock.

Bishop of Raphoe.

T. Toal.

Sir W. Whitla.

r

WELLS, W.B.

DA
962

The ^-rish convention
and Sinn Fein.

.W42

DATE

ISSUED TO

WELLS, W.B.

The Irish convention and
Sinn Fein.

DA
962'